

THE LIVING AGE



CONTENTS for October, 1933

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THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May, 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world: so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

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THE GUIDE POST

THE leading article in this month's issue is by Bassett Jones, author of *Debt and Production*, who makes the point that economics cannot yet be classed as a science because it is based on several contradictory ideas of value, no one of which can be subjected to exact measurement. The author is one of America's foremost consulting engineers and an authority on elevator construction, his latest accomplishment having been the installation of the elevators in the Empire State Building. He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and research associate in industrial engineering at Columbia. As a resident of the island of Nantucket, he is an expert sailor, navigator, and fisherman and president of the Nantucket Fisherman's Association.

MANY exciting stories and wild rumors have come out of Germany since last March, but Ernst Henri is the first man to present a complete factual story of the men behind the Hitler movement. In 'The World Over' we summarize briefly his account of how the Nazis burned the Reichstag, and in 'The Man behind Hitler' he tells how Fritz Thyssen as head of the bankrupt German Steel Trust subsidized the Nazis in order to save his own industry from ruin under cover of the present dictatorship. As the greatest German manufacturer of munitions, Herr Thyssen's next aim is war.

THE article translated from the *Neue Weltbühne*, which we have coupled with Ernst Henri's piece, indicates that the Thyssen programme is proceeding at full speed. Here an anonymous journalist quotes several damaging newspaper reports of German armaments that the Nazis have never denied and presents other evidence of his own showing that

German imports of military materials have doubled and tripled since Hitler seized power. Germany is now violating the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty so flagrantly that the French would be legally justified in occupying the Rhineland at any time. But this is not to say that France will repeat the Ruhr adventure of 1923 in the near future. The point is that France now has an excuse to fight and Germany is rapidly acquiring the necessary weapons.

THIS month's contribution by the Editor of *The Living Age* discusses the present condition of organized religion in the chief countries of the world. The collapse of the Greek Orthodox Church in Russia, of Mohammedanism in Turkey, of Catholicism in Spain, and of Protestantism in Germany indicates that, when a nation is seized by revolutionary enthusiasm, religious enthusiasm subsides. And, because organized religion has suffered most severely in precisely those parts of the world where revolutionary upheavals have occurred, the corollary would seem to be that the condition of religion in any country provides a pretty good indicator of the revolutionary temper of that country. If organized religion is rather stronger in France than in England and rather stronger in England than in the United States, may we not conclude that America faces more immediate social changes than England, and England more immediate social changes than France? Not much space is devoted to America because if the case holds water in other countries our readers can make up their own minds about how it applies over here.

VLADIMIR MAIAKOVSKI, one of the most popular poets in the Soviet Union, committed suicide two years ago. He wrote revolutionary songs and slogans

(Continued on page 187)

THE LIVING AGE

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The World Over

FOR the rest of the year currency problems seem likely to take precedence over all others abroad as well as at home. That the NRA experiment will be followed by further devaluation of the American dollar may be taken for granted; what is less clear is the effect of American inflation on other countries. Germany's near future depends chiefly on social and political forces inside the country; France seems likely to remain on the gold standard for the rest of the year; England therefore stands out not only as the most powerful country in the world but also as the one whose currency policy remains problematical. A month ago we suggested that Montagu Norman was on the skids and the reception Roosevelt accorded him confirmed that prophecy. Here is the way the *Week-end Review* of London described that episode:—

When Governor Norman of the Bank of England became worried in August 1931 about the financial effects of political policies, there was a memorable crisis, the Labor Government fell, and soon afterward London gave the signal for a large part of the world to desert the gold standard. When Governor Harrison, of the Federal Reserve, reinforced by Governor Norman of the Bank of England, called on the President of the United States in August 1933 at his Hyde Park retreat, to insist that something must be done about stabilization, they got no more out of Mr. Roosevelt than some polite conversation and the offer of another cup of tea. Here is an astounding reversal of rôle, more conspicuous than if the giants of finance had actually resigned their offices. They remain; but the initiative and the authority have gone from them to the politicians. A new stage in the struggle for readjustment has been reached.

The *Daily Herald* repeats its prophecy of a month ago that Mr. Norman's formal resignation is coming soon:—

It is suggested that Mr. Norman's resignation may be forced as a result of the visit. For some time there has been a bitter controversy between the Bank of England and the Treasury because of Mr. Norman's persistent opposition to the policy of the Treasury in the matter of sterling exchange rate and the future policy of currency and prices control.

Mr. Norman is determined to get Great Britain back to the gold standard at the earliest possible date. On the other hand, the Treasury, several cabinet ministers, including the Chancellor, important London international bankers, directors of joint-stock banks, and prominent Stock Exchange firms have other views.

In spite of this weight of opposition, Mr. Norman has made use of the Exchange Equalization Fund, which was formed to moderate the fluctuations of the pound in relation to foreign currencies, to tie the pound to the chief remaining gold-standard currency—the French franc. Mr. Norman's policy means in effect that we are virtually still on the gold standard at a time when the United States expansion scheme makes it essential that our currency should remain free.

As the organ of the Labor Party, the *Daily Herald* might be suspected of wishful thinking were it not that such unimpeachably Conservative papers as the *Daily Telegraph* report that uncertainty about all currencies has led to an epidemic of gold hoarding:—

Many millions of gold have disappeared during recent months into the vaults of banks and other institutions on behalf of foreign and other clients. So many foreign exchanges are either completely frozen, or at the best controlled, that gold is the only certain medium of settlement of debts. Hoarding by nervous capitalists, however, is also extensive.

Since this is precisely the condition that Montagu Norman is trying to prevent, it would seem that his usefulness is approaching zero, and that a New Deal for England is now in order.

THE recent activities of Lord Trenchard, Metropolitan Police Commissioner of London, reveal the present Tory Government preparing for violent class warfare. In discussing a bill to reform the century-old organization of the London police and in carrying out his official duties, Lord Trenchard has frankly declared his hostility to members of the force who come from working-class homes. He has urged that more police be recruited from those who have had secondary-school training; he has attacked the present system of raising men from the ranks; he has already issued an order retiring all chief inspectors over 47 and all superintendents over 50. If his policies are put into effect, London's police will acquire a new personnel within three years and a thousand men now eligible for promotion will be denied their opportunity. For hand in hand with the shake-up of the officials goes a general reorganization of the rank and file. Lord Trenchard has accused members of the

present force of 'stimulating resistance to government decisions' and he plans to get rid of them. The character of the British police was demonstrated during the general strike of 1926, when strikers and police played football games against each other. Evidently, Lord Trenchard is taking precautions against the repetition of such scandalous scenes.

GENERAL O'DUFFY'S Blue Shirts in Ireland have every attribute of the perfect Fascist—the drill, the uniforms, the petty-bourgeois membership, the big-bourgeois subsidies, and the animus against Communism. But the fact that not more than five per cent of De Valera's Irish Republican Army is Communist suggests that the real enemy is not Communism but De Valera himself, whom the well-to-do subsidizers of Irish Fascism hate, not because he is failing, but because he is succeeding. For De Valera's policies not only command the support of almost the entire country, including several church dignitaries; many of them have actually proved beneficial to the common man. Even the trade war with England has pleased the peasants, who can now for the first time in their lives afford to buy and eat the meat that they themselves raise. The landowners and business men have not, of course, fared so well but De Valera's refusal to take the oath of allegiance to King George and his refusal to pay annuities to absentee English landowners have made him popular. As the *New Statesman and Nation* says:—

It is true that Mr. De Valera's policy of cutting adrift from Great Britain economically as well as politically reduces the general standard of living in Ireland. But that is not the cause of the revolt against him. With the poor it is popular. The revolt is against democracy as well as against Mr. De Valera, just because the majority are willing to support a policy that menaces the power and the possessions of the rich.

FRENCH Socialism has developed a split that may destroy what little remains of the Second (Socialist) International. At an important congress opened by Émile Vandervelde of Belgium, president of the Second International, 2,197 of the 4,014 delegates condemned the tactics of the majority group of French Socialist deputies, headed by Renaudel, who had collaborated with Daladier's Radical Government, voting for the budget and for large military appropriations. Led by Léon Blum and Paul Faure, the simon-pure Socialists accused their colleagues of attempting to block Fascism by adopting it themselves and derided the Renaudel group as 'National Socialists.' But the latter remained quite unmoved by the assault and announced that its members would continue to support Daladier and would carry their case first to the high officials of the Second International and then to the people if Blum attempted to eject them from the party. Renaudel's 'Participationists' want a Social-

ism of 'order and authority.' They accuse Blum of arid internationalism and ignorance of recent events in Italy, Russia, Germany, and the United States. Whatever else the French elections of May 1932 may have proved, they certainly showed that a majority of the country wanted no more of Tardieu, and since nonparticipation on the part of the Socialists would mean a Tardieu-Herriot coalition, the National Socialists not only seem to be moving with the times but with their constituents.

THE same Ernst Henri who describes elsewhere in this issue the part that Fritz Thyssen is playing behind the scenes in Germany has contributed several other equally sensational articles to the weekly press of London. In the *New Statesman and Nation* he declared that a powerful revolutionary movement is gaining ground in Germany under Communist leadership. It takes the form of 'Revolutionary Groups of Five,' which now honeycomb German industry. Each group is united by its hatred of the Hitler régime, but no group has any knowledge of the membership of other groups. Their two chief activities are spreading underground revolutionary publications and boring from within the Nazi trade unions, where they keep demanding the higher wages that Hitler promised. The Government has recognized their existence by attacking 'this pest' in the official newspapers and demanding 'Draconian counter-measures.' But in spite of unrelenting repression the Groups of Five are said to be increasing all the time.

Another topic on which Ernst Henri has thrown new light is the Reichstag fire. He asserts categorically that the blaze was started by Storm Troopers who entered the building by underground passages from Göring's near-by house. The plan was conceived by two well-known terrorist organizations—the group of White Russians responsible for the forged Zinoviev letter, the counterfeit Hungarian bank notes, and various atrocities in Bulgaria and the group of Germans who assassinated Erzberger and Rathenau and organized the *Feme* (political) murders and the Black *Reichswehr*. Last February these groups discovered that the Monarchists were planning a *coup d'état* of their own to restore the Crown Prince with the aid of the *Reichswehr* and the Steel Helmets. Because the Nazis had lost two million votes in the last election before March their leaders bet everything on a last desperate chance and burned the Reichstag. The rest is history.

A FEW statistics tell the story of economic conditions in Germany and indicate that the same decline of business that brought Hitler into power continues. Here, for instance, is the record in millions of rentenmarks of the country's foreign trade since 1931:—

	Imports			Exports			Export Surplus		
	1931	1932	1933	1931	1932	1933	1931	1932	1933
January.....	715	440	368	775	541	391	+ 60	+101	+23
February.....	620	441	347	778	538	374	+158	+ 97	+27
March.....	584	364	362	867	527	426	+283	+163	+64
April.....	679	427	321	818	481	382	+139	+ 54	+61
May.....	600	351	333	783	447	422	+183	+ 96	+89
June.....	607	364	357	747	454	385	+140	+ 90	+29
July.....	562	366	360	827	431	385	+265	+ 65	+25
August.....	454	332	...	803	428	...	+348	+ 96
September.....	448	360	...	835	444	...	+387	+ 84
October.....	483	398	...	879	482	...	+396	+ 84
November.....	485	393	...	749	475	...	+264	+ 82
December.....	491	423	...	738	491	...	+247	+ 68

Then here is the percentage of foreign trade that each of the five chief exporting nations of the world did with the six great markets in 1929 and 1932:—

DESTINATION	GERMANY		ENGLAND		FRANCE		U. S. A.		JAPAN	
	1929	1932	1929	1932	1929	1932	1929	1932	1929	1932
Europe.....	73.7	81.0	38.3	46.1	61.9	53.9	44.7	48.7	6.9	8.9
North and Central America	9.1	6.3	13.8	11.6	9.4	7.5	26.6	22.7	44.1	32.6
South America	6.4	3.3	8.2	5.6	4.6	3.1	10.3	6.0	1.1	0.9
Asia.....	7.7	6.9	18.9	17.8	5.4	5.9	12.3	18.1	42.6	48.1
Africa.....	2.3	1.9	10.2	11.4	18.0	28.9	2.5	2.2	2.8	6.1
Australia ...	0.7	0.5	9.5	7.7	0.7	0.6	3.6	2.3	2.6	3.4

Hellmuth Magers, writing in *Die Tat*, the one intelligent Nazi organ in Germany, interprets these figures as follows from the German point of view:—

This table shows the play of world trade forces in a few significant strokes. In 1932 Germany had suffered not only absolute but proportionate losses in all non-European markets. It had been thrown back entirely upon the European field. English exports also had to fight hard on all world markets; only in Africa did they show increased percentages. But England's share of the European market grew tremendously. France is the only country that sold a smaller proportion of its exports to Europe in 1932 than it did in 1929. It also lost ground in every other market except in its new African empire. The United States made progress in Europe and Asia, and Japan gained everywhere except in America.

Germany's total export surplus for the six months ending June 30, 1933, was only half enough to pay the interest due on foreign loans, and the gold reserves in the Reichsbank dropped from 2,700,000,000 marks in January 1931 to 920,000,000 in January 1933 and to 274,000,000 in June 1933. The German Treasury has

commented as follows: 'The greatest decline in exports is in respect to Russia. Exports to France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, Norway, and British India have also fallen off. Compared with the corresponding month last year, exports to Russia have sunk to less than one-third and exports to France to 25 per cent. Exports to Sweden, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia have also declined considerably.'

Since Russia is Germany's best customer, Germany's foreign trade in that direction is likely to sink still lower as France, Poland, Italy, America, and the Little Entente make treaties to increase theirs.

MORE INFORMATION on German military preparations has just appeared in a book entitled *The German Militia of the Future* published by the firm of E. S. Mittler and Son of Berlin, long known as one of the leading European publishers of serious military material. This volume states that the young men of the country are to receive universal compulsory military training in 'the militia' for a period of at least six months. After passing through this course at an early age, the recruit will then be called upon to perform at least ten days' service a year for thirteen successive years, in addition to occasional shooting practice. Such an army would be better trained than the Swiss, less well trained than the French. The anonymous author calculates that as soon as the system goes into effect Germany will have three hundred thousand men under arms all the time and that after twelve years the armed forces of the country will total 2,500,000. Here is significant information bearing out the alarming implications of our two articles on Germany.

RECENT EVENTS in Cuba have been covered so much more thoroughly in the American press than in the press of any other country that we are merely reproducing some typical foreign comments in our 'As Others See Us' department and pointing out here the economic cause of the uprisings. While Cuba, under the Chadbourne Plan of sugar restriction, was curtailing production of her chief export commodity to less than half the 1927 and 1931 figures, American, Hawaiian, Philippine, and Puerto Rican growers of cane sugar were stepping up production and American production of beet sugar rose 132 per cent. Not only was the American market taking less and less Cuban sugar, consuming less and less sugar of all kinds, and paying lower and lower prices, but Russian production of beet sugar and Indian production of cane sugar were increasing rapidly. The cane growers of Java, like the cane growers of Cuba, had also agreed to reduce production under the Chadbourne Plan, but both Cuba and Java still have vast unsold stores of sugar. Under these circumstances the Cuban revolution can hardly be considered a surprise.

THE FALL of the Azaña Cabinet in Spain, which is occurring just as we go to press, may be followed by the growth of Fascism. Late in August a Fascist uprising was supposed to be held on the feast day of St. James, Spain's patron saint, and many arrests were made. Two hundred members of Azaña's party stayed up all night, expecting trouble, and the police promised to furnish them with arms. The Fascist movement itself, known as the *Sociedad Fascista*, still lacks an extensive following, but it is said to be receiving encouragement from the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who believe that a Fascist *coup d'état* would eliminate the Republic and would promptly be followed by a proletarian revolution. The Catholic press has condemned Spanish Fascism, but Catholics and Fascists have been known to forget their differences in other countries, and Spain seems unlikely to be an exception in this respect. The best opinion seems to be that Spain will never go completely Fascist since the precedent of other countries suggests that the growth of Fascism corresponds exactly with the decline of the lower middle class. White-collar workers being relatively less numerous in Spain than in Germany or even Italy, it therefore seems unlikely that Spain will produce a Hitler or a Mussolini.

JAPAN'S naval preparations throw disturbing light on the country's foreign policy. According to the British-owned *Norb-China Herald* of Shanghai,

Japan is out for naval equality with Great Britain and the United States when the limitations imposed by the London naval treaty expire in 1936. This matter—of Japan's determination (so far) to refuse to be content with a navy inferior in strength to that of the United States or Great Britain—has not, it would seem, received the consideration that such an important matter deserves.

Even at the Washington Naval Conference, Japanese diplomats indicated that their country would not always be satisfied with a naval ratio inferior to that of the United States and England, and the occupation of Manchuria has made a big Japanese navy more important than ever. The *Norb-China Herald's* Tokyo correspondent writes as follows on this topic:—

Japan has consummated her control over Manchuria under the camouflage of the independent state of Manchukuo, has seized the rich province of Jehol and even threatened to set up a new state in North China south of the Great Wall. The reply of the world has been to refuse to recognize Manchukuo, and the world will undoubtedly consistently refuse to recognize any other puppet creations. In other words, all diplomatic verbiage aside, this means that the powers, including the two principal and most powerful naval nations, have taken, or rather have been compelled to take, a position hostile to Japanese arbitrary expansion on the Asiatic continent.

Instead of threatening to build more ships, Japan will suggest that

the English and American navies be reduced to the Japanese level, but, as the *North-China Herald* remarks,

it is preposterous to think that Great Britain with her already scanty fleet can consent to any such thing when it is recollected that her responsibilities are scattered all over the earth; neither can the United States, with her enormous coast line and her duty of protecting Central and South America, ever agree to any such fantastic project.

Tokyo's plan, boiled down, amounts to this: Japan could neither strike at the West, nor be struck at. She would, without any cost, have secured absolute naval security. She would be safe and supreme in the East, able to do what she liked in China. How much more dependent will Great Britain, then, be on the good will of Tokyo: The Japanese plan, if successful, will ensure for Japan absolute safety and the unchallenged hegemony of the entire Far East. It would be quixotic to expect the keen-eyed naval experts of the world's two greatest maritime nations to miss the implications germane in the Japanese project.

The other alternative is a Japanese navy so large that the country could not afford to pay the bill. One is thus left with the suspicion that Japanese naval policy contains a large element of bluff.

THE CONTINENT of Australia is the most ignored of all the factors that are determining the scope of the threatened war for the Pacific. Consider these facts. The Northern Territory, with an area of over half a million square miles—more than the combined areas of Great Britain, France, and Germany—and a population of 4,460, lies within one day's voyage of half the total population of the world. The entire continent, with an area of nearly three million square miles, has but six and a half million inhabitants, half of whom live in fifteen cities. With immigration virtually forbidden, with a birth-rate of eight per thousand—less than half the figure required to maintain a constant population—it can only be a question of time before near-by countries with high birth-rates and low living standards challenge the traditional 'white Australia' policy. Indeed, the Australians themselves have been the first to recognize the danger, and the Commonwealth has recently offered to extend important privileges to chartered companies if they will finance settlement schemes in the north. But the obstacles that have kept white settlers out of the Northern Territory in the past appear insuperable. Of the 524,000 square miles available, 426,000 lie in the tropics, and 140,000 are too arid for cultivation. The rainfall is erratic on half the total area and even the most fertile districts are chiefly suited for pasturage. But these objections chiefly deter white settlers; Japanese, Chinese, Malaysians, and Indians, accustomed to lower living standards and to hotter climates, could surely survive and possibly flourish. And as 70 per cent of the British Empire is composed of colored races, the problem is one of the most delicate that Anglo-Saxon statesmanship has ever faced.

IT GOES without saying that the World Wheat Convention recently ratified by thirty-one states is doomed to failure. True, the four chief exporting nations, Australia, Argentina, Canada, and the United States, have agreed to limit exports next year and reduce production 15 per cent the year after, and the Danubian countries have agreed to limit their exports. But these measures can accomplish nothing. The Bulletin of Agricultural Statistics published last June under the auspices of the League of Nations states 'that in the whole of the world the stocks of wheat that will be carried over to the new season, 1933-34, will be the largest so far recorded.' Not only have the 'Big Four' among exporting countries added 110 million bushels to their unsold stocks this year; France, Germany, and Italy, which imported over 6,000,000 tons of wheat annually ten years ago, have become almost self-sufficient. France, in particular, is so determined to encourage her own farmers and to become independent of exports that the Government has fixed the price of wheat at about 122 gold cents a bushel at a time when the world price is about 50 gold cents. Therefore the vital provision in the Wheat Convention, whereby importing nations agree to modify present tariffs when the world price of wheat has risen to 63.02 gold cents a bushel, will probably never go into effect since the French farmer could not afford to sell wheat at anything like that price. Nor will France be the only obstacle. If the price of wheat should rise even to 63.02 gold cents at a time when gold prices are still falling, would not more farmers grow more wheat and at once glut the market and depress prices all over again? Even so conservative a financial paper as the *London Statist* cannot resist calling attention to the absurdity of the situation:—

A visitor from another planet might well be surprised that a restriction in the output of the most important agricultural product for human consumption should be considered desirable at all, and at a time, too, when there is no lack of hunger among the masses in our industrial communities. Nothing to his mind perhaps would illustrate better the bankruptcy of our statesmanship or the topsy-turvydom of our world economy to-day than the attempt to solve in this way a problem that has been created partly by bounteous harvests in recent years, and partly by man's increasing command over nature; for bumper crops with their legacy of large carry-overs, together with continued improvements in agricultural technique, have been major factors in the collapse of wheat prices.

The issue could not be more clearly stated. Are we to let our improved agricultural methods go by the board in order to maintain prices, or are we to continue improving our farming efficiency and revamp our price system accordingly?

The author of *Debt and Production*, who is also one of America's foremost engineers and inventors, explains why economics is not yet a science and suggests how it might be made into one.

SCIENCE *and* Economics

By BASSETT JONES

FOREWORD

THIS is an exciting article although by some it will be criticised as being purely destructive. As a matter of fact, after Hercules cleaned out the Augean stables, he was not directed to fill them up again. In that sense this article by Bassett Jones, as well as his other writings, are entirely constructive. This article, in fact, is a swell introduction to his recently published book, *Debt and Production*. If you intend to stay alive in this lively era, it is well to follow Bassett Jones's writings, which point to the dead spots in our vital civilization.

—MORRIS L. ERNST

I

THE two matters I wish to discuss are involved in the answers to the following two questions:—

1. In the scientific sense is there

any existing theory as to the nature of our economy—can we properly speak of economic laws?

2. By what procedure can a proper economic theory be constructed; through such a procedure can we establish laws that adequately describe the functional order of our economy?

The immense body of economic literature contains frequent references to theory, and presents statements that are defined as laws. Thus, we find in this literature what the economist calls a 'theory of value,' and constant reference to what the economist defines as 'the law of supply and demand.' Properly speaking, is there a theory of value? Is there a law of supply and demand? In answering these two specific questions I shall attempt to indicate how my first general question must also be answered.

As I understand it, a scientific

theory is a logically related group of propositions as to the relational orders found to endure in a class of facts. I use the expression, 'found to endure,' because the test of the adequacy of such a theory lies in the discoverable correlation between the propositions of the theory and the observed relations between the facts of the class under investigation. Only if this correlation is complete under any and all conditions of observation is it claimed that the postulates, or fundamental and most general propositions of the theory, are the laws of this class of facts. Thus the laws of a science are implicit in the facts themselves, and rise out of the facts as expressing the most general and reasonable description we can devise as to the order enduring between such facts.

The fundamental propositions, or postulates, of such a theory are not merely the result of abstract logical reasoning. They are developed by a painstaking analysis of the raw facts themselves in the effort to discover what common order is evident in the possible multifarious orders that such a general group of facts may exhibit.

II

While I am a little long about this preliminary, obviously we must agree on a definition of science before we can decide whether a group of propositions about any class of facts is a science or something else—perhaps a purely abstract logical course of reasoning having but an occasional and remote relation to any but the facts of reason themselves. Furthermore, it seems to me that the discussions one hears and reads on the

subject of economics show a decided lack of knowledge of the procedures of science, indeed, very little comprehension of what science is about.

H. L. McCracken's recent book, *Value Theory and Business Cycles* (1933), may serve as a base for this discussion. What McCracken presents is not at all a theory of value. He presents a series of definitions of the word 'value' as enunciated by a succession of outstanding students of economics, and gives some account of the imaginary world of economic affairs that students, from Ricardo to Marshall, have constructed in the light of some such definition.

It seems quite obvious that in no sense are any of the historic systems described by McCracken accounts of factual economic events. Such systems are not in the least analytic. They are purely synthetic logical structures resulting from some particular meaning attached to the word 'value.' Indeed, McCracken writes of Ricardo's 'assumed world of economics,' a phrase that applies equally to the 'world' of every writer whose system is reviewed in his book.

McCracken divides his array, or family, of definitions into two groups or genres. Thus, whatever value may mean, if, in general, value is embodied in goods and services as a sort of inherent quality, like a mixed-in color, we have one school of economic thought. If, on the other hand,—and again, whatever value may mean,—if value is commanded, or applied to goods and services, like a coating of paint, or a bill of lading, we have another school of economic thought. Then, in each school arises a diversification—the species of the genus—depending on

what specific meaning is attached to the word—on the color of the paint, so to speak.

In one system value may mean the equivalent in goods of a unit of productive labor. In another system value may mean the quantity of goods that can be exchanged for a unit of money, or of gold. It may mean the quantity of money that can be exchanged for a unit of goods. It may mean utility, marginal or otherwise. It may mean an undetermined relation between supply and demand. Value is also expressed as the ratio of demand to supply, thereby implying a quantitative relation; but we are left entirely in the dark as to how, and in what common unit, the quantities involved are to be measured. In another system value is taken to mean the price people are willing to pay for goods and services. It may mean that portion of the total flow of goods and services which the average individual money income will command. Given the conditions of demand, value may mean the relation to this demand of the quantity of goods and services available—and the quantity available is not necessarily the same thing as the total quantity in supply, for the availability is at a price, and so on and so forth.

III

There are nearly as many definitions of the word 'value' as there are writers on the subject of economics. Furthermore, if you will read carefully, you will find that no writer does, or, perhaps can, consistently adhere to the definition with which he starts—a statement that applies not only to the word 'value.' For

instance, consider Keynes's *Treatise on Money*. On page 123 of Volume 1 Keynes writes: 'We propose to mean identically the same thing by the three expressions: (1) the community's money income; (2) the earnings of the factors of production; and (3) the cost of production.' Since these three are identical, any one of these identical expressions can be substituted for either of the others wherever they occur in the subsequent discussion. To say the least, the resulting statements are somewhat amazing whenever the conclusions can be interpreted to possess logical meanings.

I am forced to conclude that economics as written is largely a jargon—a confusion of words. As a very excellent example read, if you like, 'The New Dollar' by George F. Warren, in *The Forum* for August 1933, and decide for yourself just what 'the new dollar' is. As for myself, I confess my utter inability to make out which is the head and which the tail of the matter, to say nothing of the dollar itself, and wonder whether Professor Warren did not actually intend a rather fine bit of ridicule. He leaves the matter completely up in the air by concluding that 'it is time for us to adopt a stable measure of value' and adding that 'there are many ways of establishing such a measure of value.' Just what shall be measured and how it shall be measured of course depends on what is meant by 'value.' Certainly no writer on economics has yet been able to point out any one stable, enduring factor in our economy to which the name 'value' can be appropriately attached and which gives the word a specific

meaning—least of all do Warren and Pearson point out any such factor in their book on prices.

As I see it, economics as a subject for discussion is much like a geometry in which no two students have been able to agree on the elements or data or on a set of consistent definitions of the elements. Furthermore, no set of postulates relating the elements has been laid down and agreed upon as logically consistent, sufficient, and dependent only on the definitions of the elements—a requirement that is an essential preliminary to any scientific theory. Again, each writer adopts a different set of definitions for what he assumes the elements to be, and treats these definitions as postulates. As P. S. Florence in *The Statistical Method in Economics and Political Science* (1929) correctly says, the economist introduces these definitions as 'laws,' and so 'darkens counsel' not only for himself, but for others.

Thus, in its present state of development, economics is not a science. It is purely conjectural. It is founded, not on the basic orders found to endure in economic facts, but on a creed—a catechism of beliefs. It has about as much relation to the measurable orders that endure in our economy, if any such exist, as the Book of Genesis has to the ordered facts of the geologic history of the earth. The moment a subject under discussion becomes infected with beliefs in the sense outlined above, it ceases to be scientific.

If economics is to become in any sense a science, the economist must first get rid of all preconceived notions. He must completely eliminate from his mind all presuppositions

as to the orders relating the facts of our economy. He must not even have a term, or a definition, in mind. He must expunge from his thinking processes any idea as to the order of our economy that is not thoroughly confirmed by ample measurements. This last requirement will render of mere historic interest virtually all writings on economics up to the present time. They are as obsolete as the writings of the alchemists of the Middle Ages, and have about as much relation to the facts of our economy as the writings of the scholastics have to the facts of our life.

IV

As a specific example of what I mean, let us for a moment consider that little book in the 'Cambridge Economic Handbooks,' *Supply and Demand* by H. D. Henderson (1922). The Introduction by J. M. Keynes starts out by saying that 'the theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method, rather than a doctrine, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions. It is not difficult in the sense in which mathematical and scientific techniques are difficult.'

I draw your attention to the statement that economics draws no settled conclusions, and is not scientific. Apparently it is an easy way of thinking—being 'not difficult.' I also draw your attention to the fact that this easy, unscientific method of thinking considers that its conclusions constitute a 'theory' and calls its assumptions 'laws'—the law of supply and demand, for instance.

Henderson starts with the statement that 'economic theory must be based upon actual fact: indeed, it must be essentially an attempt, like all theory, to describe the actual facts in proper sequence, and in true perspective.' We may ask: What are the actual economic facts the observed basic order among which is described by the law of supply and demand, and what sequence does this order possess? In passing, we may also ask what the word 'proper' means in connection with a sequence of facts. The sequence of a class of facts is the order in which the facts are found to be related. So, with supply and demand, the facts involved would seem to be the quantities of goods and services, or of money in supply and quantities in demand. The time-quantity relation found, through a purely quantitative investigation, to exist between the quantities in supply and in demand might be dignified as a law of supply and demand if that relation is found to endure, or hold at all times past and present, between the quantities of all kinds of goods, services, and money. But I ask you to observe that no such investigation has ever been made. Indeed, it seems probable that no such investigation can be made because there is no known common unit of measure for both supply and demand irrespective of whether the measure is to be applied to goods, services, or money. But until investigation shows that such a relation exists and correctly describes the correlation found to endure at all times between goods, services, and money in supply and those in demand irrespective of quantity and of time, there is no law of supply and demand.

What masquerades under the name of law is merely a convenient presupposition.

Henderson states that a theory, even of economics, 'must begin with those facts that are most general, and have the widest possible significance.' But a scientific theory does not begin that way at all. As has been explained above, such a theory begins with the analysis of a class of facts. It seeks to find the orderly relations between these facts, whatever such relations may turn out to be. Science then seeks for an adequately reasonable description of this relation in terms of the simplest possible and fewest necessary elements. Once this stage has been reached, the materials are at hand for the construction of a working hypothesis as to a general relation, or a consistent, independent, and sufficient set of relations that possibly may be found to endure between all similar facts in the same class. On this basis a tentative theory, or logically related group of theorems as to the probable nature of specific relations between such facts is constructed. If it be found that invariably such theorems do give a precise account of the behavior of, or relations between, such facts, then, and only then, are the underlying general relations among elemental facts given the name of laws, and is the theory resulting from these laws taken to be a correct account of the relations enduring in such a class of facts.

In this light consider Henderson's statement in support of the method employed in developing the laws of economics, namely that 'the perception of the even-elliptical courses of

the heavenly bodies led to the statement of the law of gravitation and the laws of motion.' But let us ask how it was perceived that these courses were even ellipses. Certainly not by mere stargazing. This perception came only after a sufficient number of accurate measurements of the relative positions in space of the heavenly bodies had been painstakingly recorded so that it could be determined by accurate calculation that the paths were even ellipses and not circles, and furthermore that these ellipses had a common focus.

After endless mental labor, and the construction of a number of hypotheses, none of which served to describe the relations of all the planets to their orbits, finally an hypothesis was worked out that required but three elements or data, the relations between which served as the basis for a theory that answered the purpose. These elements were mass, time, and distance. The concept of force results from a relation of all three together. On this concept a theory of celestial dynamics was based, the theorems of which, by careful observation, were found to have a definite correlation with the order of the astronomical facts, and not only with that but with the order of the general facts of motion. Then the three primary relations between mass, time, and distance became the three laws of motion.

Now consider Henderson's statement of the first law of economics: 'When, at the price ruling, demand exceeds supply the price tends to rise. Conversely, when supply exceeds demand the price tends to fall.' In the first place, what does he mean

by 'at the price ruling,' when, according to this law, any alteration in the relation between supply and demand changes the price? Look over the records of price fluctuations and see if you can find a 'ruling price.' You will find what Warren and Pearson, in their book, *Prices*, aptly call 'a century and a half of monetary chaos.' If this amazing record of seemingly haphazard prices is correct, then, by the above law, we should expect to find an equally haphazard relation between supply and demand. But it is known from the records of the production of goods over at least a century that the variations in production, at least, are not of the same character as the variations in prices, and, as S. S. Kuznets has shown in *Secular Movements in Production and Prices*, even the general, long-time periodic swings in production and prices have but a slight correlation—so slight in fact that only one willing to jump at conclusions would be willing to say there is any essential relation between them.

V

Then we have Keynes, in his widely known *Treatise on Money*, writing that price is dependent on the relative volume of savings and cost of new investment and on the public disposition to new securities, whereas Henderson later states that price is dependent on the quantity of money in circulation and on its velocity of circulation—a statement that events have shown to be far from the facts. So far as I know, the literature of economics presents no factual evidence that confirms, even approximately, the so-called quantity

theory of money. If you read enough of these varying and contradictory opinions,—for opinions I think is all they are,—I am certain you will become quite as confused as I am as to what the economist is actually talking about.

Above we have mentioned only production, which is but part of the supply process. Production can be measured from the records of goods produced. But what about demand? If we take this to be measured by the amount of goods sold, then indeed we find no essential correlation between supply and demand, nor any evidence confirming Henderson's statement of the first law. We are told that at the present time vast quantities of goods are in supply, but little is sold. Obviously the amount of goods sold is not a measure of what the economist means by demand. What does he mean, and how shall we measure it in the same units in which we measure supply, so that the relation expressed by this law can be found to endure? As for myself, I know of no work on economics in which any such quantitative correlation is even attempted. Hence I am forced to conclude that the so-called law of supply and demand is a case of that fault anathematized by the scientist—generalizing on insufficient data. Of the remaining three 'laws' presented by Henderson, so little is left by his own discussion that nothing need be said of them here. As a matter of fact, all four 'laws' as given by him are variants of a more general statement not emphasized as a 'law,' namely, that price is the factor which equates supply and demand. Were this more general statement

correct, then it would follow that price is a function of the ratio of demand to supply.

Here I have picked on the law of supply and demand. But I shall not take the time to show that no other so-called 'law' of economics rests on any sounder factual foundation.

Until economics is put on a base of measurable economic facts, as Henderson states it must be, and their order, 'proper' or improper, discovered by careful analysis of the statistical evidence, it will remain a pure doctrine of beliefs conceived in the closets of the mind—a 'dream world,' McCracken calls it. Curiously enough, Henderson heads each of his chapters with a quotation from Lewis Carroll. The sort of stuff that dreams are made of—such is economic 'theory' as it is written, and what is worse, believed.

VI

The point of all this is that the vast body of economic literature is not science at all. It starts out with certain preconceptions, and assumes that the world of our economy functions in accordance with them. It then seeks for general evidence that there is at least an approximate agreement between fact and fancy, or at least sufficient grounds for an interpretation of the evidence selected in accordance with the primary assumptions. Furthermore, it is intensely anthropomorphic in its interpretations. The economist has even gone to the extent of characterizing as unreasonable statistical evidence that production does not behave in accordance with his concept as to what its time order should be. Thus

we find Carl Snyder, in his *Business Cycles and Business Measurements*, denoting as 'absurd' the fact that in many cases an analysis of the trend of production indicates an approach to a maximum from which production recedes. For Snyder, as chief statistician of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is thinking of the credit structure, which, I am quite certain he dimly perceives, can be supported only by a continuously increasing production. He writes: 'The continuation of such constant growth is our concept of normality in business.' Since his studies of production indicate to him that production does not increase in this manner, he jumps at a conclusion that something is wrong. It seems to me that something is wrong—very wrong indeed. But Snyder concludes that such a condition just cannot be, and, therefore, is 'absurd.'

This brings us to another point—the economic statistician himself, who, misled by the so-called 'laws' of economics, is constantly searching for evidence to confirm the order of his figures and is turning statistics this way and that, inside and out, upside and down, always hoping to find some arrangement that will bear out the preconceptions with which he started his analysis. Never is he satisfied to seek for the implicit order of his statistics, for what the statistics themselves contain and imply and then, through careful correlation of such orders, found to endure in the measurements or observations themselves, to look for the relations common to all such orders irrespective of kind. Such common relations possibly might serve as the base for the development of a proper theory. Indeed,

underlying relations found by careful observations, and by a rigorous analysis of the orders implicit in the observations, alone can serve as the sound base for a theory. They become the postulates on which a scientific theory may be constructed.

If the resulting theorems exhibit a perfectly definite correlation with continued observations, then, and only then, have we reason to suggest that these underlying relations of order found to endure among all economic facts are probably laws. In other words, our theory is an hypothesis, and remains such until many observers of skill, and undoubted analytic ability, have repeatedly confirmed the results. Thus only through a prolonged and mentally difficult—even painful—process of conception, every step in which is amply confirmed by an analysis of factual orders, is a scientific 'law' born into this world.

VII

With this brief account of the scientific approach fresh in our minds, let us for a moment consider the kind of diagram often found in text-books on economics to illustrate the relation between supply, demand, and price, a relation that Henderson, like many others, has dignified as the 'buttress,' 'the corner stone of economic theory'—the 'undisputed law of supply and demand.'

We are shown two smooth, intersecting curves, convex toward the origin, or zero point. One of these curves, the one that reaches a maximum when zero on the horizontal axis or coördinate is reached, and that tends toward a minimum in the

other direction, is designated as the curve of demand. The other curve, tending toward a minimum as zero is approached and toward a maximum in the other direction, is designated as the curve of supply. Vertical measures are prices, and horizontal measures are quantities of goods, services, or money. Henderson says of this diagram that it enables us to deduce the laws of economics 'with the form and precision of a proposition in Euclid.'

Now Henderson's book says that where these two curves intersect we find the quantity at a price that represents stable conditions, that is, the price at which demand equals supply, or vice versa. Again, given any condition of demand,—that is, any particular location of the demand curve,—then any change in price will give rise to a change in the position of the supply curve in the diagram. This change will continue until the supply curve intersects the demand curve at a point corresponding to the new price. At this point a new condition of stability will be reached, for, again, supply equals demand.

The question that will be raised by the analyst is: What recorded, measured observations of demand, supply, and price, which, since they can be exhibited in a common geometric diagram, must be of the same dimensions and necessarily related by a common unit of measure, show that these three factors can be so represented? Furthermore, what statistical records show that demand and supply, both measured in the same unit at different times, in different places, and in all forms of goods and services, do actually have

the mutual relation expressed by the diagram? To these questions no satisfactory answer is provided by the entire literature of economics.

In calling upon the great Euclid for confirmation, Henderson forgets that Euclid started with those necessary, sufficient, and consistent elements, the point, the straight line, and the plane, which to him adequately represented the simplest rational base for all the measurements that men had been making in erecting buildings, constructing roads, and establishing land holdings—even for the crude, though surprisingly fertile, measurements by the astronomers of those days. Euclid's theorems are logical propositions about the relations of these elements, which, in applied geometry or the science of space measures, are subject to the test of accuracy. If Euclid's space and all its implications do not correlate exactly with the physical space of our experience; if the uttermost precision of measurement, so made as to avoid any tincture of the personal equation of the observer, does not show such a correlation to endure at all places, then the observer does not reject his observations as 'absurd.' He announces that the space of Euclid does not furnish a complete description of physical space. If such a statement is confirmed by a thorough check made by other adequate observers it follows that the Euclidian postulates are not the laws of physical space. Some other geometry must be devised, based on different postulates,—even on different elements,—that meets this objection to the complete validity of Euclidian space as a description of physical space. I draw your attention to the fact that this is exactly what has happened during the

past thirty years. The parallel postulate given by Euclid as presenting one of the simplest, most fundamental relations between his three elements no longer dominates the general theory of space. Even the elemental point is under question.

The scientist has no delusions as to the eternal or necessary validity of his descriptions of the orders found to endure in nature, or as to the limitations involved in his tools. His only interest is in answering the question, 'How does nature perform?' His laws and his tools are merely convenient means to that end, good so long as they work; fit only for the junk heap of discarded ideas if they show the least flaw that cannot be eliminated in his mental workshop.

Above I mentioned the necessity for the elimination of the personal equation from the results of observation, and from the logical analysis of such results. Yet Florence, in his *The Statistical Method in Economics and Political Science*, tells us that economics is concerned with 'the kind, power, sanction, and stimulus impelling human actions,' and nowhere in the literature of the subject can I find an appeal to anything but ordinary unanalyzed experience and perceptions in the crude as testimony for any so-called law of economics. Political science does not even go so far as that.

Why, then, do such philosophical discourses assume the name of science? Is it because, as Veblen says, 'within the field of learning proper, there is a predilection for an air of scientific acumen and precision, where science does not belong. So that even that large range of knowledge that has to do with general information rather than theory tends strongly to take on

the name and form of theoretical statement'?

Yet on this base of dogma, preconceptions, and beliefs we are asked to reorganize our economy. It would be quite as reasonable to suggest that the Ptolemaic cosmogony furnishes an answer to the problems of modern astronomy.

VIII

At the close of a talk that I gave on the subject investigated in *Debt and Production*, a professor of economics arose to protest that I had eliminated all questions of human relationships. 'Why,' he exclaimed, 'economics is founded on human relationships!' 'Human relations to what?' I asked; and again explained that it seemed to me quite necessary to know something of the mode of performance of the mechanism for the production, distribution, consumption, and use of physical goods before it was possible to say what kind of relations human beings could have with it. Otherwise they might get themselves into trouble—as apparently they have.

So, too, with money. Until we know how money works in connection with the production mechanism—just what functions it fills, and how it fills them—it is not possible to hazard a guess as to how human beings can use it to advantage. Lacking such knowledge, we may cause a financial runaway that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to curb. That little or nothing is known of the mechanism of production, and of the function of money, is quite evident from the records. No two writers on either subject agree, and no existing explanation of either will bear the light of even the most cursory analysis. In both cases the

approach has been from some presupposition as to the order of operation conceived in the light of what human beings wish or hope to do with the mechanism. Never does the attempted solution result from an analysis of the performance of the mechanism itself with a view to discovering the inherent limitations in the order of its performance. Such limitations can be determined only when the operating characteristics of the mechanism are known and found to endure throughout the history of its operation.

Again, consider the published discussions of employment, and its concomitant, wages. Just what actual relation the number of people employed in operating the system has with the order of operation, and what actual relations wages, purchasing power, prices, and production have with each other are never made clear, which, I take it, is a rather good indication that no one knows.

All we hear are statements that if this or that be done, then possibly this or that may happen. The probabilities are never mentioned. So we clear the decks for another 'noble experiment,' and without compass or chart take a chance that this course is better than that.

IX

In a world that calls itself scientifically minded could any approach to the manifest problems of our economy be more stupid? Does there not seem to be a parallel with a ship lost among dangerous shoals in a fog? The captain and the pilot both appear to be without any clear idea as to where the ship is, at least they cannot agree as to position, and nothing they say about it

appears to have any relation to the fact that the depths called by the leadsman in the chains bear no correspondence whatever to the soundings marked on the chart. So the captain, who speaks Greek, calls down the speaking tube to the engineer, who speaks Chinese, to reverse the engines. But the engineer who built the machine cannot explain to the captain that the engine as controlled has no reverse gear. It was not designed to run backward because the officers believed it would always be possible to hold the course indefinitely. Not to be able to hold the course would be manifestly absurd—at least, so the navigating officer tells us.

So, for a century this ship of ours has been run at ever increasing speed by dead reckoning. As a sailor knows well, the faster the ship, the further off the course the vessel will get in any given time if there is an initial error in position. Dead reckoning is good enough for fishing boats, tugs, and other slow-moving things afloat, but express steamers must always know their position within half a mile by the aid of a number of measuring devices the records of which must check within a very small margin. Just as the available speed of elevators limits the number of floors in our great skyscrapers, so does the available accuracy of navigating instruments limit the speed of vessels—short of taking a chance.

I draw this rather long analogy because it seems to me that the foregoing situation closely parallels the economic situation. Above I have given some idea of the character of the available books on economic navigation. They seem to be about on a par with those strange treatises, by

the aid of which, or in spite of their belief in which, Prince Henry's captains managed to find their way over the waters. But their ships were very slow. Moreover, the men who sailed them believed in the mythical land of Australis. So every island they sighted south of the Equator was added to the map as a headland, or as a bit of the coast. Not even when James Cook spent the better part of three years sailing over the reputed terra firma of Australis did geographers see any reason for expunging it from their maps. Well, so too, our economists still believe that the mythical continent of human relations exists, and that the operation of the economic machine we have built depends on 'the kind, power, sanction, and stimulus impelling human actions.' They seem to believe that the high-powered ship on the safe and sound operation of which our welfare depends can still be navigated without chronometers checked by wireless, without depth-finding machines, submarine gongs, automatic course tracers and thermometers continuously recording water and air temperatures, and without a thorough knowledge of astronomy, hydrography, and meteorology continuously checked by a continued shore analysis of the recorded facts—in other words, they believe that this vast and complicated organism even now can be operated by the old rule of 'by guess and by gorry.'

X

So in trying to find our present position we still adhere to the kitchen-clock and rule-of-thumb method, apparently never realizing that both the scientist and the engineer have

long since found that the stop-watch, slide-rule method gives results that events prove are hardly accurate enough to demonstrate the sufficient precision of his rules for action, which he tentatively calls 'the laws of nature.'

I note a statement by Warren and Pearson that 'the scientific principles that govern prices must be discovered and applied.' But scientific principles do not 'govern' anything. If in the above I have managed to make clear the *modus operandi* of science, this will be obvious. Scientific principles merely provide a metrical description of the relations found to endure in some particular class of facts. Such principles merely provide the best available rules by which we should govern our actions in dealing with the facts. Our relations to these facts are what such rules of action tell us they must be if we do not wish to find ourselves in a hospital bed. Only in this way do human relations enter into a 'proper' mode of action. It is the human relations that must be controlled, not the facts. The facts are immutable. I think the word 'proper' is here used in a 'proper' sense, for now it has to do with human actions, not physical phenomena.

So, we may reverse Warren and Pearson's statement by saying that the order of the behavior of money and of that phenomenon of money called price, which seems to have an analogy with physical temperature, must, if discoverable, be applied to human actions in the use of money. Sanctions for and stimuli of human actions arising from any other source whatsoever not metrically related to the physical phenomena classed as money have nothing to do

with the matter. Furthermore, since money has no meaning except to the collector unless it is metrically, or measurably, connected with the flow of goods and services, no study of money by itself has any meaning, save possibly as an interesting logical speculation. A 'pure theory of money' such as J. M. Keynes mentions in the first volume of his treatise may or may not have any discoverable relation to the real facts of our economy, precisely as a pure logic of space—say Reimann's elliptic space—may or may not have any discoverable metrical relation to the space in which we live and have our being.

So, in conclusion, let me say that I am quite certain that until economics is put on the secure base of the metrical sciences we are likely to remain in the dark and to continue stumbling over our own feet.

In another place (*Debt and Production*, 1933) I have attempted a preliminary, and very tentative, investigation of the measurable orders found to endure in our economy, which, if proved to be correct, may serve as the base for a first approximation to the laws of its operation—in other words,

I there give some account of a formulation of the operating characteristics of our economy—those of production, man-hours, and money—and of the discoverable correlations existing between them. On such a base only does it seem to me that we can decide what sort of relations human beings can have to the system, and so determine what control of these relations should be enforced. If, on the other hand, the human relations are taken to be the more important, then we have a base for the design of a new system to which human beings can have that sort of relation—provided, of course, that the more or less rigid limitations imposed on design by the physical characteristics of the available materials of which the system can be built permit that kind of human relation to it. There seems to be little to be gained in discussing anything else. In other words, I suggest that, if the tide of events permit, we follow the sage advice of Bowditch. If out of position in a fog, anchor the ship and stay anchored until you know where you are. Sometimes I think I can hear from the engine room the roar of the chains in the hawse pipes.

Two articles, as sensational as they are authentic, show that Fritz Thyssen is the real power behind Hitler and that the Third Reich is faithfully obeying his orders and preparing for war.

Germany Moves *toward* WAR

AN INTERNATIONAL
EXPOSÉ

I. THE MAN BEHIND HITLER

By ERNST HENRI

London Independent Weekly of the Right

IN CERTAIN circles in this country it has become usual to regard what has happened in Germany simply as a 'rebellion of the middle classes.' This is too easy a way to look at it. The middle classes have emblazoned Hitler on their shield, and supplied him with armed forces; but they were not the driving forces, they were driven. All these sons of butchers and publicans, of post-office officials and insurance agents, of doctors and lawyers certainly imagined they were fighting for the interests of their fathers as well as for their own ideals when, on February 28, they swarmed out of the Storm Troops barracks and struck down defenseless workers, Jews, Socialists, and Communists. But neither

a revolution nor a counter-revolution is ever made by the petty bourgeoisie alone. And the petty bourgeoisie would not have been able to do it in Germany either had it not been mobilized from some other source. Hitler, the idol of this mass, and himself only a petty bourgeois—a petty bourgeois posing as a Napoleon—in reality followed the dictates of a higher power.

The steps that led to Hitler's seizure of power in the spring, and to the consolidation of his position in face of every resistance in the months that followed, have been all too little disclosed. In Germany itself no one dare mention it. The secret must be sought in the hidden history of Germany's industrial oligarchy, in the post-

war politics of coal and steel. Not in the small shops of the German petty bourgeois but in the plots and plans of this industrial oligarchy are to be found the roots of the formation, the rise, and the victory of German National Socialism. Not Hitler, but Thyssen, the great magnate of the Ruhr, is the prime mover of German Fascism.

About six months before the last political upheaval in Germany it became clear that the existence of the greatest private undertaking in the country, the powerful German Steel Trust (Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.-G.), was in mortal danger. Everyone who has any knowledge of Germany to-day will realize what this fact means. Some time previously the bankruptcy of a smaller undertaking, the Nordwolle woolen concern in Bremen, involving liabilities to the extent of several hundred million marks, had shaken the whole German economy, and had caused the collapse of the leading bank, the Danat Bank of Jakob Goldschmidt. But the new crisis threatened the foundations of the whole economic structure, seeing that it concerned an undertaking which at its most flourishing period employed more than 120,000 workers and clerks, and was capable of throwing nearly 10,000,000 tons of steel on to the markets (almost twice the total steel output of Great Britain to-day). The collapse of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.-G. would have meant a national catastrophe. Not only would it have meant the disorganization of Germany's entire coal and iron production, as well as of the electro-technical industries (the great electrical firm of Siemens is a part of the Steel Trust); not only the dissolution of the mighty

German coal and steel syndicates in the foreign markets, and an invasion of French, English, and American products; not only the final break-up of the German banking system, which had lent to no other undertaking so much money and so unfavorably (for the banks themselves) as to the dominant steel trust; not only would it have meant all these things, but it would also have simultaneously dealt a deadly blow at the whole capitalist and social system in Germany, the basis of which was the Steel Trust; a deadly blow at the whole system of monopolies, which has dominated Germany in recent years; and a deadly blow at private property generally, whose inability to direct the economy of the nation would in this way be demonstrated before the eyes of the whole indignant and desperate people. That had to be prevented, if Thyssen, Friedrich Flick, Otto Wolff, and the other giants of the Ruhr were to preserve their property, and if Germany were not to be converted into a country of Socialism.

The state, therefore—at that time still the Brüning government—stepped in and 'bought' from Thyssen, Flick, and so on, for a fantastic price (something like twice their Stock Exchange value) nearly half the shares, nominally 125,000,000 marks, of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.-G., the holding company that owns a majority of the shares of the German Steel Trust. By this enormous disguised subsidy the Steel Trust was 'saved.' It was clear that the state would very soon sell the shares of the Steel Trust back to private control, and sell them very cheaply. But only now did the real struggle inside the combine begin.

Who should hold the shares and the leadership in the new Steel Trust, and with it the command of the monopoly, the most important economic and political weapon in Germany? This question was a political one. The group that would have the biggest influence over the Government must win the leadership of the Steel Trust. It was at this point that Thyssen stepped in with his National Socialist battering-ram.

II

On the Ruhr two rival groups confronted each other: the Otto Wolff-Deutsche Bank group, which was strongly connected with the Catholic circles in Germany and so was preferred by the Brüning government; and the Thyssen-Flick-Vöglér group, which was menaced in the first place. Both groups had been interested in the Steel Trust since its foundation, and for years had been competing in every possible way for its leadership. Each of these two groups in Germany represents different financial interests (the Morgan and Rockefeller groups in U. S. A.), has different political connections and alliances, and, above all, holds different views about the direction of German and European politics. The Otto Wolff group tends to be liberal, because its leading members are drawn from comparatively young Catholic and Jewish commercial and banking circles, regarded as 'strangers' and intruders by the Prussian coal and iron barons of the Ruhr. Otto Wolff himself is a leading Catholic who was only a small iron merchant before the War, and who later on, thanks to his connections with the Centre Party then in power, came rapidly to the fore and acquired

strong interests in the steel industry. His partner, Ottmar Strauss, is one of the best known liberal Jewish politicians in Germany, who was very near the Social Democrats. This group is closely connected with the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, which, in turn, by its connections with important Catholic circles in the Rhineland, Bavaria, and Silesia, and by financing the Catholic press, had a strong influence over the Centre Party, and thereby, in recent years, over the Brüning government as well.

It was clear that if the Brüning or Schleicher governments should remain (General Schleicher, too, was himself closely connected with Otto Wolff), the shares of the Steel Trust and the leadership of German industry would pass into the hands of this liberal Catholic group, which in internal politics supported a leveling, moderate course, and in foreign politics favored a friendly understanding with France. Linked up with this was an idea prepared long ago by this group for a Continental Steel Trust by means of a fusion of German and French interests, even at the price of recognizing the political supremacy of France. The most important fact was that Wolff and Silverberg had, during late years, taken a number of practical steps for the realization of this plan—for example, had created a close relationship with the great French steel concern, *Acieries de la Marine et d'Homécourt*, that influential Lorraine group which in post-war times in France had vigorously advocated an alliance between the German and French mountain industries (metal and coke), and which possessed a strong political supporter in the person of the French ambassador in Ber-

lin, François-Poncet, its former director. Their preparations had gone so far that news began to appear in the international press canvassing the possibility of a direct French participation in the German Steel Trust by the acquisition of shares.

This was the most ominous news for the rival group led by Thyssen, which always has been, and still is, the stronghold of extreme and aggressive German nationalism. The forefather of this group is no other than Stinnes, the old king of the Ruhr, who was the most prominent war instigator in Germany from 1914-1918, and who, after the War, by deliberately organizing inflation, sequestered a great part of German national wealth for a heap of worthless paper, and then ruled Germany for a time as his private duchy. Stinnes was perhaps the first National Socialist in Germany. In 1920, at the Spa Conference, he terrified his colleagues in the German delegation by his declaration that 'foreign races would never understand the German soul,' and he never ceased to dream of a dominant 'great German realm,' which would include Austria, Belgium, and Lorraine, and in whose centre would stand the triumphant Steel Trust on the Ruhr. Not only are Thyssen and his friends, Flick and Vögler, the political heirs of Stinnes, representatives of the same reactionary and extremely imperialistic industrial elements, for whom not even the Wilhelm monarchy itself was reactionary and militaristic enough—but the very possessions of this group are based on the old Stinnes possessions, which were distributed among them after Stinnes's death (Flick and Vögler were his personal adjutants during his lifetime).

For years now this group had been fighting to force the other group out of the Steel Trust. Thyssen, the chairman of the Steel Trust, and Vögler, his general manager, first endeavored to buy up Otto Wolff's shares two years ago, but they suffered losses of dozens of millions in the attempt. They also attacked the Deutsche Bank, but equally unsuccessfully (in the banking crisis of 1931, the Deutsche Bank 'choked' the Danat Bank, which had been closely attached to this group). The first important obstacle was Brüning's liberal Catholic government, which for political reasons favored the other half of the trust. And when, finally, there appeared the possibility that the Steel Trust shares bought by the state would change hands and that French interests would be involved, the Thyssen group felt its very existence endangered. Thyssen also stands for a German-French steel alliance, and he, too, had prepared his plans. But he demanded as the price of alliance a definite hegemony for the German partners, and all the time, in spite of these plans, he never abandoned the idea of a later military attack by Germany on France. Before the War Thyssen owned metal mines in French Lorraine, and the German demand for annexing Lorraine during the War was mainly a result of representations by Stinnes and Thyssen to the Kaiser. Subsequently, in 1923, at the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr, Thyssen, as the only one of the big captains in the Ruhr, was arrested and spent several months in a French prison as a result of his aggressive attitude toward French demands. Ever since, his nationalism has been growing still stronger. At the begin-

ning of 1933 the situation was such that Thyssen had at all costs to take action. He had to overthrow Brüning and Schleicher and to erect his own government. So he prepared the way for Hitler.

III

How the Thyssen group organized the arrival of Hitler is a chapter of its own, one of the darkest and dirtiest intrigues in German history. The so-called National Socialist Revolution had nothing to do with it, for that revolution came only when Hitler already possessed all the powers in the state and had nothing left to do but to excite the armed S.A. troops against defenseless citizens. Before this, the Thyssen group had, in an entirely 'legal' fashion, delivered up the state apparatus to him. Thyssen has been a member, the chief financier, and the real inspirer of the Hitler party since 1927, the year in which he and Vögler were received in Rome by Mussolini, and shortly before the time when the sudden growth of National Socialism in Germany began. He became the closest personal friend of its leader; Hitler never took an important step without first consulting Thyssen and his friends. Thyssen systematically financed all the election funds of the National Socialist Party. It was he who, by a majority decision and against the most pointed opposition on the part of Otto Wolff and Klöckner, persuaded the two political centres of German Ruhr capital, the Bergbauverein Essen and the Nord-westgruppe der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, to agree that every coal and steel concern had, by way of a particular obligatory tax, to deliver a certain sum into the election cash of the

National Socialists. In order to raise this money, the price of coal was raised in Germany.

For the presidential elections of 1932 alone Thyssen provided the Nazis within a few days with more than 3,000,000 marks. Without this help the fantastic measures resorted to by Hitler in the years 1930-1933 would never have been possible. Without Thyssen's money Hitler would never have achieved such a success, and the party would probably have broken up at the time of the Papen elections at the end of 1932, when it lost 2,000,000 votes and the Strasser group announced its secession. In January 1933 Schleicher was on the point of hitting the Hitler movement on the head and putting it under his own command. But, just as before Thyssen had raised Hitler by his financial machinery, so now he rescued him by his political machinery.

To bring off this *coup* Thyssen employed two of his political friends and agents: Hugenberg (who is one of the directors of the Thyssen Steel Trust group) and Von Papen. In the middle of January a secret meeting between Hitler and Papen was held at Cologne in the house of Baron von Schröder, partner of the banking house of J. H. Stein, which is closely related with Flick and Thyssen. Although, thanks to an indiscretion, the news of this meeting got into the papers a few days later, the conspiracy against Schleicher was ready. The allied group, Thyssen-Hitler-Von Papen-Hugenberg, which was backed by the entire German reactionary force, succeeded in drawing to its side the son of President von Hindenburg, Major Oskar von Hindenburg, who had so far stood by his old regimental

friend, Schleicher. In this way the sudden fall of Schleicher and the sensational nomination of Hitler came about. Thyssen had won, and Hitler set the scene for his St. Bartholomew's day.

What followed was a continual triumph of the capitalistic interests of the Thyssen group. The National Socialist Government of Germany today carries out Thyssen's policy on all matters, as though the entire nation were but a part of the Steel Trust. Every step taken by the new Government corresponds exactly to the private interests of this clique; Stinnes's days have returned.

Thyssen had six main objectives: (1) to secure the Steel Trust for his own group; (2) to save the great coal and steel syndicates, the basis of the entire capitalist system of monopolies in Germany; (3) to eliminate the Catholic and Jewish rival groups and to capture the whole industrial machine for the extreme reactionary wing of heavy industry; (4) to crush the workers and abolish the trade unions, so as to strengthen German competition in the world's markets by means of further wage reductions, etc.; (5) to increase the chances of inflation, in order to devalue the debts of heavy industry (a repetition of the astute transaction invented by Stinnes in 1923); and finally (6) to initiate a pronouncedly imperialist tendency in foreign politics in order to satisfy the powerful drive for expansion in Ruhr capital. All these items of his programme without exception have been, are, or will now be executed by the Hitler Government.

The most urgent problem for Thyssen, the handing over of the Steel Trust to his group, is being solved by

a trick that can well be called a deliberate deception practised upon the taxpayer. While previously the state has controlled half the capital of the holding company (Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.-G.), possessing as it did shares to the value of 125,000,000 marks, this company is now to be fused with a number of others, mostly valueless, belonging to the Thyssen group; in the new amalgamation, with a capital of approximately 660,000,000 marks, the state will control less than 20 per cent of the shares. So Thyssen becomes once again the coal and steel king, and therewith dictator of the whole industry. At the same time the Government, this supposedly Socialist Administration of defenders of the little man, proclaims that the great monopoly syndicates, such as coal and iron, must not be touched (the small, trivial cartels in the consuming industries are being 'examined' to decide if there is justification for their continuance). Thus the Thyssen group is once again in a position to reap extra profit from these two basic raw materials, and consequently to draw tribute from the whole nation.

And in order that in achieving this object it should not meet with any competition, the new 'race politic' and *Gleichschaltung* of the Hitler régime has been put into operation. Mass persecution and boycott of the Jews and Catholics in present-day Germany is to a large extent nothing else than a large-scale expropriation of Jewish and Catholic capital by the Fascist oligarchy of the Thyssen circle. Throughout the country the Jews and Catholics are being drummed out of their positions as directors of large and small companies; but in their places are entering old reactionaries from

heavy industry and new National Socialist agents. The managing director of the Catholic-Jewish Deutsche Bank, Oscar Wassermann, the most dangerous and most powerful rival of the Thyssen group in the fight for the Steel Trust, has retired on 'grounds of health.' Klöckner, the Catholic outsider of the Steel Trust, 'resigned' his seat in the Reichstag. Against Otto Wolff a charge of corruption has been launched, a step taken in order to force his 'voluntary' capitulation and association as a 'junior partner,' a step that has already succeeded. Thyssen, however, is appointed leader of the new amalgamated Union of West German Industry created by the Nazis; and his friend, Insurance Director Dr. Schmitt, becomes Reich Minister of Economics. Göring calls Thyssen to the post of chief representative of private capital in the new Prussian State Council.

But this is not all. At the end of July the Government appointed Thyssen as 'Supreme State Authority' for the whole of West Germany—the centre of German industry. The powers conferred upon him are practically dictatorial. All Nazi authorities in these provinces are subordinated to him, 'have to apply to him in all questions of economic policy, and regard his decisions as final' (from a letter written to Thyssen by the lead-

ers of the Essen, Düsseldorf, North and South Westphalian districts of the National Socialist Party). The life's aim of this man is hereby reached. He is now political king of the Ruhr: the S.A. is merely the pretorian guard for his trust. Thyssen has gone one better than Stinnes. And, as the sublime *dénouement* of this tragi-comedy, his new appointment coincides with the Government's dissolution of the 'National Socialist Fighting League of the Trading Middle Class'—the great league of the German petty bourgeoisie that raised Hitler on high and dreamed of dominating the new state. The new National Socialist monopolist oligarchy is already formed. The capital is the old capital, but the new holding company is called Hitler-Thyssen.

The trade unions have been destroyed. Thyssen can dictate wages through the new 'corporations' and thus reduce still further the prices of export goods in the face of English and American competition. Armaments are being prepared; Thyssen provides the steel. Thyssen needs the Danube markets, where he owns the Alpine Montan-Gesellschaft, the greatest steel producers in Austria. But the primal objective of this new system in Germany has not yet been attained. Thyssen wants a war, and it looks as though Hitler may yet provide him with one.

II. GERMANY MOBILIZES

By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Translated from the *Neue Weltbühne*, Prague German-Language Liberal Weekly

GERMANY has become an army barracks, a single vast concentration camp for the coming war. The Ger-

man people, the German soil and its harvests, German industry and its productive capacity, the theatres, the

films, the printing presses, the teachers in the schools and the children, the horses grazing in the fields, all these things have only one reason for existence—military efficiency. This single criterion now determines German foreign and domestic policy. Anyone who might mutiny is shot. Anyone who might refuse military service is denied the breath of life. Every proletarian is under suspicion as a possible striking munitions worker. Every capitalist, every giant in the chemical industry or owner of a blast furnace or shipyard, is regarded as a trusted ally in the great armament conspiracy because of his own desire for profit. Germany's peculiar military situation—for the German people are more strongly armed now than at any time since Gessler and Noske—compels a domestic policy governed by the principles of martial law, censorship, and the brutalities of the new German national capitalism. Yet the country's foreign policy has a tendency toward pacifism and a weakness for disarmament conferences.

For this Government of Hitler's can and must be more peace-loving in its declarations than any of its predecessors. It faces no opposition from the right that might turn its 'conciliatory' statements to advantage. Indeed, it has no critical opposition of any form to fear at home. It has nothing to do but prepare for war until the moment arrives when the strength and completeness of its armaments are such that the complete militarization of the people promises victory. But until that moment arrives it is resorting to the most Machiavellian display of terror at home and insincere declarations of pacifism abroad.

The rest of Europe furthers this

two-faced policy of the Hitler Government by not depriving it of its pacifistic field of action, by not finally putting an end to the Disarmament Conference, which opened eighteen months ago to the tune of Japanese gun-fire. While the international press is bombarding its public with a barrage of dispatches on German armaments, while *Le Journal*, *Le Temps*, *L'Intransigeant*, *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Daily Telegraph*,—not to mention the labor press,—and the leading English and French weeklies give space to long articles on German armaments, the Socialist, Henderson, visits the enemy's camp to try to achieve a 'settlement' of the Disarmament Conference.

No wonder the Reich, which usually seeks to deny atrocity stories in its own way by committing still worse atrocities, preserves a persistent silence in regard to all the accusations that Germany is arming. For it is only accused and not indicted. But for this very reason the bill of indictment must be repeatedly brought forth and added to. I have assembled here material from the dossiers of European foreign ministries, supplemented by the personal researches of official journalists, which has been published in the above-mentioned journals, confirmed and supplemented by information of my own.

II

The funds for printing the future White Book on Hitlerite militarism are already provided for in the 1933 budget of the German Reich. Hitler has cut this year's budget expenditures on wounded veterans, orphans, and the unemployed by 1,400 million

marks, and other economies have raised this saving to 1,900 million. Since the additional credits and subsidies extended to industry and big landholders amount to 700 million marks and since the budget as a whole has been reduced 400 million marks, there remains an unexplained residue of about 800 million marks. This sum is the most important official source of funds for German armaments.

Hitler's first budget allows for intensive arming behind the scenes. The German press therefore had to be forbidden to print the separate items of the budget or to comment on it in any way. Even Hitler's so-called 'peaceful' measures all have a least common denominator; highway improvement, intensive agricultural development, education of youth, labor service, sport, propaganda—all these things have but one purpose: preparation for war.

III

German armament plans are most convincingly revealed by certain aspects of German foreign trade. Although Germany is in an economic situation that has reduced German industry's need for imports practically to zero, imports of certain raw materials are nevertheless increasing. This is especially true of iron and copper, which are prime essentials for the manufacture of war supplies. The 'Monthly Report on German Foreign Trade' states that German imports of iron, which amounted to only 35,409 tons in the first three months of 1932, increased in the corresponding period this year to 208,802 tons, exceeding the imports for the whole of 1932, which amounted to only 171,597 tons. Most of the iron comes

from Belgium, whose monthly exports to Germany averaged two thousand tons in 1932, whereas this year they have leaped forward to a monthly average of from eight thousand to twenty-five thousand tons. These figures from a semiofficial German source provide a valuable addition to and confirmation of charges made by a special Dutch correspondent of the Paris *Intransigeant* in its July 12th issue:—

'The export of raw materials from Dutch ports to Germany has recently increased tremendously. In the year 1931 Germany received 6,700 tons of copper by way of Amsterdam and 1,600 by way of Rotterdam. In the first five months of 1933, 9,100 tons of copper were sent by way of Amsterdam and 6,000 by way of Rotterdam. The shipments of iron and copper ordered from Dutch ports amounted to 48,700 tons in the year 1932, whereas in the year 1933 they had come to 61,000 tons by the month of May. In 1932, 27,000 tons of scrap iron, which is used in making steel, were sent from Holland to Germany. Up to May of this year, scrap-iron shipments to Germany amounted to 83,300 tons.'

For months past the ports of Lübeck and Emden have been busy night and day unloading metals and other raw materials used for military purposes. Most of this is Spanish and Swedish ore, which has certain chemical contents that are necessary for certain products. The heads of the German steel trust, Thyssen, Flick, and Vöglér, have therefore acquired the Swedish ore concern of Grängesberg, which is useful as a 'neutral' source of supply and as a hiding place for concealed profits.

IV

What is Germany doing with these rapidly increasing imports of raw materials? For a long time there has been no doubt about the answer to this question. Dispatches in the foreign press merely state what the exploited working class has known for a long time. Germany is again producing war materials. On July 26 *Le Journal* printed a statement on military production in Germany that has not been denied. Here is a list of what is being made and of the places of manufacture:—

Tanks at the Linke-Hoffmann railroad-car factory in Breslau and at the Daimler-Benz automobile factory at Offenbach. Small arms at the Mauser sporting-rifle factory in Oberndorf, at the Polte iron foundry in Magdeburg, at the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik in Berlin and Karlsruhe, and at the B. M. W. engine plant in Eisenach. Cannons at Simson's rifle factory in Suhl. Mine-throwers at the vehicle factory in Eisenach and at the Pintsch gas-metre factory in Fürstenwalde. Munitions at the steel mills of the Dortmunder Union and of the Deutsche Werke in Spandau and at the Polte iron foundry in Magdeburg.

The two former giants of the German armament industry, Krupp and Rheinmetall, deserve special attention. Up to recently the Krupp works, which since 1918 have manufactured everything from typewriters to locomotives, have on account of the Versailles prohibition been able to produce cannons in theory alone—through building up a staff of artillery engineers. Now their hour has arrived. The Krupp works are again producing cannon. They have made tests on the

Meppen artillery range of a new 42-centimetre Mörser and have tried out a heavy field howitzer in Jüterbog. Meanwhile Essen has been producing a whole series of special armor plates. For months Krupp has been purchasing from the Dresdener Schleifmittelwerken, which is controlled by the Commercial and Industrial Bank of Prague, many thousand tons of silicon carbide for hardening steel by a special process. The Rheinmetall works in Düsseldorf and Sömmerda, formerly the bitter opponent of Krupp but now controlled by him and the Reich, have just finished constructing a colossal cannon that is regarded as a miracle of armament technique in respect to calibre, range, and destructive power.

V

It is clear that some central plan must underlie these preparations and must be directed by a general staff of the armament industry. *Le Journal* of July 21 states: 'There are special commissions made up of technicians in the fields of artillery, infantry, aeronautics, ballistics, and so forth whose duty it is to investigate all questions of delivery, output, and the quantity of products to be manufactured. They must, on the one hand, have regard to the need for sufficient weapons and munitions at the right place and, on the other hand, they must follow the continuous technical improvement of war materials, which are being developed so rapidly that weapons are often obsolete only a few months after they are made. One of the most important of these commissions was installed in the offices of Koch and Kuenzl, 9 Margarethenstrasse, Berlin. Directors are now set

up in every department, especially for the testing of new weapons. They have been stationed throughout the Reich and, as luck would have it, their central offices are near the Technische Hochschule in Berlin.'

The German industrialist has accepted this trusteeship. Indeed, it fulfills the desire of his heart for huge expenditures on armaments, thanks to which Hitler will guarantee to him again the generous orders that he used to receive. But as long as the working people were under their old leadership this amount of secret production would have been impossible without arousing the serious opposition of the majority of the German people. That is the most important reason why the German labor organizations had to be destroyed, root and branch. Nevertheless, more people are being tried in Germany to-day for revelation of military secrets than in any other country and these are almost always the secrets of the armament industry.

Along with thirty-one other nations Germany signed the Geneva protocol forbidding poison gas, and it is also bound by Articles 163 and 171 of the Peace Treaty not to make poison gas and not to store it. Yet Major Enders of the German army has formulated the following programme for the future gas war: 'The war of the future will no longer be waged against hostile armies but primarily against the unarmed masses of the enemy in cities and industrial centres. These masses will be slain by gas that will be dropped from airplanes, and peace will be imposed over the dead bodies of the hostile people.' Germany has decided to throw its *potentiel chimique* into the scales, regardless of what may follow.

VI

Thirteen years ago French writers on military subjects began complaining that the disarmament articles of the Versailles Treaty had not provided for the confiscation of the German chemical industry and had not made it subject to a corporation under international control. But they woke up too late. Germany is the greatest producer of chemical products in the world and possesses a virtual world monopoly. On account of the special character of chemical production, Germany can at any time stop manufacturing peace products and manufacture war products instead. Two factories in particular can shift to hundred-per-cent war production without previous preparation—the I. G. Farbenindustrie, the big German chemical trust in whose laboratories over a thousand different poison gases have been developed, and the Hugo Stoltzenberg concern of Hamburg, whose name recalls the episode of a few years ago when many people were killed by escaping phosgene. These deaths from poison gas in peace-time provided a gruesome warning that horrified everyone except the manufacturers. Since Stoltzenberg is now working three shifts the factory must be producing something, yet every country anxiously denies that it is purchasing these products.

The following incidents show how difficult it is to detect and supervise the production of chemical products. The Von Heyden chemical factory in Radebeul-Dresden, which is now making saccharin and inorganic mucilage, can also produce a light, invisible gas of a hitherto unknown composition. Billwarder in Hamburg-Billbrock can

easily stop making chromoxyd and turn out the most dangerous kind of arsenic gases. The Gehe pharmaceutical factory in Dresden can do the same thing with phosphorous gas, and Shering and Kahlbaum, in Berlin, can make a poison gas on a chlorine, boron, and cyanogen base. Germany sprang one surprise on the world on April 22, 1915, when the first English soldiers came to a painful end in the deadly clouds of gas that suddenly poured out of the German lines. What new scientific triumphs are in store?

Germany is preparing to combine the terrible weapon of poison gas with an air force of such magnitude that a sudden attack would have the same chances of success that the German armies did when they marched into Belgium in 1914. Göring, the commission agent for the airplane factories, loves to pose as a Mars of the air, with his flying helmet and gas bombs, and the German press has been strictly ordered to devote as little space as possible to news about new airplane construction. But the manœuvres of 'our air force' that the public has already witnessed have given them some idea of the armament fever, the armament madness, the armament delirium that now prevails.

VII

The ultimate ambitions of German militarism are beyond the present domestic resources of the country. Hitler is therefore mobilizing those secret foreign industrial combines that were part of his heritage as Chancellor. The names of the foreign firms have been known for a long time. They are the same ones that have come to the fore in other arma-

ment scandals. Here is the rôle of honor arranged by countries:—

Holland: Siderius A.-G., of Krimpen aan Yssel, which produces cannon barrels with its subsidiary corporation, Piet Smit; Nedinsko of Venloo, which makes periscopes for U-boats and sights for guns; Meaf of Utrecht, which makes U-boat torpedoes, and IFFA-Minimax, which makes flame projectors.

Switzerland: the Solothurn arms factory and the Oerlikon tool and machine factory, which make guns and machine guns; also the Dornier airplane factory.

Sweden: the Bofors armament factory, which is closely connected with Krupp and which makes a new type of cannon.

Italy: a branch of the Dornier factory.

Turkey: a branch of Junkers.

Behind the names of these firms lurk men of whom the patriotic, militaristic public know nothing. They are men of the stripe of Basil Zaharoff and Paul von Gontard, who was released from prison by the Hitler régime as a token of its capitulation to big industry. These big munition makers, these dangerous intriguers in the twilight zone of political manipulation, these bluebottle flies who buzz over every war wound in the world, can, of course, also be found in the German armament business. There is general manager Mandl of the Hirtenberg cartridge factory, whose last great armament deal with Mussolini shook Austria. Mandl is as versatile as the rest of them, for he is also general manager of the Dutch Cartridge and Rifle Works, which sells to Germany. Nor is he troubled, any more than he was in the Hirtenberg affair, by the

fact that he is thereby violating solemn international agreements. 'I sell guns and munitions and am not concerned with interpreting treaties,' he replied to the questions of a French journalist.

Usually these gentlemen are not so impolitic. There is Herr von Beumingen, for instance, one of the directors of Piet Smit and Dutch representative on the board of the Ruhr coal syndicate. He was the man behind the Frank Heine incident of some years ago when an effort was made to prevent Belgium and Holland from coming to an understanding by means of a forged secret protocol between France and Belgium. This deal copied the methods of the forged *Figaro* letters of Paul von Gontard, by which the German Reichstag was to be duped before the War. Herr von Beumingen also has direct connections with the Dutch Black Shirt movement, which has borrowed from Mussolini and Hitler both its outer propaganda and its inner corruption. How charming that this internationalist of the armament business is among the contributors to the Pan-Holland movement propagated by the newspaper, *Dietschege Datsche*, which preaches civil disobedience in Belgium and France. These big business agents are surrounded by swarms of smaller fry representing the munition factories of every country in the world. For the munition industry knows no frontiers and no patriots. It has no scruples about arming Hitler's Germany for the next war as long as it gets paid for its good wares in good money.

VIII

But the imports of raw materials for military purposes, the connections

between the various munition factories, the output of poison gases and bombing planes, the gagging of the working class, the fawning before heavy industry on both sides of the German frontier—all these things do not guarantee a German victory in the coming war. More is necessary. A vast, obedient army is needed, a completely poisoned popular opinion, a younger generation that prefers falsehood to truth and has learned only how to march. Insane propaganda, poverty, and instigation are necessary. Organization as well as industrialization, spiritual preparation as well as material preparation are needed, and in these respects the Hitler régime is superior to all its German predecessors and to any other government in the world. Its recruits, its enthusiasts, its leaders are all part of the brilliant strategy of an omnipotent general staff.

This organizational and spiritual armament of the German people did not begin with Hitler. Hitler has merely speeded up the tempo. Every government before his had a Minister of Defense like Noske, Stresemann and Brüning—who by his own admission came within a hundred yards of freeing Germany from military inequality—both had such men. All of them chose the same historic precedent as their ideal—Prussia between 1806 and 1813. When Napoleon conquered Frederick William III, he limited the German army to 42,000 men, but seven years later at the Battle of Leipzig Frederick William put 280,000 men into the field. All the *Reichswehr* ministers—Noske, Gessler, Seeckt, Groener, Heye, and Schleicher—tried to be the successors of Scharnhorst, and the Republic did not

grudge them their military atavism. It never occurred to the Republic to summon men of another tradition, with other political ideas, to this post.

But it was not possible for these military leaders simply to train secret reserves. They made the attempt with the 'Black *Reichswehr*' in 1923 and almost lost the Ruhr in consequence. They had to proceed cautiously, and thus they began a systematic organization of the *Reichswehr* as a skeleton army that did not outwardly violate the conditions of the Versailles Treaty.

Every soldier in the *Reichswehr* must have such a thorough and versatile training that he is a war specialist who can become the nucleus and leader of a new fighting unit of twenty or thirty men. An army of officers was trained, an army of well-paid, well-nourished, warmly dressed, strongly armed fellows who were inoculated against any social resentment or any tendency toward mutiny. The soldiers in the *Reichswehr* remained untouched by the economic crisis. They are a carefully protected *élite*. These hundred thousand men have become a framework on which a solid structure of two or three million scantily trained reserves could be built—and the reserves are really very well trained.

The same principles have been applied to preparing the human war material and the inanimate war material. At any moment the *potentiel de paix* can be transformed into a *potentiel de guerre*, any moment can mark the beginning of a mobilization. According to Ernst Roehm, member of the Military General Staff of the Hitler Government, who has good reason not to exaggerate his figures, the combined forces of the Storm Troops and Storm Detachments at

the end of June this year amounted to 800,000 trained men, uniformed and armed. There are also 120,000 members of the Steel Helmet organization and smaller armed groups. Thus the German national army amounts to a million trained recruits, able and willing to go to war.

IX

But even this million, even the *Reichswehr* and the pseudo-military organizations are merely the skeleton of a still larger army. Compulsory military service has now to all practical purposes been put into effect in Germany. Two hundred and fifty thousand young people received training this year, and next year the number will be 350,000. The name now given to universal military service is 'voluntary service,' since enlistment that is made under threat of reprisals in the form of hunger, imprisonment, and loss of unemployment relief is considered 'voluntary.' And those who do not serve will be subject to even worse reprisals when the time comes to organize and finance for a full year ahead. Next spring, when the Terror is stabilized, when wages are cut, when the last vestiges of trade unionism have vanished, when the people, especially the young people, are pauperized to an unparalleled degree—next spring compulsory military service will be called by its right name. Then all boys of nineteen will be enlisted. Then the industrial reserve army of youth, the useless product of the German working class, will be formed into the military reserve army of German Fascism and ranged in fighting battalions.

These young people will be sepa-

rated from their own class and made the jailers of their fathers and brothers; they will be established as the advance guard of the coming European upheaval. Anyone who knows the young unemployed in the big German cities or the little German villages, anyone who is familiar with their desperate fate and knows the hopelessness in which they live will know the aspect, bearing, and fighting power of the future nationalist army. It will consist of an army of classless proletarians who have learned to hear nothing but commands, to move only when they are ordered, to shout instead of to speak, and to see nothing but the glitter of bayonets, the black swastika cross on its red background, and Hitler's raised hand. The new régime needs this army, not so much because of their numbers as because of their delirium. It can count on the loyalty of these young people only because their obedience is born of stupor. The present régime needs a nation that is starved and humbled, that is sickly and stunted beneath its uniform. And it is succeeding in creating this nation, this starvation, this obedience, this excessive militarism.

The spirit of the nation will be destroyed at every point by the poison of the new nationalism. Its leaders believe that they can overcome every contradiction through a raucous radio, a filthy press, and an incredibly crude and corrupt educational system. Children are marching, boys are practising military sports, students are not

reading any books. Even in its sleep, the nation hears the ominous tread of its army, a million strong.

Universal compulsory military service should bring complete ruin to German industry because it will depress the national buying power still further. But if this tremendous army of young soldiers, serving without pay, can contribute nothing to the economic lifeblood of the system, it can at least serve the glory of the nation. Next spring the Reich will be like ancient Egypt in the time of the Pharaohs, with compulsory labor, pillaging expeditions, slave-trading, the worship of human beings, and—instead of the worship of animals—the worship of deadly weapons. Poverty, ignorance, and superstition will be cultivated in the people. Holding a whip of terror in one hand and a poison-gas bomb in the other, this modern Pharaoh reigns supreme. The first of the seven lean years has begun and, if Europe is laid waste, if the familiar world goes to pieces, if the analogy continues and seven fat years follow for this régime, such an outcome depends not least on those who call themselves the guarantors of European peace. It will be due to those non-German powers that are to-day still supplying Hitler, Göring, and Goebbels with raw materials, guns, munitions, and everything else needed to arm the last man in Germany. The men responsible are those who go unpunished while they violate treaties and hide blindly in the shelter of public apathy.

Taking the temperature of the chief organized religions of the world, the Editor of *THE LIVING AGE* indicates some causes of religious collapse and some consequences of religious decline.

TWILIGHT *of the Gods*

By THE EDITOR
of THE LIVING AGE

WHEN Maurice Hindus, who spent the first fourteen years of his life in Tsarist Russia, returned to his native country after the Revolution he found one change that overshadowed all others—the collapse of organized religion. But Russia is not the only country in which revolution has laid religion low: every social upheaval of recent years has been accompanied by a religious upheaval of corresponding violence. In Mexico and Spain the Catholic Church has lost important powers. In Germany and Italy concordats with the Vatican have not put an end to disputes between church and state authorities. In Turkey Kemal not only abolished the Sultan's political office; he abolished the religious office that the Sultan also held as Caliph of Islam. In India Gandhi's nationalist movement has persuaded high-caste Hindus to break religious precedents thousands of years old in

order to retain the political support of sixty million Untouchables. Even in the United States, the immense popular majorities that voted for Roosevelt and Repeal have repudiated those powerful Protestant leaders whose secular arm up to four short years ago was the Ku Klux Klan.

If the recent social and political upheavals in Russia, Turkey, Spain, Mexico, Italy, India, and Germany caused some surprise, the accompanying religious upheavals caused more. Perhaps religious upheavals defy prognosis: stock-market quotations, birth- and death-rates, indexes of production and consumption, price fluctuations, unemployment, and election returns bear chiefly on secular affairs. But if no thermometer exists for measuring the religious temperature of a community, a sudden change in that temperature does serve as an indicator of other changes. Let us, then, con-

sider the recent changes that have come over the great religions of the world in those countries where other changes have also occurred. And if any connections can be detected between changes in religion and other changes we may finally be able to forecast on the basis of any country's religious condition what other conditions are likely to arise.

The 1933 edition of *The World Almanac* computes 'The Religious Membership of the World' as follows:—

Roman Catholics	331,500,000
Orthodox Catholics	144,000,000
Protestants	206,900,000
Jews	15,630,000
Mohammedans	209,020,000
Buddhists	150,180,000
Hindus	230,150,000
Confucianists, Taoists	350,600,000
Shintoists	25,000,000
Animists	135,650,000
Miscellaneous	50,870,000
Total Christians	682,400,000
Total non-Christians	1,167,100,000
Grand total	1,849,500,000

Taking the largest sects in the order listed, we find that the Spanish Revolution represents by all odds the greatest tangible loss the Catholic Church has suffered since the War and one of the most unexpected losses ever suffered by any religious sect in world history. Roman Catholicism was rejected as the state religion, teaching of any religion is now forbidden in the schools, the Jesuit order has been dissolved, and its property, valued at \$30,000,000, taken over by the state. Only last month in 'The World Over' we quoted the comment of a Republican newspaper in Madrid when crowds threw stones through the windows of

buildings decorated with sacred colors on the Holy Day of the Sacred Heart: 'The sovereign people gave the right answer to the immeasurable provocations of the Monarchists.'

What has just happened to the Catholic Church in Spain corresponds to what happened in Italy when Victor Emanuel seized Rome from the Pope in 1870 and what happened in France when the National Assembly proclaimed the Constitution of 1791 and the state took over property and functions hitherto controlled by the Church. In other words, all three of the great Latin nations have now undergone bourgeois revolutions and in all of them the same dominant religion suffered the same kind of losses. But in both France and Italy the Church has shown powers of recuperation and readjustment with the passage of time. The fact that the present law separating Church and State in France was drawn by the Socialist, Briand, represented, to be sure, something of a concession on the part of the Vatican, but not so great a one as the Lateran Convention of 1929 between the Vatican and the Italian Government.

Take, to begin with, Articles 19 and 20 of that Convention, in which, 'before an archbishop, bishop, or coadjutor with the right of succession is nominated, the Holy See shall communicate the name of the chosen person to the Italian Government in order to be sure that the Government has no objections of a political nature against such person' and in which all bishops take an oath at the hands of the Premier promising 'not to participate in any agreement or attend any council that would be injurious to the Italian State.' Then

compare the two following statements. Speaking in Milan on September 28, 1919, Mussolini declared: 'I should love a pagan nation which chooses battle, life, struggle; which does not believe blindly in revealed truth; and which despises miraculous panaceas.' But in November 1924 the Pope told the Federation of Catholic University students: 'It is said that coöperation in a movement bad in itself is justified if the result is for the public good. This is false.' Has not the expedient politician remained quite as true to his principles as the infallible Pontiff?

At the moment, however, it seems possible that the Italian state and the Roman Church may develop so many common policies outside Italy that they will come to a better understanding at home. For while Catholicism has been losing ground in the Latin countries that were once its chief stronghold, it has been gaining ground in Eastern Europe. Poland, shaky as it may be, is at least a more united and even a more predominantly Catholic nation than pre-war Austria-Hungary. And though Poland has only half the population of the Habsburg Empire, it is a growing population that may wake up some morning in the not distant future and discover an equally prolific and devout nation of equal size to the south. In our May issue Giselher Wirsing, writing on 'War over Europe,' indicated the possibility that a new Catholic state might be formed including Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia. 'The Austrian legitimists,' he said, 'are unquestionably laying very concrete plans in respect to Croatia.' Their 'fundamental idea . . . is to restore a large Catholic monarchy uniting German Austria and Croatia with Slovenia

and maintaining close relations with Hungary. Fantastic as such a combination may appear, it is important to remember that the Vatican would welcome and support it.' Because both Italy and the Vatican know that all these countries are overwhelmingly Catholic, they have laid their political plans accordingly. Here, then, is proof of two things—that Catholicism is not moribund in all parts of Europe and that modern diplomats understand that some connections exist between the affairs of Church and State.

II

The nation most likely to thwart the common desire of Mussolini and the Pope for a powerful Catholic state within Italy's economic orbit is also the nation in which the Catholic Church has submitted to almost as much humiliation as it suffered in Spain. Neither the ostensible Catholicism of Hitler nor the real Catholicism of Von Papen prevented the Third Reich from persecuting Catholic citizens, dissolving the Catholic Centre Party and the Catholic trade unions, and attacking the Catholic Austrian Government of Chancellor Dollfuss, who has been struggling against German opposition to carry out policies advantageous to the Vatican. Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's most confidential adviser on foreign policy, has said: 'The Roman Church to-day is still working to poison the Nordic progressive spirit through witchcraft and mysticism.' Other Nazis attack all religion. Herr Rust, Minister of Education for Prussia, told a group of Protestants: 'Do not call God to witness, gentlemen, but call the people. . . . It is upon this

people that we call—let us leave God's name out of it.'

Not only has the Vatican ignored these attacks on Catholicism in particular and on religion in general; it has welcomed with open arms the men directly responsible for them. Von Papen and Cardinal Pacelli initialed the recent concordat between the Church and the Third Reich a week after the German Government passed a law permitting the sterilization of degenerates. Since the Church has always combated this kind of legislation in every country, no wonder Hitler's official organ, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, exulted in the recognition its master had received at Rome: 'With none other than Adolf Hitler has the Vatican concluded this treaty at the moment when the Catholic Centre Party has disappeared from the political stage forever.' Hitler expressed himself even more forcibly on the subject: 'The conclusion of a concordat between the Holy See and the Government of Germany appears to me to offer sufficient guarantee that Germans of the Roman Catholic confession will in the future place themselves unconditionally in the service of the new National Socialist state.' Note especially that although Hitler is himself a Catholic he has never been so much as censured, much less excommunicated, by Rome for his provocative words and deeds.

But what else could Rome have done? According to Dr. Schneider's Church Year Book of Germany for 1926, 10,000 Catholics a year turned Protestant in Germany between 1922 and 1924, while only 7,000 Protestants turned Catholic. Other figures show that in 1925 the evangelical churches in Germany had 40,000,000 members

and the Catholic Church 20,200,000. Therefore the number of Catholics converted to Protestantism does not stand in a ten to seven relationship to the number of Protestants converted to Catholicism, but in a twenty to seven relationship. In other words, twenty German Catholics are turning Protestant for every seven Protestants that turn Catholic. Finally, non-church members are multiplying faster than any of the confessions, having increased from 209,000 in 1910 to 1,551,000 in 1926. In the face of this trend away from all forms of organized religion, the Vatican could hardly dictate terms to a man whose followers have increased within ten years from six individuals to more than half the citizens of a country with sixty-six million inhabitants.

III

The Church and State dispute in Mexico that began when all Catholic places of worship were closed by the Government on August 1, 1926, indicates that the Vatican is having its difficulties overseas. Here is the way Arnaldo Cipolla, a distinguished Italian journalist with no anti-clerical bias, wrote from Mexico about conditions there a month before the churches were shut: 'The attitude of the Indians toward the Roman Church resembles that of the Russian *mujik* toward the Orthodox Church. . . . Mexico is a country where at least four-fifths of the people still await conversion. . . . A serious danger for Catholicism in Mexico is the disposition to cut loose entirely from Rome.' When the churches were finally reopened they were recognized to be the property of the nation and, as such,

under government control. But peace is not yet entirely restored, and the papal encyclical, *Acerba Animi*, of September 29, 1931, charged the Mexican Government with persecution and actions contrary to the agreement of 1929.

If the three hundred and thirty million Roman Catholics in the world show signs of declining religious fervor, how much more is the same thing true of the Greek Orthodox and Protestant church membership. What happened to the Greek Orthodox Church in Russia needs no comment here—the debacle of Catholicism in Spain pales beside the debacle of Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union. As for Protestantism, it never presented more striking evidence of weakness than when the Nazi army chaplain, Pastor Müller, became primate of the newly formed Evangelical Church of the German Nation. Although there are twenty-eight Protestant sects in Germany, joined together loosely in a kind of federation, their members were outvoted by the new Nazi group of 'German Christians,' who refused to accept the leadership of Bishop von Bodelschwingh, whom all the other sects had supported as head of the combined Protestant churches. Thus Protestantism has become an integral part of the Nazi dictatorship, one of the 'German Christian' leaders, Pastor Hossenfelder, having written a book entitled *Unser Kampf*—paralleling Hitler's *Mein Kampf*—in which he denies that the Church can be neutral in political affairs. This does not mean that control of the Nazi movement has passed into the hands of the clergy. Quite the contrary. Last July, while a Berlin pastor preached a sermon on the necessity of spiritual

freedom and suggested that a man's conscience cannot be the plaything of the state, a phalanx of Nazis were holding their party flags about his altar.

IV

So much for the storm centres of Christendom—those parts of the world, that is, where Christianity is the prevailing religion and where social and political upheavals have been accompanied by religious upheavals. Now for those districts where other religions dominate. If Spain, Italy, Russia, Mexico, and Germany have been the chief storm centres of Christendom, what are the others? Turkey, Arabia, India, Japan, and China would seem to be the storm centres where other religions predominate.

Lord Cromer in his *Modern Egypt*, published in 1908 and containing the wisdom and experience of one of England's greatest administrators in Mohammedan countries, wrote: 'Islam reformed is Islam no longer. It has yet to be proved that Islam can assimilate civilization without succumbing in the process.' Yet this is precisely what Kemal has been doing in Turkey, deporting the Caliph and dissolving the monasteries. A Westerner can conceive of what this means to devout Mohammedans only by imagining the effect on Roman Catholics if Mussolini were to seize the Pope, eject him from the Vatican, and abolish all church education in Italy. But nationalism is running so much stronger than Mohammedanism in Turkey that religion went by the board when loyalty to the state conflicted with loyalty to the Koran.

The World War hastened this

condition. Between 1914 and 1919 Mohammedan Arabs allied with the British were fighting Mohammedan Turks allied with the Germans—a significant contrast with the Middle Ages, when Frenchman, Englishman, German, Italian, and Austrian fought side by side against the infidel, and religious loyalties, not national loyalties, determined the side a man took. And when the War was over, religious loyalties counted for less and less. The Christian French did not hesitate to support the Mohammedan Turks against the Christian Greeks in 1921–22, and Kemal was presently executing his Mohammedan subjects for wearing the fez. Aga Oghlu Ahmed, a Turkish deputy writing in a semi-official Angora daily, declared on May 20, 1926: 'We confess that we are Occidentalists—that is to say, we believe in adopting all the apparatus of Western civilization from its machinery of government to its family life.' In the same year the *Saturday Review* of London commented: 'It has been calculated that more Moslems come to Europe now each year than make the pilgrimage.'

Ibn Saud's Arabian Wahabis—members of the puritanical wing of Islam—are the only defenders of Allah who have held their own. Living as they do the primitive life of their forefathers, they have adhered to their forefathers' religion. Leopold Weiss, a convert to Islam who has dwelt among Ibn Saud's people for years, describes their condition as follows: 'Life in Arabia has been transformed only slightly by human hands. Crude nature was always stronger than man and prevented him from breaking up his existence into many different forms. It reduced the

activities imposed by will and necessity to certain fundamental lines that have remained the same through the ages.'

That is why their leader was able to describe his own work in words that would sound insincere in the mouth of any Western ruler and that bear no resemblance to what the Kemal type of Mohammedan has to say: 'I am no king; I am only a missionary of the faith in whose hand God has put His sword. Show me the man who can do better than I and I will follow him. I swear it by the living God. I will follow him with all my strength and serve him wherever he may go.' Where can faith of this kind be found among the industrialized nations of the West or among those nations of the East that are adopting Western ways? The voice of Ibn Saud is the voice of a religion that can exist, as the Moslem, Weiss, himself admits, only in a primitive community, and as such communities vanish from the face of the earth their religion vanishes with them.

V

The article in our August issue on Gandhi by the same Leopold Weiss, who now signs himself 'Mohammed Asad,' shows that in India the Hindu religion has also begun to weaken under the impact of industrialism. As leader of the Indian middle class, which is trying to wrest concessions from the British by appealing to patriotic instincts, Gandhi has undermined some of the fundamental doctrines of Hinduism—notably untouchability. Rather than permit sixty million Untouchables to escape from the *political* control of the Hindu

community, members of the highest castes have thrown their *religious* scruples to the winds and admitted the Untouchables to temples from which they had been excluded for thousands of years. The rapid growth of religious indifference in India is also indicated by the fact that in 1916 a Hindu delegate to the Indian National Congress was hissed down for speaking well of Christianity, whereas in 1925 Gandhi, as president of the same Congress, quoted from the New Testament and was hailed by Mohammed Ali, leader of the Moslems, as 'that Christlike man.'

How successfully have the Confucianists, Buddhists, and Taoists of China and the Buddhists and Shintoists of Japan clung to their beliefs during the last decade? As far as China is concerned, the answer is that organized religion never did have a strong hold on the people, but that what hold it did have has not been strengthened. Although Christianity has made no progress among the masses, many of the nation's leaders have been converted to the faith or brought up in it. Here surely is an indication of widespread indifference—imagine the outcry in the skeptical West if several leading statesmen in England, Germany, France, or the United States were to become devout Mohammedans. Yet in China Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong are both Christians, whereas in the United States Al Smith's Catholicism disqualified him for the Presidency. But Japan has reconciled the conflict between religion and patriotism more successfully than any other country, for there the Mikado's divine descent assures him the devotion of both the patriot and the priest.

VI

So far our inquiry has been confined to the condition of organized religion in those countries where social and political unrest has been most marked. Now let us look at organized religion in the chief countries that have remained comparatively stable—France, England, and the United States.

One outstanding incident since the War has thrown light on the present position of the Catholic Church in France. Twenty years ago, Charles Maurras, one of the most influential writers in modern France, took charge of the *Action Française*, which promptly displaced *Le Gaulois* as the mouthpiece of French Royalism and orthodox Catholicism. Abbé Ernest Dimnet, who can hardly be regarded as anti-clerical, has written in this connection: 'With spectacular rapidity the *Action Française* became what *Le Gaulois* had been, namely the official mouthpiece of the Monarchists, but with an influence over the whole press that the older newspaper had never commanded. Almost simultaneously the *Action Française* assumed not only a Catholic, but an ultra-orthodox tone and showed a distinct tendency to bully writers into conformity. M. Maurras remained an unbeliever and even an atheist, but he published expurgated editions of his early works and took advantage of the education he had received in a Catholic school to adopt a faultless ultramontane attitude that was preserved during many years and interrupted only a few months ago. Indeed, many episcopal *semaines religieuses* would quote the *Action Française* as, forty years ago, they used to quote the *Univers* and Louis Veuillot. This accounts for the

astonishment caused last September [1926] by the totally unexpected condemnation of the *Action Française* by Cardinal Andrieu, Archbishop of Bordeaux, and the almost immediate ratification of the same by the Pope.'

Yet even when the *Action Française*

1926. It took the form of a questionnaire covering fourteen subjects, and the answers given to four of them by the readers of the high-brow weekly on the one hand and by the readers of the low-brow daily on the other are worth listing here:—

QUESTIONS	NATION AND ATHENÆUM			DAILY NEWS		
	Yes	No	Blank	Yes	No	Blank
Do you believe in a personal God?.....	537	736	65	9,991	3,686	366
Do you believe in personal immortality?	578	646	114	10,161	3,178	704
Do you believe in any form of Christianity?	666	585	87	10,546	2,879	618
Are you an active member of any church?.....	475	837	26	8,796	4,896	351

was placed on the papal Index its readers ignored the Pontiff's instructions. To quote Abbé Dimnet again: 'Although the daily *Action Française* is on the Index, its circulation is virtually the same as ever,—about ninety thousand,—but its readers, mostly Catholics, feel that they can be loyal to their King only by being disloyal to their Pope, a situation fraught with danger.' Just as Alcalá Zamora remains President of Spain although it persecutes his religion, so in France political loyalties outweigh religious loyalties even among the most devout. As for the rank-and-file French Catholics, their lack of religious zeal is revealed by the fact that hundreds of parishes now have no priest at all. And Protestantism has become so weak in France that its members contributed an average of less than 24 francs apiece annually to their churches.

One of the best indications of the religious temper of England appeared in the weekly *Nation and Athenæum* and the *Daily News* of London in

Is it not more likely that the low-brows will follow the high-brows away from religion than that the reverse process will occur?

Crockford's Clerical Directory, which lists every year all the clergy of the Church of England and takes no side in any church dispute, declared in 1927 that 'if the history of the last ten years is continued for another ten . . . anything that can fairly be called "the Church of England" will have ceased to exist.' It ascribed this state of affairs to two causes—'men are not forthcoming' and the number of those who are 'capable of "attacking the intellectual problems of religion" in the universities or elsewhere is neither large nor increasing.' The growth of 'Buchmanism' among the upper classes confirms all too accurately *Crockford's* analysis of the intellectual powers of England's spiritual leaders. One has only to imagine a Donne or a Newman attending one of those celebrated 'confessional' week-end house parties to measure the spiritual degeneration of the British aristocracy

to-day. Catholicism has fared somewhat better. Membership has at least held its own and several distinguished converts have been made. But it has not enjoyed anything like so much of a vogue, even among the well-to-do, as 'Buchmanism.'

VII

The United States is the one country in which the collapse of organized religion may precede the collapse of other institutions. The chapter, 'Religion,' in *Recent Social Trends* contains many illuminating items, but none of them, surely, is more amazing than the next to last sentence: 'During the period [*i.e.* since, roughly, 1900], the Church has held fast to its historic moorings, and has retained the allegiance, in form at least, of half the population.' In other words, three centuries of religious freedom and unparalleled economic progress have brought the United States halfway toward the same goal of complete atheism that Soviet Russia has set itself. The value of church property increased from \$1,258,000,000 in 1906 to \$3,840,000,000 in 1926, but as wealth accumulated faith decayed. Nor has the depression sent Americans back to the religions of their ancestors. 'No matter how badly the nation has suffered,' said an officer of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America not long ago, 'it cannot be said that any large number of people have gone to the churches for solace. This effect has been the occasion of a good deal of comment; and I think it has been one of the most conspicuous features of the depression.' Finally, the recent victories of Repeal in states hitherto dominated by the Baptist

and Methodist churches represent the same kind of defeat for Protestant leaders that Catholics would suffer if the city of Boston voted to legalize the dissemination of information about birth control.

Although the Catholic Church has not yet suffered any such spectacular defeat, unmistakable evidences of weakness do exist. 'The belief is often expressed,' says *Recent Social Trends*, 'that the Roman Catholic Church is growing in membership faster than the group of Protestant bodies. In reality it is not growing as rapidly. Between 1906 and 1926 the adult membership of the Roman Catholic Church increased 25 per cent, while the rate of expansion for the Protestant bodies was 46 per cent . . . If one takes into consideration the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward contraception, which has resulted in the maintenance of a birth-rate greatly in excess of the Protestant birth-rate, the relatively slow increase in Catholic membership becomes even more surprising.'

But some outstanding American Catholics are changing with the times, even when they are forced into conflict with their own authorities. Thus we find Father Coughlin, Detroit's famous radio priest, attacking members of his own clergy. 'I am defending,' he exclaimed in open court on August 23, 'a Protestant President who has more courage than 90 per cent of the Catholic priests in the country.' Anyone who remembers the indignation produced in Catholic circles half a dozen years ago when the *Atlantic Monthly* printed a series of articles by an anonymous Catholic priest criticizing even the celibate clergy must be aware that vital—

possibly fatal—differences exist within the fold.

VIII

A concluding word of warning is now in order. Of all the nonsense talked in the world none is more driveling than the statement that people are getting more 'materialistic.' The patriotic Turk fights as unselfishly for his country as the pious Arab fights for his faith. The class-conscious Russian defends the fatherland of the proletariat as generously as any hundred-per-cent American fought to make the world safe for democracy. Even accepting the doctrine of Marx that 'the consciousness of man does not determine his environment, but, on the contrary, his economic environment determines his consciousness,' millions of people are now prepared to crusade for such causes as democracy, Fascism, Communism, and nationalism.

But the causes for which men will fight, bleed, and die have no bearing on those mysteries with which organized religion has concerned itself from time immemorial—birth, love, pain, and death. Hence, as organized religion falls away we find many of its functions being taken over by doctors, psychiatrists, faith healers, astrologists, and dispensers of advice to the lovelorn. One concrete instance must suffice. In Germany a man called Joseph Weissenberg has founded a 'Church of St. John the Evangelist' where he gives spiritualist séances. His followers are numbered by the ten thousands and he has thirty-nine parishes in various parts of the country. Wolfgang von Weisl, a doctor of medicine and an expert on occultists, has attributed the appeal of

all these men to one thing: 'It is the horror of the state of being dead—not of dying, but of what follows the process of dying. This fear has provided motive power to the founders of sects throughout the ages, and it impels the Weissenberg agitation.'

Since the disciples of men like Weissenberg are increasing in most countries more rapidly than the devotees of the traditional faiths and since the State has prevailed over the Church almost every time the two have come into conflict, it would seem that the great religions of the world have abandoned their two chief functions. For powerful religion—the kind that existed in mediæval Europe and that can be found to-day in its unspoiled form only in the Arabian Desert—includes both the inner life of the individual and the outer life of the whole community. But now almost everywhere men will die only for their country, and they are tending more and more to take their personal troubles to the Weissenbergs, the Buchmans, the Coués, the Freuds, and the Mrs. Eddys.

Thus I arrive at these conclusions: In those countries where organized religion has collapsed most completely the most complete kind of revolution has occurred. In those countries where industrialism has advanced furthest, organized religion has declined proportionately to industrial advance. The future of organized religion would therefore seem to be most precarious in those countries where it has already been weakened by advancing industrialization but where no revolution has yet occurred. But if revolution is a portent of religious collapse, may not religious decline also be a portent of impending revolution?

Persons and Personages

POPE PIUS XI

By EDMOND WELLHOFF

Translated from *Vu*, Paris Topical Weekly

NOBODY is more conscious than the Supreme Pontiff himself of the duties and grave obligations with which he is charged. Unlike some of his predecessors, Pius XI never unbends for a moment or forgets his throne. He always reigns. He alone exists, he alone remains, and the cardinals stand before him humbly, the first of his servants. Endowed with a prodigious, superhuman memory, he knows what is going on in the smallest diocese. Some Polish pilgrims were recently presented by a bishop who introduced one of them as a priest from Poznań. 'No,' said the Pope, 'he is from Warsaw.' Fifteen years ago the Pope had been the papal nuncio to Poland, where he had seen the priest and remembered him.

Pius XI studies everything himself, and the papal Secretary of State is really nothing more than His Holiness's secretary. The Holy Father never laughs. His idea of his sacerdotal office prevents him. One must not try to analyze him as a man. Adroit and astonishingly young for his seventy-five years, he says: 'Nobody will make us deviate from our path. People desire our death, which is perhaps what keeps us alive.' His energetic chin, large forehead, and profound, scholarly eyes that do not know what fatigue means make him a leader. More even than Mussolini, he is an absolute master in whose presence one would not wish to commit even a technical error. He will not make himself amiable. He remains majestic. No one can boast of having enjoyed his intimacy. He has maintained only the necessary relations with his family. His religious office has absorbed him entirely.

In the hall of the Consistory there recently occurred the reading of the decree canonizing Blessed Bernadette Soubirous. At the end of the ceremony the sister of the Supreme Pontiff, who had been in the front rank of those present, approached him. He gave her his ring to kiss and passed on, as Christ once did with the Virgin Mary.

The Pope's labors are also superhuman. He gets up at half past five in summer and at six in winter. After a very light meal he sets to work in a combination library and office adjacent to his bedroom. There he receives His Eminence Cardinal Pacelli, Secretary of State, who gets his instructions from the Holy Father. Visiting prelates and priests are

also admitted. Diplomats accredited to the Holy See are received at the same time, as are important characters who are passing through the city. In private audiences visitors put on all their decorations and women wear long gloves and cover their heads with veils, as they do at public audiences.

The Pope as sovereign directs the conversation. No one would dare to be so incorrect as to interrogate him, but the Holy Father easily sees what each interlocutor wants to have him talk about. Benevolently, and very clearly when he considers it a good thing to do so, he talks of what interests his visitor. Not to lose time he often has placed on his table the books that he wants to read during the day, for he likes to keep posted on everything. During the few minutes that separate two audiences he resumes his reading, and often, when the next visitor is introduced, the Pope has not lifted his eyes from the page. His speech is slow. He always seeks for the exact term to express his thought, and, as a former librarian, sage, and scholar, he knows so many words that he often hesitates before choosing. His knowledge of languages is perfect, especially of French. He raises his head quickly and speaks with a strange mobility of mind. The visitor receives the impression that Saint Peter's successor is already occupied with him and with the business that he has come to discuss. Yet from time to time the eyes of the Holy Father wander, glance down at a line of the book he was reading. It was thus that he was able to read and annotate the complete works of Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet.

AFTER the private audiences he gives his public ones. First he receives the ecclesiastics and nuns who surround his throne. He blesses them and always addresses a few words to them. Then he turns to the galleries, where more than a thousand pilgrims present themselves every day. With infinite patience he passes before each one of them and holds out his ring to be kissed. He has luncheon at about three o'clock, always eating lightly, a chop and some fruit being more than enough. He then returns to work and later walks for an hour in the Vatican gardens, which look like the gardens of a health resort, where everything is in a constant state of repair and where comfort is more important than taste. The paths, which are usually crowded with ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and workers, are emptied for the occasion. The Holy Father is accompanied by two secretaries to whom he rarely speaks. It is a silent, contemplative walk. He returns and works again until dinner. Unlike Pius X, he has never broken the procedure for meals. No one is present when he eats.

'He really lives apart from the world,' said an illustrious prelate. 'God is his only confidant.' The Holy Father prays a great deal. He asks the Divine Master for inspiration to guide his acts. After many

orisons he declared the Holy Year to commemorate the 1,900th anniversary of the Redemption. The Pope, who is well posted on the political and economic situation of every country, had been disturbed by what was happening in the world. Did he foresee the worst? He summoned the Catholics of the world to pray to avoid war. Thousands of pilgrims, hundreds of statesmen from every country poured into Rome. He spoke to them. For war in a Holy Year is a double crime.

Yet this Pope is revolutionary. He perceives the increasing weakness of the temporal demands of the Vatican. They are beginning to make the Italians and the rest of the world smile. They are looked upon as stylistic flourishes. 'It was then,' declared one of his entourage, 'that he abandoned even the most legitimate demands and accepted this pocket handkerchief of a Vatican City.' Above all, he wanted religion to live, and he threw himself completely into the policy of concordats. He signed one with Bavaria in 1925, with Poland in 1925, with Rumania in 1927, with Lithuania in 1927, with Czechoslovakia in 1928, with Portugal in 1928, with Italy in 1929, with Prussia in 1929, with Austria in 1933, and with Germany in 1933.

Some of these treaties have grievously disappointed the French public. But the Supreme Pontiff defends the interests of the Church with rare fervor, braving unpopularity to do so. 'I shall deal,' he said, 'with the Devil to safeguard religion.'

Criticism was inevitable. At one time there was an Italian party that claimed to support the Holy See, the Popular Party led by the priest, Don Sturzo. In Germany, as recently as a few months ago, the Chancellor of the Reich was Dr. Brüning, head of the Centre Party and a man of great piety. As long as these political parties progressed the Holy See seemed to accept them with a good heart. But with Fascism installed in Italy and Hitlerism in Germany the State became a unity and there was no Catholic question any more. The Popular Party and the Centre Party dissolved of their own accord and the Holy See did not try to save them. 'We do not indulge in politics,' his most authorized representatives say. 'We will not admit that anybody can make religion serve as a means of propaganda. The eternal Church will not ally itself with an essentially temporary organization. Of course, Don Sturzo, Brüning, and, in France, the directors of the *Action Française* claimed our support, but it was one-sided. We never gave them the least authorization.'

THIS thesis has enabled the Church to deal with governments morally remote from it, and the history of the concordat with Hitler is similar to that of the concordat with Mussolini. While the *Duce* forced priests or militant Catholics to go into exile or to suffer outrages, the least of which

were compulsory doses of castor oil, he was negotiating the concordat. He held a club in one hand and in the other a document very agreeable to the Vatican. Besides the pension provided the Pope, schools were allowed to give religious instruction again and a church marriage became the equivalent of a civil ceremony. Between the bastinado and the olive branch, the Holy See had no choice. Above all, it wanted peace for Catholics. Nevertheless, His Holiness said: 'We do not fear any power. If we are menaced we shall know how to reply.' But here as always necessity created law. Hitler seems to be directed by Rome and, happily provided with a precedent, the *Führer* imitates the *Duce* with the utmost scrupulousness.

At Easter he sent Von Papen to Rome, and it was then that the Vatican and Berlin entered into their first conversations about a concordat. The Holy See hesitated. Hitler was not firmly entrenched. However, the Pope reflected that Hitler, like himself, was violently opposed to Bolshevism. Von Papen returned empty-handed and the persecutions began. Cardinal Faulhaber and members of the German clergy suffered insult and injury on the open street.

The Pope said nothing and even refused to express his opinion on other persecutions that were making the whole world indignant. Diplomacy often takes precedence over charity. Meanwhile, Germany continued to propose a concordat that would recognize the Catholic religion and give it public privileges in a Protestant state. In June Von Papen returned to Rome, where he passed his vacation and gathered the harvest of this policy. Here again the Holy See quite rightly preferred agreement to violence.

A concordat with Germany—there was a real revolution in the Church. There had not been one since the Reformation. And now German Catholics can live in peace. There is also no doubt that the Church has benefited from these treaties, which serve its essential interests.

Of course, Fascism and Hitlerism have profited too. The fact that they have talked on equal terms with the Eternal Power cannot fail to strengthen their position in the world at large. But whereas the Mussolini concordat took seven years, Hitler obtained his in a few weeks. Does this mean that Hitler has proved himself a better negotiator than his Italian colleague? Not at all. The questions between the Vatican and the Venetian Palace were more complex. It was a question of defining the temporal domain of the popes, and, besides, Rome had again set the style for Berlin, and Berlin benefited from the precedent. The proof of this collaboration is revealed in the fact that the Fascist press in Italy took care between Von Papen's two visits to Rome not to mention the persecutions that the Catholics in the Reich were suffer-

ing at the hands of the Hitlerites. If the same things had happened in France or any other country they would have been described in complete detail in the Italian newspapers, but the orders to keep silent were respected. The Holy See takes satisfaction in its accords with the *Duce* and the *Führer* because it has thus allied itself with two powerful governments. A concordat necessarily affects the domestic policy of the country that signs it. A government without force cannot impose its demands on a parliament or on a Jacobinic population.

At the same time His Holiness does not fear to establish connections with democratic governments—witness the pact of last May with Austria. The Vatican was simultaneously negotiating with the Hitlerites and with Chancellor Dollfuss, who will perhaps be slain in his struggle against Hitler.

This eclecticism might be considered opportunistic, but it is not. 'The real policy of the Vatican takes no notice of policy.' It has but one end—the tendency of the Church to persevere in the Church.

GANDHI'S RIVAL SPEAKS

By VITALBHAI PATEL

Former President of the Indian National Congress

Translated from the *Prager Tagblatt*, Prague German-Language Daily

TO-DAY profound differences of opinion separate Gandhi and the majority of the Congress leaders. Gandhi still believes that he can change public opinion by means of love and that the sufferings of the Indians will finally melt the hearts of the English. India has given England a long time to be won over to Gandhi's point of view; from 1919 to 1933 Gandhi was the virtual dictator of India and the people followed him. What has been accomplished? More than two hundred thousand Indians have been thrown into jail, an equal number have been beaten by the police, and thousands have been sentenced to death. I myself was in prison twice, on one occasion for six months, but I was not treated badly. The leaders, who make up one per cent of the movement, were not maltreated; it was the remaining ninety nine per cent that suffered. And what they endured as political prisoners! Many were beaten so severely that they collapsed, and yet, in conformity with Gandhi's doctrine, they loved England.

But all their tribulations gained them nothing whatever. Many of us have therefore come to the conclusion that this doctrine is no good, that we cannot win Europe over through love. Here is the point at issue between Gandhi and the Congress leaders. Gandhi places nonresistance

above everything else, but the Congress leaders say that the freedom of the country comes first. I am of the opinion that the English Government is heartless, whereas Gandhi believes that the English Government can be prevailed upon through love. England has become great by means of India and England cannot get along without India. It will give way to India only if it is compelled to do so by brute force. Gandhi has been given a long time to negotiate. No other leader in India has ever been given such complete power, but the result is nothing at all. We want a new programme and a new leadership, and we want to establish friendship with all nations in the cultural and economic spheres.

In the economic sphere we should like to establish direct contacts, without the assistance of England. The Ottawa Conference raised such high tariffs that no country can compete against them. But in India we are now boycotting English goods and prefer to purchase foreign goods, even at a higher price. Even in Czechoslovakia there are a great many industries that would be glad to market their goods in India. Yet the British Government does not allow us to try to establish direct connections. Business men from Czechoslovakia ought to be able to deal directly with Indian business men.

India was once the richest country in the world. To-day it is the poorest. The average daily income of an Indian amounts to between one and two Czechoslovakian crowns. India was once the most progressive country in the world. When the English arrived there were fifty thousand schools in the Presidency of Bengal. To-day ninety-two per cent of the male population and ninety-eight per cent of the female population cannot read or write. Poverty has attained terrible proportions. The physical resistance of the people is broken. When an epidemic comes, millions die. In 1918, when the Spanish influenza broke out in India, it claimed twelve and a quarter million victims—more than were killed in the whole World War. The death-rate in India amounts to 32 per cent, compared with 12 or 13 per cent in America and England.

People in Europe believe that India would be contented if it were granted dominion status like Canada and Australia. That is not true. We want complete independence and separation from England. We want to trade freely with whatever countries we choose. The Canadians and Australians are English people who emigrated and colonized the land on which they settled. But the Indians are an entirely different people with a different culture, a different civilization, a different religion, and a different language. Ninety per cent of the people speak only one language—Hindustani. Of the entire Indian population not half of one per cent speak English.

An essay on the art and creation of
poetry by the foremost poet of Soviet
Russia, who committed suicide in 1930.

How One Writes a Poem

By VLADIMIR MAIAKOVSKI

Translated from *Europe*
Paris Literary Monthly

I MUST explain my title. In the course of various literary discussions and conversations with young workers about verbal assonances ('soap,' 'rope,' 'Pope,' and so on) and in writing criticism it has often fallen to my lot to discredit, if not to destroy, the ancient art of poetry. It is not that I have anything against ancient poetry, which is innocent of all evil. I attacked it only because the zealous defenders of what is old-fashioned used to shield themselves against new art by hiding behind the monuments of great men. The point was that by knocking down these monuments I made readers see a completely obscured and ignored aspect of these great men.

Children and young literary schools are always curious to know what is hidden inside cardboard horses. The labors of the formalists have clearly revealed what the intestines of paper horses and elephants contain, and we must not feel aggrieved if the horses

are degraded. There is no use doing injury to the poetry of the past, for it presents us with material for study.

My chief and abiding hatred goes out against the romantico-critical, petty-bourgeois spirit, against those good gentlemen for whom the grandeur of ancient poetry consists of the fact that they, too, have loved as Onegin loved Tatiana in one of Pushkin's poems. They understand poets because iambs caress their ears—a trick they learned in school. This facile hocus pocus revolts me because it surrounds an important, serious work of poetry with an atmosphere of sexual thrills and swoons. It is based on the belief that only eternal poetry is above all dialectic and that the creative process merely consists in throwing one's hair back with inspiration and waiting until celestial poetry descends on one's bared head in the form of a pigeon, a peacock, or an ostrich.

It is not difficult to confute these

gentlemen. One need only compare Tatiana's love and the 'art that Ovid sung' with the projected marriage law, to read to Donets miners the story of the coxcomb who was made a cuckold, or to rush to the aid of May Day parades shouting 'My uncle has very honest principles,' these words being drawn from the beginning of Pushkin's story of Onegin. After such an experiment it is doubtful whether a young man who is burning with desire to devote his powers to the Revolution will still want to occupy himself seriously with the antiquarian element in poetry. Much has been written and said about this theme and we who have written and talked have always received the enthusiastic approval of our audiences. But after they have given their approval skeptical phrases rise. 'You only destroy; you do not create.' 'The old manuals are bad, but where are the new ones?' 'Give us the rules of your poetic art, give us manuals.'

To say that the ancient art of poetry existed for fifteen centuries and that our own has existed for only thirty years is a shabby excuse. You want to write and you want to know how it is done. Why do people refuse to regard as poetry the kind of work that is composed in strict accordance with the rules formulated by Chengelev, with perfect rhymes, metres, and refrains? You have the right to demand that poets should not take the secret of their calling with them to the tomb.

II

I am going to write about my calling not as a theorist but as a practitioner. My article has no 'scientific value.' I speak of my work. In the

light of my own observations and convictions there are no great distinctions between it and the work of other professional poets. Once more I warn the reader categorically that I am not laying down rules that will enable any man to become a poet and write verse. A poet is a man who creates poetic rules. For the hundredth time I shall resort to a comparison that I am reluctant to employ.

A mathematician is a man who creates, develops, and perfects mathematical laws. He is a man who brings something new to mathematical science. The man who first stated that two and two make four was a great mathematician even if he got this result by adding two pebbles to two other pebbles. All other men, even those who add incomparably greater things, locomotives, for instance, are not mathematicians at all. What I am saying does not detract from the value of the work performed by the man who adds locomotives. When transportation gets disorganized this work may be a hundred times more precious than pure mathematics, but it is not necessary to assign the task of comparing figures on locomotives to the Mathematicians' Society and to demand that it put that task on a level with the geometry of Lobachevski. It would enrage the Planning Commission, overtax the mathematicians, and confuse the railway offices.

It will be said that I am drawing a farfetched analogy, that the thing is clear enough without this comparison. But nothing could be more false. Eighty out of a hundred rhymed imbecilities that the editors of our magazines publish are brought out simply because the editors either have not got the least idea of poetry or do

not understand its purposes. Magazine editors only know enough to think, 'I like that' or 'I don't like that.' They forget that taste is a faculty that one can and must develop. Almost all magazine editors have complained to me that when manuscripts of poems arrive they do not know why they reject them. A really literary editor should be able to say to the poet, 'Your verses are very regular. They are composed in accordance with the third edition of Brodovski's versification manual. All your rhymes are well tested and have long been found in N. Abramov's *Complete Dictionary of Russian Rhymes*. Since I do not have any good verse now I shall accept them and pay for them as I pay for the work of any trained copyist, that is to say, thirty rubles per printed page.'

The so-called poet will not know what to reply to this. Either he will stop writing or he will begin to consider verse as something that demands a great deal of work. In any case, the poet will stop putting on airs in front of a reporter who does real work and who is paid so much per line for what he writes even if it is not printed. For a reporter wears out his clothes running to scandals and fires, whereas our poet uses only saliva in turning over the leaves of his manual.

In order to raise the level of poetry, in order to contribute to the future development of art, we must stop considering poetry independently of other forms of human activity. But watch out. The creation of rules is not the ultimate purpose of poetry, for in that case the poet would degenerate into a research investigator who would spend all his energies making up rules to explain nonexistent or useless things

and situations. For instance, there would be no use inventing rules to count the stars while one is riding full speed on a bicycle.

Life creates the situations that must be expressed and for which rules must be invented. The form of expression and the purpose of the rules are determined by the social class, by the exigencies of our struggle. For instance, the revolution has given the rude language of the masses the right to circulate anywhere; the popular language of the working-class districts is moulded by the broad streets on which it is spoken. But the weak, slender language of the intellectuals, with its overworked expressions: 'ideal,' 'the elements of justice,' 'the divine principle,' 'the transcendental face of Christ and the Antichrist'—all these phrases that are murmured in chic restaurants have worn thin. Language is being carried away by a new torrent. How can it be made poetic? The old rules with all their dreams, roses, and Alexandrines do not fit any more. How can current speech be introduced into poetry, how can poetry be extracted from current conversation? Must we spit on the Revolution in the name of iambic verse? Certainly not.

III

Let us therefore give the keys of the city to this new language. Let us let shouts take the place of refrains. Let drumbeats take the place of lullabies.

Let us march
in step
with the revolution.

—BLOK

Form yourselves in line of march . . .

—MAIAKOVSKI

It is not enough to give samples of the new verse, to show how words act on revolutionary crowds. We must adjust this action in such a way as to bring the maximum help to the working class. It is not enough to say, as Blok does, 'the old, implacable enemy'; we must indicate precisely the aspect of this enemy or else enable people to visualize it exactly. It is not enough to form in line of march. We must do so in accordance with all the rules of street fighting, taking the telegraph services, the banks, and the arsenals and causing them to fall into the hands of the revolutionary workers. Thus I have written:—

Eat your pineapples
Devour your pullets
Your last day has come, bourgeois.

Classic poetry could hardly consider such lines worth quoting. In 1820 Gretch did not know the *chastuchki* (Russian popular songs) and even if he had known them he would have spoken of them as he did of popular poetry, disdainfully: 'These verses have no rhythm, no assonance.' But 'these verses' were adopted by the Petersburg streets, and when our gentlemen critics have leisure they will be able to discover what rules were used in composing them. Novelty is obligatory in a work of poetry. The verbal matter that offers itself to the poet must be transformed by his labor. If one uses old verbal scrap iron to make a poem one must take care that a definite proportion of new material is added. It is the quality and quantity of this new material that determine the value of the mixture.

Of course, novelty does not mean that one keeps producing unheard-of truths. Iambic verse, free verse, al-

literation, and assonance are not created every day. One can try to develop them, to expand them, and make them penetrate the public. 'Two and two make four' has no life of its own. One must apply this truth (rules of addition). One must also make this truth easy to remember (more rules). One must clearly reveal the character of this truth through a whole series of visual representations (examples, subjects).

It is clear from what I have said that poetry does not consist in describing and representing bare facts. Of course, there is need for this kind of work, but it is on a par with the minutes that a secretary takes at a great meeting. It consists of nothing but 'We have heard,' 'It has been decided.' That is the whole tragedy of the 'fellow travelers' [the writers who came over to the Revolution after it had triumphed]. They 'agreed' only five years afterward, and 'decided' too late, when the others had already achieved.

Poetry begins with tendency. To my mind, Lermontov's poem, 'I go alone on the road,' is a kind of propaganda to encourage girls to go walking with poets. To walk alone is boring, you know. If one could only write a poem as forceful as Lermontov's but appealing to people to join coöperatives.

The old manuals of poetic art are of no use. They only catalogue different ways of writing, all of which have become conventional. Actually such books should not be called, *How to Write*, but *How People Wrote*. Let me be honest. I know nothing about iambs or trochees. I have never been able to distinguish them and never shall be able to. Not that it is difficult,

but I have never had to concern myself with such things in my poetic work. If my poetry contains fragments of rhythm it is simply because I have repeated too frequently those boring motifs that one encounters everywhere. Several times I have attempted to study these matters. I have succeeded in understanding the mechanism of regular verse and have then promptly forgotten it. But these trifles, which occupy ninety per cent of our manuals of poetry, do not occupy three per cent of my own practical activity.

In poetic work there exist only certain general rules for getting one's work under way, and even those rules are purely conventional. As in chess, the opening moves are almost always the same, but after you have played them once you try to find others. The most brilliant *coup* cannot be repeated in a given situation a second time. For one's adversary can be defeated only by unexpected attacks. The same thing is true of unexpected rhymes in poetry.

IV

What, then, are the necessary conditions for getting one's poetic work started?

1. The existence of a social task that can be accomplished only through poetic work. There must be a social 'command.' Here, incidentally, is an interesting subject for special research: the lack of connection between the social command and the command actually given.

2. You must have an exact knowledge of or at least a feeling for the aspirations of the class or group you represent toward this social task, in

other words, a final attitude, an end.

3. You must have the material, the words. The store house, the reserves of your mind should be equipped with the necessary words—expressive, rare, new, renovated, and invented words of every kind.

4. Means of production are necessary. These include a pen, a pencil, a typewriter, a telephone, clothes to wear when going out for food. A bicycle to ride on to the editorial office, a table, an umbrella to enable one to write in the rain, a room in which one can take a certain number of steps (this is necessary for one's work), connections with a clipping bureau in order to make sure of receiving a continual supply of material on subjects that are of interest to your district, a pipe and a supply of cigarettes.

5. One must have formed the habit of elaborating words. This habit is infinitely individual and comes only after years of daily work. It covers rhymes, measures, alliterations, images, gradations, style, pathos, endings, titles, plans, and so on.

For instance, the social task is to find the words for a song to be sung by the Red Guards, who are going to defend Petersburg. The purpose is to defeat Yudenich. The material is words, drawn from the common speech of soldiers. The tool is a pencil point. The form, a rhymed *chastubka*. Here is the result:—

Milkoj mne v podarok burka
I noski podareni
Mchit Yudenich s Peterburga
Kak naskipidareni.

(My girl friend made me a present
Of a jacket and some socks.
Yudenich is fleeing from Petersburg
As if he were soaked in turpentine.)

The novelty of the quatrain that justifies the production of this particular *cbastuebka* rests in the rhyme, 'noski podareni' and 'naskipidareni.' This novelty makes the thing necessary, poetic, typical. For the *cbastuebka* to attain maximum effectiveness the rhyme must be unexpected and the first two lines must have no relation to the other two. Moreover, the first two lines can be regarded as purely accessory. To any man who wants to evaluate and qualify poetic work these very general rules will open up more possibilities than the rules that now exist. It is enough to consider as coefficients the elements of material equipment and form. Is there a social command? Yes. Two points. A purpose? Two points. Is it rhymed? One more point. Are there alliterations? Half a point. Then one point for the rhyme because one had to take an autobus to arrive at this unaccustomed measure.

Do not smile, critic. The truth is that I should prefer the verses written by an inhabitant of Alaska, provided, of course, he had the same talent, to those written by a man who lived on the Côte d'Azur. And quite rightly. An inhabitant of Alaska suffers from cold. He has to buy a fur coat and the ink in his fountain pen freezes. The inhabitant of the Côte d'Azur writes surrounded by palm trees in a setting that makes even his poems pleasant.

To qualify a poem is equally easy. The verses of Demian Biedni correspond to an urgent, well-understood social command. Their purpose is clear. They are adapted to the needs of workers and peasants. The words are those of the daily life of the semi-peasant class, mixed with remnants of poetic rhymes.

The verses of Kruchenikh, with their alliterations, dissonances, and purpose, are destined to aid future poets. I shall not occupy myself here with the metaphysical problem of discovering which is the better—a poem by Demian Biedni or a poem by Kruchenikh. They are made up of different elements that belong on different planes and each can exist without embarrassing the other or competing against it. For my part, I believe that the best poetic work will be written in accordance with the social command laid down by the Communist International and that it will tend to assure the victory of the proletariat. It will be written in new, striking words comprehensible to everybody. It will be born in the hour when it is wanted and will be sent to the editor by express airplane. I insist on this last point, for the poetic way of living is also one of the most important factors in our production.

Of course, the process of evaluating poetry is really something much more complex and subtle than I have indicated here. I am simplifying, enlarging, exaggerating my thought intentionally. I simplify to show more clearly that the essence of this study of literature does not reside in individual appreciation of any particular piece of writing but rather in a fair way of approaching the study of the process of literary production. The purpose of the present essay is not to discuss already existing examples and forms but to try to show the actual process of poetic production.

V

How, then, is a poem written? Work begins long before the social command

has been received, all unknown to one's consciousness. Preparatory poetic work continues uninterruptedly. One can write a piece of poetry within a given time only if one has previously accumulated considerable poetic reserves. For instance,—and I am merely mentioning what comes to my mind at the moment,—a good family name, Glitzeron, happens to come into my head. It came by chance during some conversation about glycerine. I also have a reserve of good rhymes and I shall always remember a passage taken from some American song that needs to be Russified and that gives me infinite pleasure:—

The vamp of Sovani
The vamp of Sovani
J. A.

I also have in my storehouse of alliterations one that was suggested to me by an advertisement that I happened to see out of the corner of my eye and that bore the name, 'Nita Jo':—

Gde jiviot Nita Jo
Nita nije etajom.

(Where does Nita Jo live?
One story below.)

I also can choose between various subjects, some clear, some confused. First, rain in New York. Secondly, the prostitute on the Boulevard des Capucines in Paris. It is said to be particularly chic to make love to her because she has only one leg. She lost the other in a street-car accident, I believe. Thirdly, the old man who is stationed in the wash room of the huge Heissler restaurant in Berlin. Fourthly, the immense subject of the October Revolution, which is something that one cannot imagine if one did not live in a village.

All these reserves exist in my mind, and I have noted down here those that are particularly delicate. All my time is spent accumulating these reserves, and on this work I lose eighteen and twenty hours a day. I am almost always murmuring something. It is this concentrated effort that accounts for the supposed distraction of the poet. I pursue this work of accumulation so intensely that eight times out of ten I can recall the place and particular circumstances in which during fifteen years of work certain rhymes, certain alliterations, certain images came to me and received their definite form.

The notebook is one of the essential factors in any real piece of work. Ordinarily one does not learn of the existence of the notebook until after the death of the writer. For years it is ignored, and it is only published posthumously after his complete works have appeared, but for the writer the notebook is everything.

Beginners in poetry do not possess such a notebook, for they have no practice, no experience. Rarely does one find in their work really finished verses, and that is why their poems are so long-drawn-out. It is only with the aid of reserves that have been carefully worked over that I have been able to do a thing by a given date, because my normal production is eight or ten verses a day when I am occupied with a real task. To the poet every encounter, every lesson, every event, has value only in so far as it provides verbal material. I used to be so immersed in this work that I even feared to express myself in the words and phrases that my futurist verse seemed to demand, and I therefore became sombre, boring, and taciturn.

About 1913, as I was coming back from Saratov to Moscow in the company of a certain young lady, I told her, in order to prove my complete loyalty to her, that I was 'not a man but a cloud in trousers.' At once I realized that this expression might serve in a poem and I was afraid that she would repeat it and prevent my turning it to profit. In great anxiety I questioned the girl for half an hour, asking her insidious questions, and I only became calm when I was convinced that my words had gone in one ear and out the other. Two years later I used the 'cloud in trousers' as the title of a poem.

Here is another example. For two days I meditated on the best way to express the tenderness a solitary man feels for a woman he loves above all else. How would he care for her, how would he love her? The third night I went to bed with a headache, not having discovered anything. But in the middle of the night it finally came to me:—

I shall guard and I shall love
your body
as a soldier
mutilated by war
—of no use to anybody—
guards
his remaining leg.

I jumped up half awake. In the darkness I wrote down on a cigarette box with the blackened end of a

match the words 'one leg' and fell asleep again. The next morning I spent two hours trying to remember what leg it was and how the words happened to be written on the box.

When you are about to seize on a rhyme but have not yet found it, life is poison. You talk without understanding what you say, you do not know what you are eating, and you cannot sleep because you are continually obsessed by the rhyme that is fluttering before your eyes. Yet here is an advertisement from the Kharkov *Proletarian*: 'How to be a writer. Detailed reply for fifty copecks in postage stamps. Slaviansk Station, Donets Line, Post-Office Box 11.' What do you think of that? Simply a survival of the old régime, and already the magazine *Distraction* is giving away as a supplement a book entitled *How to Be a Poet in Five Lessons*. I think that my little examples are enough to prove that poetry belongs to the category of the most difficult things in the world, the category of reality. A poem must be considered in the same way in which this immortal quatrain of Pasternak's considers a woman:—

From that day, from your head to your feet,
I carried you with me and knew you by heart
As a provincial actor knows a play of Shakespeare's.

I took you about with me in the city and repeated you.

A Scotsman who knows America well
and has often written about it pays
tribute to one of our greatest economists.

Henry George TO-DAY

By JAMES F. MUIRHEAD

From the *Contemporary Review*
London Political and Literary Monthly

THE *raison d'être* and gist of this article can be summarized under a few brief heads:—

1. The complete breakdown of civilization throughout the world exonerates us from any undue reverence for the methods of the past and entitles us to investigate any plausible remedy, however widely it may differ from our conventions, traditions, and prejudices.

2. The problem is one of distribution, not supply. There never has been any real overproduction, except geographically or (temporarily) in special articles. Legitimate human demands are illimitable, and have consequently never been fully satisfied. We are suffering from the unendurable paradox of want in the midst of plenty. Our problem is the distribution of plenty.

3. It seems evident that those who enjoy a comfort obviously in excess of the average must resign themselves to the conclusion that something has to

be jettisoned to redress the balance.

4. The remedy that seems to hold the field at present is some form of Socialism; but to many of us this cure seems worse than the disease.

5. Without any dogmatic assertion that the taxation of land values would be a panacea for all our ills, and with a clear recognition of the view that its sudden introduction at this period of the world's history might conceivably cause so much dislocation as to defeat its own end, I have enough belief in the doctrine eloquently preached by Henry George to plead for a much fuller and less prejudiced investigation of it than it has hitherto been vouchsafed by our statesmen and economists. Even if it is not a panacea, it offers a plausible basis for other desirable reforms.

6. My attitude is not polemical, unless it can be so called because I am arguing in favor of a special policy. Taxation of land values, however, does not seem to me incompatible with the

best programmes of any political party.

7. Henry George considered himself an opponent of what he called 'the fatal defect of Socialism,' and would, in my view, be much amazed to find himself ranked with Socialists and Communists. My strongest reason for the advocacy of some practicable adaptation of his gospel is that it seems to me the most hopeful line of resistance to the unsound and dangerous doctrine of thoroughgoing Socialism. Neither Conservatives nor Liberals nor Labor have a monopoly of good ideas, but there is no logical reason why they should not all contribute to the superstructure erected on a taxation-of-land-values basis.

II

It is unfortunate that most of Henry George's disciples in England have needlessly become identified with the Socialist wing of Labor and with the doctrine of free trade, and have practically cried, 'Procul, o procul este, profani,' to all Conservatives, Protectionists, and Imperialists. No objection can be made to their espousing the side of free trade in a still unsettled controversy; their mistake is in the assumption that a taxer of land values *must* be a free trader. Henry George was fully alive to the benefits of coöperation, and he certainly envisaged a world of universal and reciprocal free exchange of commodities as the economic ideal. It is, however, clear that he considered free trade as a consequence rather than a compeer of the abolition of private monopoly of land surface. Even in the volume he wrote in defense of free trade he tells us that 'the

abolition of protection . . . can accomplish no permanent benefit for the laboring class so long as the land on which all must live is made the property of some, [for] increase of productive power can only increase the tribute which those who own the land can demand for its use' (*Protection or Free Trade*, chap. xxvi); and in *Progress and Poverty* (Book IV, chap. iii) occurs the significant sentence: 'Free trade has enormously increased the wealth of Great Britain without lessening pauperism.'

By Socialism is understood a system that brings practically all civil life under government regulation and abolishes individual property except for a few personal belongings. Individuals, as such, have no rights as opposed to social solidarity. In Henry George's words, Socialism is 'an attempt to carry conscious regulation and direction beyond the narrow sphere of social life in which it is necessary.' It is not socialistic, but simply self-protective, to assert that the state has a right to interfere with any individual enterprise that is harmful to the community as a whole. But the individualist has no more right than the Socialist to be a bigot. We already own the wisdom of entrusting certain services to the hands of the community; and we must leave it to the future to decide how far this principle may be justifiably extended.

Henry George (differing in this point from land nationalizers) did not advocate ruthless and universal state control. He did not believe that coöperation, working through government regulation, is the wisest way of managing the world. He believed that, in the main, individual effort is the best method of stimulating progress.

So long as no injury is thereby done to the community, the more private enterprise the better. In its essence his scheme really means nothing more than a change in the basis of taxation. It is, in Colonel Wedgwood's phrase, the state appropriation of monopoly rent. Taxation is unavoidable. The problem is to find the fairest, the most equitable, and the most convenient form of taxation. This Henry George believed he had discovered in taxation in the shape of an equitable rent paid for the unearned increment in site-value. His doctrine might equally well be called a change in the basis on which we pay rates. In return for the state's permission to exploit a given piece of land, we should pay an annual rate for this among other state (and municipal) services.

III

This principle does not involve any denial of the right of private property, for which, if correctly defined, Henry George had as sincere a respect as the most bigoted backwoodsman. It is a little difficult to give a definition of property (as, for example, distinct from possession or occupation) that will please all parties, especially as regards the line between the individual and the community. Few, however, will deny that the original title to property arises from production or creation, from the result of human labor. Production, in this sense, includes everything, from the poet's ballad on his mistress's eyebrow down to the club made by the cave man. The man who finds an object of human utility in a desert and brings it to a place where it will be of service is *pro hac vice* a producer. His labor has

produced a value in exchange that had hitherto been dormant. The property right may pass through innumerable hands, by sale or gift or inheritance; but its inherent existence lies in the making. The George position is, simply, that land, or extension in space, was not created by man, but preceded him and would continue unchanged if the human race were exterminated. The varying value of equal areas of space *qua* space (the 'site-value') does not depend on any individual man but arises from its relative situation; it is determined (other things being equal) by the nature of the community in which it lies. The community, therefore, is the rightful owner, inasmuch as it is the creator or producer of this value. During a long period of the world's history land was accordingly treated as common, joint, tribal, or communal property. The idea of the absolute ownership of land by individuals is one of comparatively late development, and, indeed, is theoretically unknown to law. (Tenancy-in-fee is the nearest approach to absolute ownership of land as recognized by English law.) The legal fiction in England still views the land as belonging to the Crown—that is, to the representative of the state or community. The right of absolute private property in chattels and the denial of that right in land are not contradictory but correlative. Property in land is a mere juridical relation, not a physical fact like the holding of movable chattels. What law has made, law can unmake. The history of human slavery is a striking illustration of this; and the cases are closely analogous. In denying the right of private monopoly of site-value, there

is no infringement of private property as such. The position is that site-value cannot be attributed to individual action.

It must, of course, be recognized that any increased value of site due to improvements by human labor can be rightfully claimed by the producer. This covers the house built on the land, the improved quality due to drainage and fertilizers, that part of the value of coal and other minerals due to the bringing of them to the surface, and all manufactured articles. The land below and behind them all, which would have no value but for the population in general, cannot be justly treated as private property or private monopoly.

The objection that it is impossible to distinguish between prairie value and improvements has been effectually countered both in the writings of Henry George and other land-value taxers and by the common experience of us all. Of course, some reasonable date must be fixed from which to calculate the value of improvements. It would (for example) be unreasonable to hark back to the Roman roads of England! The objection that the assessment of land values would involve a larger army of government officials seems fairly met by Henry George's explanation of the simplicity of his system in contrast to the present 'immense and complicated network of governmental machinery.'

IV

Henry George's attitude toward capitalism is so fully stated in his works that there is no need to belabor the point here. Capital is for him 'the third factor of production,'

is 'essentially labor raised to a higher power,' and is 'stored labor, necessary and important to civilized life.' He would, doubtless, agree with many of the present-day strictures on the defects of the capitalistic system, but he would say that these are not inherent in the principle and are due mainly to the monopoly of land. Free access to land would checkmate most of them. Though interest and money-getting are perfectly legitimate, he would agree with Walter Rathenau that they should not have the first place in our minds. The transference of ground rents from a multiplicity of owners to one owner (the state) does not interfere with the relations of capital and labor, except in so far as it would tend to make them less one-sided. Henry George would, if I understand him aright, disapprove of the onerous burden of the present death duties, and certainly of a levy on capital as such.

The main stimulus of civilization has been the desire of each individual to do the best he can for himself and his family. To abandon this principle and to fly to a purely socialistic gospel is surely to reverse the curve of progress instead of inclining it a little more to the right. The attractiveness of an exclusively altruistic principle may be allowed; but facts seem to show that we are still a long way from a moral standard that would make this possible. Moreover, the best good of the community depends in the last resort on the health, character, and competence of the individual. Such actual socialistic legislation as we have had seems to bear distinctly the brand of 'class'; and surely the acceptance of this dichotomy is an abandonment of a higher ideal. The George view is

that it is possible to improve matters without beginning all over again. Competition in itself is a sane and healthy function, and it is only its abuse that is undesirable. The next step should not be the substitution of Socialism for competition, but the substitution of an (at least relatively) fair and unprivileged competition for the chaotic, privileged, and unfair brand we have at present.

The taxation of land values does not militate against our sense of justice. This seems to demand that everyone should have a fair start and that reward should be as far as possible commensurate with the value of service rendered to the community. The socialistic idea that remuneration should be as nearly equal as possible for all seems benevolent rather than just. Equality is a chimera, and must remain so until every child is born with the same capacity as others. Our motto then is not 'Equality' but 'Equal Opportunity,' so far as that is attainable. The prosperity of a country depends upon the distribution as well as the amount of its wealth; and the present disproportion between incomes and services offends our sense of justice. Attempts to overcome this should not be hampered by privileged monopolies, of which the monopoly of site-value is the chief.

V

Another way in which taxation of land values appeals to our sense of justice crops up in our relation to posterity. Since we can neither increase nor decrease the size of the earth, and since future generations will be in the same case, it is obvious that the inhabitants of the earth at

any one moment are merely tenants-for-life, entitled only to usufruct. If so, we are not at liberty to tie up any portion of the terrestrial surface by entail. The compensation due to present landowners, on the score of the tacit connivance of the community as a whole in the creation of the present situation, need not be extended to their unborn 'heirs.' There will be no injustice in taking measures to let all future members of the community inherit their property on equal terms. Babies must be relieved of their present function of adding to the wealth of the existing landlords. Brazil, in her treatment of slavery, compromised with abstract justice by decreeing that all children born after a certain date should be born free. There would be no injustice in decreeing that after (say) 1980 no little absolute landowners should be born in England's green and pleasant land. This does not mean that no landholders should be born. Fixity of tenure, in all reasonable cases, is quite compatible with land-value taxation. The actual holder has merely to make over to the state the annual rental or ratable value of his holding. We agree with Arthur Young that secure tenure (our equivalent for 'ownership') turns waste land into a garden. The principle involved is merely an extension of the right of eminent domain.

The position of the land-value taxer is by no means a mere outcry of the poor, anxious to lay their hands on a share of the wealth of the rich; it rests on the belief that all will ultimately gain by the abolition of private monopoly of land. In the words of Henry George: 'When labor yields the largest result to the laborer, when the production of wealth is greatest and

the distribution most equitable, when the man who has nothing but his labor is surest of making the most comfortable living and best provision for those whom nature has made dependent on him, then will be the best conditions of life for all—then will the general standard of intelligence and virtue be highest, and then will all that makes a nation truly great and strong and glorious most abound.'

VI

A frequent misconception in regard to land-value taxation is the idea that it is mainly concerned with 'country' or agricultural land. As a matter of fact, at least seventy-five per cent of the land value of England is urban (London alone accounting for fifteen per cent). The pages of *Progress and Poverty* in which Henry George tries to show that the farmer will be one of the chief beneficiaries under his system are among the most important in the book. The gist of them is that the farmer would be a gainer by the institution of an annual land-value tax instead of the rent tithe, interest on mortgages, and rates he now pays. It seems fairly clear that in modern conditions agricultural land cannot support the three classes of landlord, farmer, and agricultural laborer. Under George's scheme there would be practically only two classes: the farmer (including owners who farm their own land) and his employees. The site-value rental, paid to the community, would often be less than that now paid to the landlord; not to speak of the relief from other burdens.

Henry George gives us also good reason to believe that the landlord need not suffer in the long run (see

Progress and Poverty, Book IX, chap. iii, and compare the quotation given above). Indeed it might help the ideal 'squire' to regain some of the prestige he has lost of late. The important and beneficial side of the country-gentleman owner may be freely recognized; and it is hoped that many of the best features of this may be quite compatible with the new arrangement for agricultural rent. Mere rent-receivers might suffer at first, but they have been receiving for generations what (*ex hypothesi*) they should not have received. So far as they have invested in improvements on land, in industry, or in trade, they will share the general advantages of the reform. Landlords will gain as producers, even if they lose as speculators. No landlord need be dispossessed of any of his holding provided he pays over the annual rental value to the state. This might interfere with the holding of land as a mere hobby. Then, as now, this would be one of the luxuries of wealth. But those who exploited their land economically would be as untrammelled as all other farmers. Minor owners of small homesteads, suburban gardens, and the like, would gain. The selling value of their lot would disappear, in the same ratio as that of all similar lots; but they would be losers only in the sense that 'the man who has bought himself a pair of boots may be said to be a loser by a subsequent fall in the price of boots. His boots will be just as useful to him, and the next pair of boots will cost him less' (*Progress and Poverty*, Book IX, chap. iii).

Those who feel that the revival of British agriculture is a paramount necessity may rest assured that the taxation of land values, encouraging

as it does free access to land and discouraging the holding of unused land for a future rise in price, cannot be other than helpful to all reasonable measures to attain this end. Unemployment begins in the village; and farmers, who cannot close down in bad times like the manufacturer, will achieve the security they need.

Planned society is not socialistic. There is nothing in land taxation that militates against careful planning and desirable coöperation. In industry it aims at the smooth and correlative working of the two operative factors—capital and labor. Socialism is really a defeatist solution. It presupposes an eternal antinomy between two great divisions of mankind, which can be met only by a complete abandonment of any policy of conciliation. If the machinery of progress can be so improved that present handicaps and injustices are done away with, this should make a stronger appeal to common sense than a complete scrapping of the whole outfit.

As already noted, the single taxers of to-day are practically all free traders, so there is no need to doubt that these two doctrines are quite compatible. The relation of land value to protection is not so obvious, but perhaps the situation might be presented as follows. Under normal conditions free access to land would naturally be accompanied by a free exchange of the commodities produced by using the land. This might be agreed to as the ideal *in vacuo*. But we are not in a vacuum; we are living in a world in which protection is the creed of the great majority of white men. To the protectionists in our own country it seems unfortunate for a nation to be practically the only im-

portant upholder of free trade in a world of protection. Be this as it may, the first nation that abolished land monopoly would not thereby be bound to adopt free trade. Land-value taxers might argue that free trade and the single tax together would make any kind of protection needless, but the position of the protectionist would still be analogous to that of the man who says, 'I have insured against death, sickness, fire, and burglars; to make my position still more secure, I'll take out policies against earthquakes and the birth of twins.' He might fairly put protection ahead of free land, just as the single taxers put free land ahead of free trade. The protectionist might justify himself by his belief (right or wrong) that in a bad storm it may for a time be more urgent to work the pumps than to keep the ship on its correct course. It may be significant that important steps involving the Henry George principle have been taken in protectionist states like the United States of America (Pittsburgh Plan) and New Zealand.

VII

Conservatives, Liberals and Labor members may all be invited to look carefully at the points in which they might find Henry Georgeism useful in the furtherance of the best features of their policies. The Liberals and Socialists have already shown that they do not object to the principle, though the latter do not seem to realize the essential individualism of the Georgian gospel. The Conservatives might remember with Tennyson that 'he is the best Conservative who lops the mouldered branch away,' and welcome a doctrine that would take the

wind out of the sails of Socialism and Communism. More than one Conservative statesman has made statements that show practical agreement with site-value taxation. It would only be the owners of valuable urban sites or underground minerals who would have to submit to a progressive diminution in the unearned-increment part of their income.

The recognition that land-value taxation will produce greater prosperity in one's own country is not inconsistent with international policies, which might remain as widely divergent as they now are. The same remark applies to internal matters of nonpolitical complexion, such as religion, education, the drink question, and so on. The land taxer is free to ascribe the kindly gifts of the earth to Divine Providence or to blind natural force. The Roman Catholic may be reminded that the Pope agrees with Henry George in denouncing Socialism. The land taxer may welcome the

Continental Sunday or he may close all theatres and cinemas on that day. He may increase or decrease the speed limit. He may amend, end, or extend the powers of the House of Lords. He may be monarchist or republican, inflationist or deflationist, gold-standardist or bimetallist. The only thing that really clashes with the taxation of land values is artificially or legally created privilege or monopoly. Mr. Bernard Shaw will retain the monopoly of his brains; Carnera the monopoly of his muscles. This is a natural, unavoidable, and unobjectionable monopoly. It would be a very different thing if Mr. Shaw were put in a position to levy a small tribute on all his fellow authors, or Carnera on all his fellow pugilists, though even that would be preferable to the unearned increment accruing to a fainéant landowner who does nothing but continue to live. It would be more of the nature of a financial O.M., awarded by natural suffrage to superman ability.

The Witnesses

By W. H. AUDEN

From *The Listener*, Weekly Organ of the British Broadcasting Corporation

I

You dowagers with Roman noses,
Sailing along between banks of roses
 well dressed,
You Lords who sit at committee tables
And crack with grooms in riding stables
 your father's jest;

Solicitors with poker faces,
And doctors with black bags to cases
hurried,
Reporters coming home at dawn
And heavy bishops on the lawn
by sermons worried;

You stokers lit by furnace-glare,
And you, too, steeplejacks up there
 singing,
You shepherds wind-blown on the ridges,
Tramps leaning over village bridges
 your eardrums ringing;

On land, on sea, in field, in town
Attend: Musician put them down,
 those trumpets;
Let go, young lover, of her hand
Come forward both of you and stand
 as still as limpets

Close as you can and listen well
My companion here is about to tell
a story;
Peter, Pontius Pilate, Paul
Whoever you are, it concerns you all
and human glory.

II

Call him Prince Alpha if you wish
He was born in a palace, his people were swish;
his christening
Was called by the Tatler the event of the year,
All the photographed living were there
and the dead were listening.

You would think I was trying to foozle you
If I told you all that kid could do;
enough
To say he was never afraid of the dark
He climbed all the trees in his pater's park;
his nurse thought him rough.

At school his brilliance was a mystery,
All languages, science, maths, and history
he knew;
His style at cricket was simply stunning
At rugger, soccer, hockey, running
and swimming too

The days went by, he grew mature;
He was a looker you may be sure,
so straight
Old couples cried 'God bless my soul
I thought that man was a telegraph pole'
when he passed their gate.

His eyes were blue as a mountain lake,
He made the hearts of the girls to ache;
he was strong;
He was gay, he was witty, his speaking voice
Sounded as if a large Rolls-Royce
had passed along.

He kissed his dear old mater one day,
He said to her 'I'm going away,
good-bye'
No sword nor terrier by his side
He set off through the world so wide
under the sky.

Where did he travel? Where did n't he travel
Over the ice and over the gravel
 and the sea;
Up the fevered jungle river,
Through haunted forests without a shiver
 he wandered free.

What did he do? What did n't he do,
He rescued maidens, overthrew
 ten giants
Like factory chimneys, slaughtered dragons,
Though their heads were larger than railway wagons
 tamed their defiance.

What happened, what happened? I'm coming to that;
He came to a desert and down he sat
 and cried,
Above the blue sky arching wide
Two tall rocks as black as pride
 on either side.

There on a stone he sat him down,
Around the desert stretching brown
 like the tide,
Above the blue sky arching wide
Two black rocks on either side
 and, O how he cried.

'I thought my strength could know no stemming
But I was foolish as a lemming;
 for what
Was I born, was it only to see
I'm as tired of life as life of me?
 let me be forgot.

Children have heard of my every action
It gives me no sort of satisfaction
 and why?
Let me get this as clear as I possibly can
No, I am not the truly strong man,
O let me die.'

There in the desert all alone
He sat for hours on a long flat stone
 and sighed;
Above the blue sky arching wide
Two black rocks on either side,
 and then he died.

Now ladies and gentlemen, big and small,
This story of course has a morale;
 again
Unless like him you wish to die
Listen, while my friend and I
 proceed to explain.

III

What had he done to be treated thus?
If you want to know, he'd offended us:
 for yes,
We guard the wells, we're handy with a gun,
We've a very special sense of fun,
 we curse and bless.

You are the town, and we are the clock,
We are the guardians of the gate in the rock,
 the Two;
On your left, and on your right
In the day, and in the night
 we are watching you.

Wiser not to ask just what has occurred
To them that disobeyed our word;
 to those
We were the whirlpool, we were the reef,
We were the formal nightmare, grief,
 and the unlucky rose.

Climb up the cranes, learn the sailors' words
When the ships from the islands, laden with birds
 come in;
Tell you stories of fishing and other men's wives,
The expansive moments of constricted lives,
 in the lighted inn.

THE LIVING AGE

By all means say of the peasant youth
'That person there is in the truth'
we're kind

Tire of your little rut and look it,
You have to obey but you don't have to like it,
we do not mind:

But do not imagine we do not know
Or that what you hide with care won't show
 at a glance;
Nothing is done, nothing is said
But don't make the mistake of thinking us dead;
 I should n't dance

For I'm afraid in that case you'll have a fall;
We've been watching you over the garden wall
for hours,
The sky is darkening like a stain,
Something is going to fall like rain
and it won't be flowers.

When the green field comes off like a lid
Revealing what were much better hid,
 unpleasant;
And look! behind without a sound
The woods have come up and are standing round
 in deadly crescent.

And the bolt is sliding in its groove,
Outside the window is the black remov-
ers' van,
And now with sudden swift emergence
Come the women in dark glasses, the hump-backed
surgeons and the scissor-man.

This might happen any day
So be careful what you say
or do
Be clean, be tidy, oil the lock,
Trim the garden, wind the clock
Remember the Two.

BOOKS ABROAD

THE MENACE OF FASCISM. By John Strachey. London: Victor Gollancz. New York: Covici-Friede. 1933. \$2.25.

(Sir Norman Angell in the *Week-end Review*, London)

FASCISM, says Mr. John Strachey, is 'the attempt of the capitalists to preserve their system by violence.' It is 'merely the militant arm of the largest property owners.' It is 'in the interests of a tiny minority of the richest, biggest bankers, capitalists, and landlords alone. For their sake, and for their sake alone, it tortures and terrorizes.' This statement in one form or another is repeated again and again throughout the book. And particularly will Fascism, at the behest of its real paymasters, promote war. And thereby, Mr. Strachey goes on to explain, destroy that large-scale industry upon which capitalists depend and which it is their object to defend. Why are the capitalists, supposed to be particularly astute in the protection of their interests, thus indulging in obvious *hara-kiri*? Why are vast numbers of petty bourgeois—the small shopkeeper and trader, the local manufacturer—made to serve the interests of their economic enemies?

We are confronted here, in the case of both of the big and the little capitalist, with an obvious contradiction between their interest and their behavior. Mr. Strachey makes it quite clear that another war will smash capitalism utterly; that a child could see it. Then why do capitalists pro-

mote it? Mr. Strachey does not really tell us, any more than he attempts to explain by what means hundreds of thousands of youths, in other circumstances generous and high-minded, are led to feel that obscene and cowardly bullying is high patriotism. The only explanations vouchsafed, made in terms of the orthodox Communist assumptions about capitalism and imperialism, are themselves contradictions. We are told that the capitalists of Germany and Italy have a compelling interest in conquest. Now in view of the situation of capitalism in the countries that have just had a successful war, the question would naturally arise: What do capitalists expect to get out of a new war, in view of what they got out of the last? Debts that cannot be paid, investments that have melted into thin air, financial dislocations and losses such as economic history has never known before, millionaires reduced to penury, the whole system all but shaken to pieces, and revolution forever in the background?

Mr. Strachey insists, as an almost self-evident fact, that the next war will, from the capitalist point of view, be worse still. He makes the usual suggestions about 'fights for markets.' Well, Britain fought the war and won it. Where are the markets? How can capitalism use military power to obtain them? Raw materials? With capitalism unable to dispose of what it now has? Is British capitalism in a sounder, more prosperous position after the defeat of Germany than it was before? Mr. Strachey speaks of

British capitalists exploiting a vast Empire as a private preserve. The implication is that they 'own' it. What are the functions of ownership that the capitalist British Government can exercise in Australia, Canada, South Africa, or any other Dominion? Forbid hostile tariffs that help to reduce the textile industry of Lancashire and Yorkshire to utter ruin? Compel repayment of money loaned if, say, Australia cares to repudiate? Mr. Strachey is aware, of course, that the act of the British House of Commons does not run in most of the British Empire; that the Dominions are fiscally independent states; that Britain has no more economic authority over Australia than over Argentina; that in so far as preferences are arranged they are a matter of bargain in which the 'exploited' state, say Canada, is able usually to exercise a bargaining power greater than that of the 'exploiter'; that, in other words, the political power exercised by a state like Britain has very little indeed to do with capitalist exploitation, which may be carried on by an 'oppressed' Indian mill-owner or a protected Irish manufacturer even more ruthlessly than by one belonging to the 'oppressor' state.

You have here a series of facts that must obviously be taken into account in any attempt to analyze the nature of the forces underlying the armed struggle of states; facts that bear most pertinently upon such a theme as Mr. Strachey's. But, as in most Socialist discussions of the question, the facts are simply ignored or, by implication, flatly denied. Until they are taken into account we shall miss the most menacing feature of Fascism, which is not that it may be used by

economic groups to promote their interests, but that they are able to use it because it appeals to motives, both conscious and unconscious, which can smother reason and turn whole nations into semi-madmen. How may we render innocuous the terrific psychological forces that Fascism exploits? That is a question as interesting to the Socialist as the capitalist; for those same forces can destroy Socialism as easily as they may destroy capitalism.

It is true that capitalists promote war in the sense that, while capitalism as a system has certainly nothing to gain by war, capitalists as a social order usually throw their weight in favor of policies that make war inevitable, or extremely difficult to avoid; but the explanation is that they behave as nationalists rather than as capitalists. And, after all, there is nothing astonishing in this. It is, of course, pure myth to regard 'the' capitalist as a steel-brained robot seeing clearly and pursuing a narrowly economic interest quite uninfluenced by the emotions to which the 'people' are subject. And sometimes warlike courses are imposed upon capitalist governments against their will by the type of popular passion that gives Fascism its opportunity and power. Practically every historian who has analyzed the facts is of opinion that if bankers and industrialists had been making the Treaty of Versailles they would have omitted the more destructive features, which were inserted because the governments concerned were afraid of popular nationalist clamor; just as for years American bankers and financiers have stood for a policy of debt cancellation that American governments have not

dared to favor because of popular sentiment in Oshkosh and Gopher Prairie. If from the mass of conflict so produced war results—as it may—will that also be a 'capitalist plot'?

We used to have the 'guilty-nation theory' as an adequate explanation of war. Socialists now present us with 'the guilty-class' theory as the explanation of such phenomena as Fascism and war. It is inadequate. There are certain psychological tendencies which Fascism reveals that will present as great a problem to the Socialist world as to the present one. Those facts ought to be faced realistically, particularly by the Socialist. Despite this gap in his explanation, Mr. Strachey's book is well worth reading, if only for some of his documents bearing on Fascism, and his forecast of the possibility of Fascism in England; and from what he has to say, from inside knowledge, of the political pilgrimage of Sir Oswald Mosley.

FAUBOURGS DE PARIS. By Eugène Dabit. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française. 1933.

(Marc Bernard in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Paris)

THE working population of Paris is not an easy one to understand. One can live close to it for years without ever knowing it, without gaining more than a surface understanding of it. Neither sympathy nor attentiveness can bridge the gap. I believe that one has to share its bitter bread of misery to understand it fully. Riding down the deserted streets of Belleville or Ménilmontant in a bus or an automobile of a Sunday, one cannot imagine the world that lives within these boundaries, its customs, laws,

and spirit. The only impression one takes away is that of the desolation in these joyless streets.

One needs courage to deal with a subject like *Faubourgs of Paris*. Eugène Dabit makes us penetrate the men who live there. He describes their existence with a faithfulness, an honesty, a lack of pride, a refusal to seek for facile effects that give his book a remarkable quality. One finds no airy romanticism in his pages. Eugène Dabit confines himself entirely to describing those laborious ants that we see marching in regular formation four times a day, at the same hours, along hillsides where only a few small squares of grass still remain between the tall, black houses. As Dabit clearly shows, there is nothing on which one's eye can rest. No matter where one looks, one sees nothing but the same mediocrity, the same atrocious Monday mornings with fate resuming its desperate march.

The humble pleasures of the moment after the noonday repast, when one strolls for a minute before returning to the factory; the housewives who go marketing in sandals; the lazy Sunday mornings; the wretched, raucous local diversions; the urchins whose heels go rattling through the street as they look with eager eyes into the fairyland behind shop windows; the dreary roar of the railroad; the green oasis of the Buttes-Chaumont—Eugène Dabit describes all these aspects of the life of the people who live in the Paris faubourgs with the same minuteness, the same attention to perfect detail that Flemish masters brought to their paintings. It is the same serious, honest art, the same effacement of the painter as compared with his subject. In an epoch of bluff like our own and

of thwarted ambition, one feels happy to encounter a writer who addresses us in measured, calm words, but without coldness, as he applies himself to render an exact reproduction of his model, ceaselessly seeking the proper tone, harmoniously combining its effect with the end that he had set for himself, a man who, in a word, is more concerned to present his own testimony in all its purity rather than to astound the good bourgeois reader.

It is more of a pleasure than one can say to discover in *Faubourgs of Paris* those qualities that form the foundation and essence of Eugène Dabit's personality. One appreciates the real courage he needed to write certain pages and not be repelled by the vulgarity of certain details. Turning his back on the picturesque, he is always sacrificing to truth, showing us his characters as he actually saw them without adding an inch to their stature. These are such rare virtues that they evoke unqualified praise.

It is a good thing that people send messages to each other over the ram-parts, messages with such a note of authenticity concerning the life of their own class. Since what divides people is always on the surface and what brings them together lies deep down within, we are not slow in feeling that we have entered, if not a familiar country, at least a known country when we read the honest accounts of these travelers, whether they are Prousts or proletarian writers. I can still remember the joyful astonishment of a young worker who found on the opening pages of *Côté de chez Swann* word-for-word descriptions, executed with such delicacy and exactness that only the settings had changed, of impressions that he himself had experienced viv-

idly a thousand times over. How much our vision of the world gains in clearness and in depth when such things confront us.

Having moved through these quarters for nearly ten years, I am in a position to say that only *Pain Quotidien*—a beautiful book that fell victim to terrible injustice—equals the sincerity of *Faubourgs of Paris*. Nor have I seen any other book that deserves to be praised above these two. But documents of this kind are multiplying, and it is all to the good. They will lead to all kinds of reflections. They will throw light on many things that are little known. They will reveal in words of flame that many men are facing this alternative: either brutalization a thousand times more frightful than death, or revolt. Would that we had a Marcel Proust of the proletariat. In the meantime let us fervently welcome books like this and give them our ear. Then less of what is human will be unknown to those who are ignorant of these miserable regions.

AN ANTHOLOGY OF HAIKU. *Ancient and Modern. Translated and Annotated by Asabori Miyamori. Tokyo: Maruyen. 1933.*

(Basil de Selincourt in *The Observer*, London)

THE charm of Japanese poetry is so great that you can feel it, even if you are totally ignorant of the language. But I must speak for myself alone. I know no Japanese but what I have learned from reading Japanese poetry; and reading is certainly the wrong name for it, for I have never even used a dictionary. I do not read. I taste and meditate and wonder.

I have dipped at various times into

collections of *Haiku*, but none has ever delighted me so much as this of Mr. Miyamori's, partly because it is the most representative I have seen (it contains a thousand haiku, and of the most celebrated Mr. Miyamori gives, besides his own, numerous alternative renderings by well-known authors), and partly because, written in English by a Japanese of high authority and published under the patronage of one of the Imperial Princes, it involves me more deeply than ever in the mysteries of beauty worship in Japan; for what is their poetry but an exquisite verbal obeisance, as of the pilgrim at the shrine?

Mr. Miyamori gives us, to begin with, the history of the haiku from the first definite emergence of the form in the sixteenth century, and then the lives of its four greatest exponents. Coming to the poems themselves, we find them accompanied sometimes with a reproduction of the poet's original writing and design (for a Japanese poem is like a song of Blake; you can not fully find its quality till you have seen the artist's penmanship), and often with a description of the circumstances in which they were composed. Finally, we have, of course, with the translations, the original Japanese text, printed first in Oriental and afterward in Roman type.

Candidly, it is these Japanese texts that have chiefly fascinated me. The translations, though indispensable, are rather uninteresting. Mr. Miyamori is critical of most of the attempts that have been made by English and American writers to express the haiku flavor in our tongue. Naturally, I am no judge of their various approximations to accuracy. But Mr. Miyamori himself has not appreciated all the diffi-

culties; they begin, of course, in the Japanese, but they end in the English. He has an exhaustive knowledge of our language, and yet he is not sufficiently at home in it to feel those indescribable gradations which in a translation of poetry are all. There is, indeed, little or nothing one cannot learn from this monumental work of his; but if, like Professor Housman, he is an oyster, he is not an English oyster; most of his translations must be retranslated, and his comments when most serious are sometimes most absurd. For example:—

Upon the temple bell
A butterfly is sleeping well.

Mr. Miyamori explains that he has used rhyme to convey the nobility of style in his original; but, unluckily, it is less noble in English to say that a butterfly is sleeping well than to say simply that it is asleep. Or, again:—

A CROW ON A BARE BRANCH

A crow is perched on a bare branch;
It is an autumn eve.

Mr. Miyamori explains: 'It is an evening of advanced autumn. A tall tree is standing on the withered moor. Bereft of leaves, its branches are utterly bare. The setting sun shines on the tree tops,' etc. The explanation does not amount to more, I think, than an assertion, in emphatic terms, that the poem is poetical; it does not help one to discover where the poetry resides.

The more I savor with my untutored mind the delicious enigma of the originals, the more I see how large a proportion of their poetry lies in choice and collocation of imitative words. The haiku requires the reader to be a poet, able to supply a back-

ground of poetry. It vivifies one or two details, and vanishes with a hint or gesture to indicate context. In fact, conjecture is a recognized element of true appreciation; as in the crossword, there is always some missing link to be supplied, and enjoyment is not made perfect till the hearer finds the precise and sensitive response that the poet has left to his imagination.

After its mystery, the quality most prized in the haiku is its spontaneity; it must have the flavor of an improvisation. This, of course, is the hardest requirement to fulfill, not least because everyone, in Japan, is expected to be a poet. The composition of haiku is a part of manners. The best people are also the best poets. So the professional or vocational poet is as much a rarity as with us, and his utterances are received in an atmosphere of veneration that oftentimes confuses criticism. It seems to have been customary for poets of renown to set out on pilgrimages in the hope of hitting on occasions when immortal words would fall from their lips; and often on his deathbed, or when his house burned down, a poet would find himself surrounded by disciples, confident that grief or disaster would be surmounted by the appropriate haiku.

These are humorous aspects of a great tradition. Poetry in Japan is, in a sense that we can scarcely fathom, the expression of a collective, national spirit. Inevitably certain knobs and corners obtrude themselves on our undisciplined attention. Wherever convention is powerful, incongruities must arise. But here is a convention that commands our understanding and our homage because of the strength and delicacy of its works. In Japan, a poem is an interjection; and yet poetry

is with them, what it has failed to be with us, an example of the love of beauty accepted popularly as a form of worship.

Lo! the fireflies are afraid of their reflections in the water . . .

Ah! rain is also one of my desires in spring . . .

Yield to the willow the desires and passions of your heart . . .

O glorious moon! I strolled all night around the pond.

JOHANNA UND ESTHER. *By Frank Thiess. Berlin: Paul Zsolnay Verlag. 1933.*

(From the *Neue Freie Presse*, Vienna)

THIS is a beautiful book and should be read. There is much knowledge of humanity in it, much love of humanity, and much love of nature. One realizes with pleasure that love impelled the author to write it. In short, here is a book that warms the heart.

It is full of 'plot,' to be sure, and thus gives the average reader what he wants. But it is not the plot that causes these 582 pages (actually 582—a trifle too many) to make such a strong and lasting impression on the exceptional reader. It is the atmosphere that rises from the black, dead letters, a pure, clean atmosphere, refreshing to breathe. Frank Thiess has called his book 'A Chronicle of Rural Events.' He might also have called it 'A Symbol of Fertility,' for it is another *Growth of the Soil*—not a clumsy imitation of Hamsun's splendid, naturalistic book, but perhaps a subconscious reflection of it, the product of strong, deep feeling for everything that lives and grows.

Therefore this novel ends organically as a hymn of praise to maternity, to the motherliness of women and the motherhood of nature.

Johanna and Esther are two women who become mothers. At the beginning of the book it seems as if no two people could be more unlike. Johanna Konken, the virtuous daughter of a German farmer living in a Danzig village on the Baltic, marries Albrecht Reitter, a young man from Hanover who is eager to see life and to capture a dowry. Esther Caserta, on the contrary, is a married woman twenty years Johanna's senior, an Italian with some English blood and a city dweller to the marrow whom chance has brought to the same part of the country in which Johanna lives. Her husband, an internationally known violinist, pays her flying visits between his concert tours.

In spite, and even because of the difference between his two heroines, Frank Thiess, who is a true poet, succeeds in raising the contrast on which the book is founded to a harmony, so that finally the symbol that appeared vaguely at first becomes a concrete image—the meaning and holiness of woman, motherhood that is not accidental but intentional, that is not experienced incidentally but is suffered vitally. Moreover, a powerful and sustaining poetic effect is gained by making Albrecht Reitter, the man who causes both the girl and the woman to become mothers, a completely worthless good-for-nothing who cares only for parties and good times. A parasite without an ounce of responsibility, he is one of those countless men to be found everywhere who conceal their infamy behind pleasing polish and courtesy. It is admirable

that just such a worthless fellow should cause an awakening to higher things in the God-forsaken village, that it should be he who brings the most opposite feminine types to a knowledge of their mission in life. And it is proof of the prevalence and fertility of this mission that the most worthless sort of man can unintentionally awaken and even ennoble it.

These contrasts lie in the wide domain of the spirit. But Thiess, the poet, is also concerned with the age-old elementary contrast between city and country, which he expresses through some of the subsidiary characters into whom he breathes the breath of life. Herr Drogist Schnase pursues his rural way with tragi-comic effect, his little black cloak concealing a scrawny figure and a not wholly tidy appearance. How true to life is Frau Laroche, a former city actress, when she opens her bright-red mouth, pretending that one is at one's youngest at forty and that it is normal for men and women to lie to members of the opposite sex. And how faithfully is the violinist, Herr Professor Caserta, portrayed, with the cruel fatigue of his life, perpetually condemned to sleeping cars, his yearning for rest and inability to achieve it.

This is indeed a poetic work that is occasionally proud of its character and takes pleasure in literary phrases and hazy trains of thought. But its author is so closely bound to nature that he constantly descends from these dead excrescences to the root of fertility that he is seeking throughout. It is a fine thing that this message of love should be given us again in these days of havoc and destruction. It is a fine thing that an entire book should not contain a single word of hate.

THE SCIENCES AND SOCIETY

THE WHEAT PACT recently signed by Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States, providing for a 15-per-cent reduction in acreage during the next year, is but a feeble imitation of the thorough measures by which nature (frequently aided by human ignorance and neglect) regulates production. Crop removals that cause leaching of the soil; rains and floods that wash away the precious topsoils; the effects of drought, high winds, and frost; the never-ceasing attacks of insect pests—any one of these can effect more damage in a single season than any human efforts.

Consider, for example, the effects of soil erosion in the United States. Chester A. Reeds, Curator of Geology of the American Museum of Natural History, has pointed out that the sedimentary material of the topsoils carried down the Mississippi River totals more than 400,000,000 tons per year—enough material to cover one square mile of the earth's surface to a depth of 268 feet. In addition to this, all the rivers of the continent contribute each year to the oceans nearly three billion tons of dissolved mineral matter from the subsoil, and in 1932 America lost 3,000,000 tons of cultivable soil that were washed out of fields and overgrazed pastures. The United States Bureau of Chemistry and Soils estimates that about 17,500,000 acres of good crop land have been destroyed by erosion, in other words, nearly twice the wheat acreage to be withdrawn from cultivation under the Pact. The Department of Agriculture, on the basis of numerous erosion surveys, concludes that probably a third of the often irreplaceable surface soil has been leached away from a quarter of the 359,000,000 acres under cultivation, and that another fourth has suffered depletion amounting to one-sixth of the humus. Unless present cropping methods are altered, and more attention paid to the terracing of sloping lands, the next half century may add another

100,000,000 acres to those already claimed by the oceans, one of which, the Atlantic, has been estimated by the Danish zoologist, Dr. August Kroch, to contain potential food substances equivalent to twenty thousand times the wheat harvest of the world.

CLIMATIC AND WEATHER effects upon crops between the years 1909 and 1925 have also been studied by the United States Department of Agriculture, which brings forward further evidence that nature has her own code of fair competition, with results not always favorable to man. Thus, during the years under investigation, weather conditions reduced the expected yield of corn by over 900,000,000 bushels annually, drought alone having claimed more than 500,000,000 bushels for about half the period. Further corn losses from excess moisture amounted to over 200,000,000 bushels in six years, rising to 600,000,000 bushels in the year 1915 alone. Two years later frost claimed a similar amount, and in 1918 hot winds added another 250,000,000 bushels.

For wheat, admittedly inadequate statistics reveal a loss of 250,000,000 bushels by drought in 1911; excessive moisture destroyed more than 100,000,000 bushels in 1915; frost claimed an equal amount in 1917; and in 1922 hailstorms took another 25,000,000 bushels. In spite of this continuous destruction by natural forces, wheat stocks in the United States now amount to well over a third of the world's total of 950,000,000 bushels.

MOISTURE CONTENT in harvested crops is also an important factor in scientific agriculture. A note in *Nature* (London) points out that, although conditions are seldom too dry for wheat in Great Britain, wet weather during harvest time can spoil the crop in many ways—chiefly by raising the percentage of moisture in

the grains. A 30 per cent water content may easily lead to sprouting and heating in the stacked grain, whose moisture must be considerably reduced by storage before further processing is advisable. Even 18 to 20 per cent of moisture may lead to serious losses in milling. The present (1933) harvest has been exceptionally favorable in this respect. The moisture content of delivered wheat grains is not expected to go much beyond 13 per cent—a figure approaching that of some American wheat, but above that of Australian and Indian samples. This will result in flour of excellent quality, thus proving again the extreme dependence of man upon the climate of whatever region he happens to inhabit.

FURTHER EVIDENCE of the growing interest in 'economic' problems on the part of scientists may be found in an open letter contributed to *Nature* by Henry E. Armstrong, renowned for his original work in chemistry. Taking the position that the failure of the World Economic Conference was a foregone conclusion owing to the hopeless conflict of interests, Professor Armstrong generalizes on the problem of 'monetary standards' in a way that may cause some readers to note, with pleasure or regret, resemblances to the Major Douglas school of New Economics:—

The present impasse is clearly traceable to unrestricted, unscientific squandering of the world's resources: this cannot go on; some halt must be called. In some way, science must be made to prevail: some element of scientific thought must be introduced into world affairs generally, some element of altruism, far more understanding of the limitations. It is essential that we learn to measure all things, so that we have a check upon production and use.

This—with the exception of the altruism—sounds also like a very faint echo of Technocracy. But presently Professor Armstrong engages upon the Ixionlike task of seeking to standardize a unit of value, gold:—

The term 'standard' has no meaning for people generally. The way in which it has been bandied

about of late in connection with gold is clear proof that it has no meaning in the commercial mind or even within the Bank of England. Presumably tables of weights and measures are taught in every school. How many know upon what standards they rest? . . . If, to-morrow, the world could agree that the metric system should be used generally, measurements—whether of length, area, volume, or mass—would everywhere be made in terms of one primary standard, the metre.

It is significant that Professor Armstrong does not himself include 'value' among the dimensions susceptible of metrical treatment. Standing alone, the statement might permit one to conclude that, like Bassett Jones, its author regarded 'value' as a purely subjective—and therefore metrically indeterminate—concept. It is thus interesting, if not very helpful, to find Professor Armstrong returning to the orthodox economists with his left hand what he sought to take from them with his right:—

The only possible scientific close of the Conference will be [he wrote in July, before the parley had been adjourned *sine die*] a recommendation that the nations forthwith take steps to establish a gold-standard unit of monetary value for international use. The establishment of the standard will necessarily entail the fixation of the price at which alone gold may be sold and bought.

IN ALL FAIRNESS to the Douglas group, it must be pointed out that Professor Armstrong's emphasis upon the *commodity* nature of gold (he treats it as something to be bought and sold on its own account—an obvious perversion of the correct purpose of an exchange medium) is not in line with the teachings of the English Social Credit School. Major Douglas, Frederick Soddy, Arthur Kitson, C. M. Hattersley, A. R. Orage, and their followers in America, while maintaining the principle of a standard of value, insist that its unique function is to facilitate production and distribution of goods and services to the utmost limit of human needs.

One fallacy in Professor Armstrong's position was shrewdly indicated in a subsequent letter to *Nature* written by a Mr. W. S. Gall, who pointed out

that standards of weight or length can be agreed upon because they will not vary with changing world conditions, but the quality of value or desirability to mankind cannot be standardized; yet it is this quality which a money standard attempts to fix. The value of one commodity in terms of some other, such as gold, must always vary in relation to the supply.

Compare with this statement the remark of Bassett Jones in his *Debt and Production*: 'Measuring price by any existing standard is like trying to keep a globule of mercury steady on a plate of glass,' or with Howard Scott's: 'Any unit of value under a price system is a certification of debt. Any unit of measurement under technological control would be a certification of available energy converted.' Mr. Gall, however, is apparently unwilling to draw the logical conclusion from his own premise, for he writes: 'Even the energy required to produce a commodity is not fixed, so that an energy standard is also unsatisfactory as a gauge of value.' This sounds very much like saying that because the fuel consumption per horse power of a hydro-electric plant is decreasing as a result of technical improvements, therefore the energy unit, the kilowatt, is an unsatisfactory gauge of performance. It is quite true that no standards, not even those of energy consumption, can measure the subjective element, value: the reverse, however, is equally true—no unit of value can measure energy. And it is precisely from energy sources, chiefly nonhuman, that the Western world derives most of the 'material wealth' upon which society now depends for its security and continuance.

INTERESTING FIGURES on American highways and motor-vehicle transportation have been assembled by the British technical journal, *The Engineer*. A study of the following figures, which are all for the United States in 1932, will give some idea of one factor involved in the much-discussed American 'standard of living.' The registration of motor vehicles was 24,276,000, or 73 per cent of the world

total of 33,026,000. There were 4,100,000 passenger cars in use on farms, and of the country's 3,231,000 motor trucks 880,000, or 27 per cent, were owned by farmers. One hundred railways used a total of 12,000 motor trucks, and eighty railways a total of 4,800 buses. The country contained 97,721 garages, repair shops, and service stations, and 3,700,000 persons were employed in the motor-vehicle and allied lines. There were 3,055,000 miles of highway, of which 868,000 were surfaced, and 1,436,000 motor vehicles were built during the year.

Other figures that have recently been compiled on the costs of motor-vehicle transportation in the United States show that the average tax per vehicle in 1932 was \$45.28, and that this amounted to 24.4 per cent of the average value of the vehicle. The operating cost per mile of the 'composite' or average car was 6½¢, which, at 7,000 miles per car per year, would bring the average annual cost to \$455. In 1932, 1,485,127,929 gallons of gasoline were consumed in New York State alone, the average consumption per car being 700 gallons. But during 1932 New York City showed a decline in automobile registrations of 6,500 a month.

As North America produced last year over 100,000,000 metric tons of petroleum, while Europe (including Russia) yielded about 30,000,000, and Asia less than 14,000,000 metric tons, it is not difficult to understand some of the physical and technical problems that must be correctly solved before we can even begin to realize that pipe dream of the orthodox economist—a high standard of living for all inhabitants of the globe.

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC regulation, long a feature of the American scene, is undergoing rapid development in Europe. A special correspondent, writing in a recent issue of the *London Times Trade and Engineering Supplement*, reports on this problem as it exists in London. Commenting on the improvement following the adoption

of the Road Traffic Act of 1930, which provided for a carefully worked out system of automatic control involving four types of signals, the correspondent gives some figures illustrating the effect upon human labor of mechanization in this field:—

A police constable on traffic duty for sixteen hours a day costs from £700 to £800 per annum. Light signals have been installed at many crossings at a capital cost of £500, with a maintenance cost of £70 per annum, the signals thus paying for themselves in the first year. Trafalgar Square is an example of a traffic centre recently controlled by police at a yearly cost of approximately £5,000, and now entirely controlled by the most up-to-date vehicle-actuated signals installed at a cost of approximately £2,500, with an estimated maintenance cost of £200 per annum.

In the London area automatic traffic-control signals have already replaced 150 constables, and in the whole of the country 550 police constables have been replaced by these signals. The first mechanical signal for the control of traffic (this will be news to many) was erected in London as long ago as 1868. The illuminant, however, being gas, an explosion occurred and the experiment was not continued. No further mechanical signals were erected in this country until the year 1927.

Traffic density, one of the most exasperating problems of the highway engineer, has been found to depend very largely upon the time factor in automatic control. Thus, in London, when the signals completed their cycle in 105 seconds, two of the more heavily traveled roads had a density of 1,158 and 1,032 vehicles per hour, a figure resulting in much congestion of traffic. By reducing the cycle to 70 seconds these densities were cut to 674 and 803 vehicles per hour respectively.

ELECTRIFICATION of railroads has also been proceeding in Europe and in Great Britain. Sir Philip Dawson, in a paper given last year before the International Electrical Congress at Paris, reported on the situation in England. The Southern Railway, controlling 4,000 miles of single-line track, operates at present about 750 miles under electric power, using, not electric locomotives, but nearly 900 electrified motor carriages. He points

out that slow freight trains can, by electric traction, increase their average speeds about 30 per cent; passenger trains, 25 per cent. Despite this, with electric locomotives repairs, renewals, and upkeep cost approximately 40 per cent of what they do when steam is used. (Of every 100 pounds of coal used in a modern locomotive 80 pounds and more goes to warm up the countryside.) If complete railroad electrification were achieved in Great Britain, the maximum power required would represent about 10 per cent of the total demand from the unified power 'grid' and the cost would be approximately one cent per kilowatt hour.

Italy is engaged upon an electrification programme involving nearly 3,000 route miles, to cost over a billion lire and to be completed in 1936. The German State Railway recently electrified the Stuttgart-Ulm line, and the lines from Augsburg to Nuremberg, from Tübingen to Plochingen and from Munich to Dachau, a total of 130 miles, are now being electrified. In Spain, the Spanish-Norte line plans to electrify 105 miles of the difficult Madrid-Avila route, using 2,500-horse-power locomotives. Switzerland, far ahead of other countries, already has 1,130 miles electrified and several hundred miles more will be completed by the end of 1934. Thus it will shortly be possible to travel the 825 miles from Geneva to Budapest behind a single-phase electric locomotive. The Midi Railway of France has 35 per cent (926 route miles) electrified, and the Paris-Orléans line has completed double-track electrification of the 68-mile route from Orléans to Tours, and is waiting for delivery of twenty-five 4,000-horse-power locomotives. The Belgian National Railway hopes to complete its Brussels-Antwerp section in 1935, following up on the steeply graded Luxembourg main line. Suburban electrification is proceeding actively around Copenhagen, Warsaw, Moscow, and in Holland between Rotterdam and Dordrecht.

—HAROLD WARD

AS OTHERS SEE US

CUBA

YANKEE imperialism and dollar diplomacy have come in for their usual abuse in the European press in connection with the crisis in Cuba. Here is the way Pierre E. Briquet describes the situation for the benefit of the *Journal de Genève's* Swiss readers:—

Coolidge and Hoover remained indifferent to prayers of intervention, leaving Machado a free hand and even letting it be understood that they would not tolerate a revolution. The reasons for this attitude must, alas, be traced back to the economic activities of the United States. Before his election Machado had sold out his electrical concern to the Electric Bond and Share Company. The Cuban branch of the Chase National Bank, one of whose directors is Obregon, Machado's own son-in-law, represents the interests of other American companies and is the biggest bank on the island. It advanced at first thirty and then twenty million dollars to the Machado government. Is it therefore surprising that Wall Street found in him a valuable and obedient servant?

Obedience meant continued exploitation of the sugar industry and increased harvests. Since the Spanish troops departed in 1898, New York financiers have been buying sugar plantations. They have paid high prices but they have covered their expenses by depressing the labor market and replacing Spaniards and Cubans with Jamaica Negroes and Haitians. In 1912, a third of the sugar land was in the hands of Americans. The War made the price of sugar go up and increased the area of land devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. But prices fell and Wall Street gathered in

its harvest. Cubans who had fallen into debt had to sell their plantations to big American companies. To-day three-fourths of the plantations and forty per cent of the area of the island are in their hands. The companies continue to use Negro labor, and the white population, impoverished and proletarianized, is gradually being driven off its land and finally off the island. Every year it loses between twenty and thirty thousand people who are replaced by Negroes. The Americans have left Cuba only a phantom of its independence. Their fleet occupies the Bay of Guantanamo, the best harbor. Railways, street-car lines, sugar, tobacco—everything belongs to them.

The Spanish régime, with all its faults, at least strengthened the small property owner. But the American régime has encroached upon the latifundia and eliminated the white population to enrich foreigners. This has meant the annihilation of the Cuban nationalists who fought the War of Independence.

The *Moskauer Rundschau*, German-language Communist weekly, comments in a similar vein:—

Cuba is not the only land in which the revolutionary movement has assumed enormous proportions; the economic crisis has descended with unusual force upon all one-crop countries. But Cuba's one-crop culture was the result of the deliberate policy of American capital. Central and South America are to a certain extent agrarian dependents of the United States. And Cuba is the centre of cane-sugar production.

American capitalists made huge profits from sugar cane. The most favorable climatic conditions and, even more important, cheap human labor assured high dividends. Under the influence of American capital the Cuban government has

been pursuing a policy aimed at assuring a maximum concentration of capital. The reverse side of this process has been the bankruptcy of the small producer. On account of European competition the Cuban sugar industry was forced to mechanize its production, and obviously the small landowner could not afford expensive machinery. He could not compete against large-scale industrial production and therefore he was ruined.

The world crisis of capitalism affected the Cuban industry in the most serious way. Those tenant farmers who were still producing went into bankruptcy. Work on the plantations was reduced to a minimum. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were thrown out of work. Production in the sugar factories also diminished, and Cuba became a land of unemployed. No wonder the all-devouring crisis increased the dissatisfaction of the masses and impelled them to occasional uprisings.

But the recent uprisings differ from earlier ones in that they were universal, and included the widest groups of workers and in many instances even the army, which made common cause with the rebels. In the earlier palace revolutions one general, supported by some of the officers, would generally overthrow the others in order to gain control of the state treasury. In the present revolution, however, it was not the generals but the workers and their political organizations who took the lead. The fact that the various bourgeois groups quickly agreed to throw out Machado and chose another man in his place indicates how serious the situation in the country really is. What has happened is that the various bourgeois groups have suddenly found themselves ready to compromise in order to form a united front against the workers. Hence the decision to send American warships to Cuba.

As is usual in such cases, intervention will be explained on formal grounds. The well-known formula that the United States uses in its treaty relations with its

virtual colonies in Central and South America will be trotted out again. This formula provides for active military support by the United States of any government that is not able to protect the life and property of American citizens. Thus the question of intervention depends on the discretion of the United States, since no criterion exists except a purely subjective American decision as to the ability of this or that government to protect the life and property of American citizens. But this formal aspect in no way alters the real picture. American capital invested in Cuba amounts to more than a billion and a half dollars. Cuba also lies on the route to the Panama Canal and therefore provides a natural fortification for this canal. These two considerations determine the military intervention of the United States.

The revolution in Cuba and its accompanying events, its international political aspect, so to speak, prove once again that the life and property of natives in no way deters an imperialist country from shedding blood as soon as its own invested capital is threatened. The Cuban revolution is an episode in the struggle of the oppressed for freedom from imperialist exploitation.

Writing in *Repertorio Americano*, Juan del Camino, a frequent contributor to that liberal Costa Rica weekly, warns against the Roosevelt policies:—

Machado has been the creature of the Yankee imperialist plutocracy, but he defied the State Department of the Administration of the second Roosevelt, when, his position having become scandalous, it asked him to resign. It seems as if there were a conflict of interests, but in reality there is none at all. The State Department is hostile to Machado simply because the public clamor against his brutal crimes rose to thunderous proportions.

Americans witnessed the work of bar-

barism in Cuba and returned to report in moving articles what had occurred before their anguished eyes, and for very shame the President who had just begun his term could not remain indifferent. It was through shame that Roosevelt withdrew Guggenheim from Cuba and placed his own representative in the Embassy, shame for the many crimes committed by a fiend who is the puppet of Yankee imperialism. It is only because of shame that Roosevelt is fighting Machado's policies. He wishes to replace him with a less bloody figure, and when the tyrant is removed continue the conquest of the island without disturbances that attract attention. Let us have no illusions about Roosevelt's attitude. It will be easy for the Cuban who has spent years fighting Machado and the State Department itself to put an end to Machado, but this same struggling Cuban will find it very difficult to put an end to the State Department's policy of conquest.

For none of the economic victories achieved by the Yankee plutocracy during the atrocious régime of Machado will be annulled by Roosevelt. The idea that Cuba is a factory which is held by the Electric Bond and Share Company and by the Chase National Bank and all the other pirate institutions that have fallen upon Cuba will stand firm. Machado has withdrawn only so that a government may be organized that will still be dominated by Machado's spirit, a spirit that will surrender soil and natural wealth and economic resources. Serfdom is perpetual under Yankee imperialism. The North Americans do not appropriate for limited periods of time. Their plans are vast, and when they win a vantage point they transform it into a fortress of imperialism.

The posturings of the second President Roosevelt do not inspire confidence. It would be childish to sing hymns of praise to him as the liberator of a nation. Cuba must be saved by the deeds of its own sons. They have done a tremendous thing

and they must not let their work be hindered by the power which believes that Cuba is merely a factory. The Cuban is visionary and the anguish that Machado's reign has caused him will not pass without enlightening him.

A BEAR ON THE DOLLAR

SHORTLY before the London Conference adjourned T. E. Gregory, Professor of Banking in the University of London, expressed bearish views on the future of the American dollar and the prospects of the New Deal. Since his prophecies usually disagree with those of Sir Arthur Salter, he deserves serious attention:—

My own strong feeling is that the U. S. A. has embarked upon an adventure the outcome of which is absolutely unpredictable. The President has given no indication of what he regards as the 'fair' level of internal prices; but will he ever be able to fix such a point? The inflationists in the U. S. A. have won two resounding victories: they have forced the Government to abandon gold and to imperil the future of the Conference in order that prices may go on rising. An enormous opposition to any immediate stabilization is being created under our eyes. Wall Street is allying itself to the farming interest—for what will happen if the dollar is stabilized? Surely a slump in the commodities market and in the 'Street' which no one is willing to face. In these circumstances I am inclined to be very 'bearish' on the future of the dollar, and not too optimistic about the outcome of the American experiment as a whole. I cannot refrain from adding that, in my judgment, the American experiment will verify what I have previously said in opposition to Sir Arthur Salter and others: that 'controlled reflation' is an impossibility—for either there will be no reflation, because there

is control, or there will be no control, because there is reflation. At any rate, the American experiment is affording economists the opportunity of witnessing an empirical test of some very popular economic theses.

AMERICAN PROSE THROUGH ENGLISH EYES

THE publication in England of Mark Van Doren's *Oxford Book of American Prose* brought forth a surprising review by Bonamy Dobrée in the London *Spectator*, a journal that customarily glories in every affinity that it can discover between the two English-speaking nations. To be sure, Mr. Dobrée praises the selections as 'readable, interesting, sometimes excellent and even exquisite,' but he does not feel that the book lives up to its title and suggests that it would better have been called *The Book of English Prose Written in America*. Here is the essence of his case:—

The fact is that Mr. Van Doren has stopped at the point where American prose becomes interesting as American prose, and not simply as prose, English prose. Unable to tell for certain along what line American prose will develop, he has evaded the critic's responsibility, which is to choose, and therefore foretell at whatever risk, and has carefully omitted anyone doing anything new, anything un-English, such as Miss Stein, Mr. Dos Passos, Mr. Hemingway, or Mr. Faulkner. There is nobody represented who was born in this century, nobody, that is, who is doing the sort of thing which shows that America, at last feeling itself as an economic power, and thus at last culturally free from England, has begun to be individual, to speak its own language and idiom, to talk in a way that corresponds with its own being. And since Mr. Van Doren has glided past this ad-

venture, he has not sought a line leading up to this development; he does not even give us O. Henry, who was in some sense a liberator. Indeed, finding himself uncomfortable with Mr. Dreiser, he omits his prose though he grants he is a great writer. But even admitting that Mr. Dreiser does not write good *English* prose, may he not have something significant in him as regards the American variety? And if Bret Harte does not fulfill the canons of the best English prose, is there not, perhaps, some American flavor about him? Mr. Van Doren does not give us a chance to judge.

Yet Mr. Van Doren has tried to find a distinctive quality in the prose that adorns his collection, so admirable from the English point of view, and this quality he says is speed. This, with all respect, one must flatly deny. It is true that he is probably unable to give an example that has the stately progression of Pater, or the intolerable dawdling of Matthew Arnold, at all events he does not; but there is no one in this book who has the swift pace of Thackeray or anything approaching the arrowy flight of Landor, or the rippling run of Wilde. No, Mr. Van Doren, that criterion will not do. Prescott is grand, but not swift; Emerson is abrupt, but not swift; Mr. Paul Elmer More is dignified, and William Crary Brownell is positively slow. Nothing is to be obtained from trying to isolate this quality.

It is true, of course, that many of these writers are unique, that we have nothing quite like them in England: Melville for instance. No one has written like Henry James, whose prose, by the way, is undoubtedly rapid, however long he may take to develop an idea. But it is doubtful if these have contributed anything to the development of prose in their country—if one may call America Henry James's country—any more than Doughty has to ours. In short, one may venture to think that American prose is only just beginning, and that Mr. Van Doren's selection stops precisely where it does begin.

OUR OWN BOOKSHELF

THE UNIVERSE OF LIGHT. By Sir William Bragg. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1933. \$3.50.

ONE of the most famous series of popular scientific lectures in the world is that given each Christmas season by the Royal Institution of Great Britain. The present volume is based upon the lectures delivered by Sir William Bragg in this series in 1931 and is, without question, one of the most authoritative and instructive accounts of our current physical knowledge available to the layman. The subject is light, its nature, forms, and behavior; its myriad effects and its relationship with the deeper problems of radiation, relativity, and the quantum theory. Chapters on the eye and vision help to explain the physiology of light phenomena; color and the spectroscope are fully discussed, enabling us to appreciate some of the intricacies of scientific method in its never-ending attempts to answer the question, 'How?' In addition, there is much valuable information on crystals, a field in which Sir William is preëminent and on which he has written several books. Readers who wish to keep abreast of current scientific activity would do well to obtain this volume.

ENQUIRIES INTO RELIGION AND CULTURE. By Christopher Dawson. New York and London: Sneed and Ward. 1933. \$3.00.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, lecturer in the history of culture at University College, Exeter, has risen rapidly since 1925 to a position of renown among present-day thinkers. He objects to the petty bourgeois parlor intellectuals who would repair the foundations of a social order by erecting a newer and heavier economic roof. He finds a plutocracy of wealth, possessing no definite social function, and a separate class of paid bureaucratic hirelings not to his liking. He scorns a naïve and rudimentary social science that seeks national salvation in the subordination of social organisms to economic machinery. 'In fact,' says he, 'Socialism and industrial capitalism both share the same fundamental economic fallacies and the same urbanist and mechanical ideals: both lead to the disintegration of the

social organism and to the destruction of its agrarian foundation.' On the other hand, regeneration by a reformation of political and social institutions that will bring them into line with the requirements of a new type of culture is not impossible; and if the Fascist ideal of order within the state eventually demands a similar principle of international order, then Fascism may be the regenerative influence that will follow the broken régime of *laissez-faire* and liberal imperialism.

NEWS SERVICE BULLETIN: SCHOOL EDITION. Volume II, 1930, 1931, 1932. Carnegie Institution of Washington, Division of Publications. 1933. \$2.50.

YEAR BOOK. No. 31, 1931-32. Carnegie Institution of Washington. 1933. Paper, \$1; cloth, \$1.50.

TAKEN together, these two handsome volumes constitute an impressive record of American scientific activity during the past three years. First organized in 1902, the Carnegie Institution has steadily increased its scope, until to-day its contributions to knowledge cover ten distinct fields in the biological and physical sciences. The elaborately illustrated and carefully written articles in the *News Service Bulletin* provide a storehouse of valuable information for both layman and student: accounts of expeditions to Mexico, to South America, and around the Pacific; journeys within the atom and to the furthest galaxies; bird migrations; heredity; problems of nutrition and metabolism; terrestrial magnetism and stellar temperatures—all these and many other subjects are touched upon and described by highly trained specialists. As an introduction to general science, and as a reference work to stimulate further curiosity and study on a score of different subjects, the *Bulletin* is one of the most admirable publications we have seen. The *Year Book*, more official in character, contains abstracts of the numerous research, field, and laboratory activities of the Institution's departments throughout the world. The growing interest in science should find in these and other publications of the Carnegie Institution encouragement of the finest kind.

WITH THE ADVISORY COUNCIL

EDWARD A. FILENE, long a member of the Advisory Council, returned from Europe this summer profoundly impressed by the growth of economic nationalism over there and profoundly convinced that the United States must move in the same direction.

'All European countries are headed for a régime of autarchy—that is, of economic isolation and intense nationalism, and America can do no better than to do likewise,' he declared.

Like John Maynard Keynes, Mr. Filene is an apostate free trader, but, unlike Mr. Keynes, he also used to believe in the gold standard. Now he says:—

'Under the present conditions, devaluation of the dollar and the adoption of a high protective tariff are temporarily necessary for the successful achievement of America's industrial and economic recovery.'

Finally, Mr. Filene's knowledge of international affairs has made him skeptical of internationalism—an opinion that many readers of *THE LIVING AGE* must also have arrived at.

'This,' he declared, 'is no time to hope for internationalism in trade, and for the moment there is no better policy for the United States to follow than to adopt the same principle of economic isolation as the other nations. When the cure has been effected it will be time to return to lower tariffs and the economic ideals of internationalism. Supernationalism can not be a permanent remedy, but it is now necessary as first aid to the injured.'

'I believe in intelligent selfishness. President Roosevelt's plan to raise wages throughout the United States will succeed because it is based on intelligent selfishness, for higher wages mean increased buying power and will greatly help all of us. What I have seen in Europe confirms me in the belief that he is the wisest and most courageous ruler in the world to-day.'

ONE MEMBER of our Advisory Council succeeded another when Dr. Harry Woodburn Chase became Chancellor of New York University in place of Dr. Elmer Ellsworth Brown. Dr. Chase believes that a university education is now becoming as much of a necessity as a high-school education was a generation ago. Industry is demanding that the young men and women who come to it should be more mature than ever before and that the university should offer a two-year course to fill the gap that a high-school training now leaves.

'It is only a new type of education that can fulfill the need I have spoken of,' he said. 'Its quality will not decrease, but its character will change. The social sciences will occupy a far greater place, and courses of a general nature, especially scientific courses, must be offered.'

'As a matter of fact, there has been for some time a strong tendency in the direction I have outlined. In 1930, 18 per cent of the youth of college age was in some institution beyond the high school, and that represents an increase of 600 per cent in thirty years. But the problem still is, to put it shortly, extending universal educational opportunities upward, to the age of eighteen or nineteen at least. They used to say that colleges existed to train a few leaders, but now with a million in the colleges one begins to wonder if there can be a million leaders. If you're training for leadership you want intensive cultivation for a small portion of the population, and you want to keep it small and intensive. That sort of education and the kind I envisage must exist side by side, and I am sure they can.'

DR. MORRIS FISHBEIN, editor of *The Journal of the American Medical Association* and a member of our Advisory Council, is the author of a new book, *Frontiers of Medicine*, published by Apple-

ton-Century. He declares that too many American doctors are specialists and that in spite of the discoveries they have made they raise the cost of medical care to the public. Here are some interesting figures he presents in this connection:—

'The Commission on Medical Education has shown that 85 per cent of the conditions for which patients consult a doctor can be satisfactorily diagnosed and treated by a competent general practitioner with the amount of equipment that he can carry in his handbag and with the facilities of his office and of the neighboring hospital.

'The Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association has shown that more than 100,000 of the licensed 145,000 physicians in the United States are directly associated with existing hospitals. Nevertheless, from 40 to 45 per cent of the physicians in the country limit themselves to various specialties, and a questionnaire circulated among medical students indicates that some 50 or 55 per cent have already chosen their specialties by the time they reach their senior year in medical college.'

THE IMPACT of science on daily living is a subject to which we are giving more and more attention in our pages, witness Julian Huxley's 'Age of Planned Power' in our July issue, Harold Ward's department 'The Sciences and Society,' which we inaugurated in August, J. L. Garvin's 'Oil from Coal' in our September issue, and Bassett Jones's 'Science and Economics' in this issue. At the same time we are also adding several distinguished scientists to our Advisory Council. One of these men, Orestes H. Caldwell, electrical engineer, radio expert, and president of the New York Electrical Society, recently described the wonders of the 'electric eye' in the *New York Times*. Here is the way he describes some of its revolutionary effects on the printing and publishing businesses:—

'A newspaper editor wants a half-tone

cut. His secretary can make the half-tone right in his office and have the finished cut back on his desk before the editor has had time to write the corresponding caption, saving several hours of time and the 179 manual processes required in present half-tone making. Beautiful three-colored plates are now made in half an hour instead of three days; and the cost of such photo-electric engravings is one-twentieth of that by the old-fashioned acid process.

'Electric eyes now match colors of paper and inks far more accurately than any human eye could do. They count logs entering paper mills; they control the thickness of paper being produced. They detect breaks in the great rolls of paper going through huge printing presses and instantly stop the machines, saving tremendous damage and expense.'

Mr. Caldwell prophesies further improvements in television and suggests the possibility of converting sunshine directly into electricity.

DURING the past month the following new members have been added to our Advisory Council: Henry S. Canby, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*; Samuel P. Capen, chancellor of the University of Buffalo; William J. Cooper, United States Commissioner of Education from 1929 to 1933; Sir Alfred T. Davies, lawyer, author, and former Secretary of Education for Wales; Clyde Eagleton, professor of government at New York University; Charles N. Edge, economist, mathematician, author, and head of his own Stock Exchange house in New York; Nicholas Kenney, New York lawyer and financier; B. J. Mullaney, public-utilities executive of Chicago; James Harvey Rogers, professor of economics at Yale University; Bishop William Scarlett of St. Louis; A. Wellington Taylor, dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration of New York University; Jean Tillier, New York corporation executive; and Julia W. Wheelock, director of the Liberty Legion, New York.

THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

that spread like wildfire during the Revolution and the Civil War, and he was also highly esteemed in academic circles. His article on how he went about his work introduces to the English-speaking public a writer who possessed unusual talent, intelligence, personality, and integrity. Maiakowski used to be an anarchist in his salad days, and even at the end of his career he retained some of the eccentricities generally associated with bourgeois Bohemians.

JAMES F. MUIRHEAD'S essay on Henry George possesses two timely attributes. Those who heard or read Bernard Shaw's speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York last spring may recall his tribute to the originator of the Single Tax theory: 'Henry George set me on the economic trail; the trail of political science.' Also there has just been published a large and important study entitled 'The Philosophy of Henry George' by Professor George R. Geiger, with an introduction by John Dewey. Mr. Muirhead is a Scotsman who knows America intimately, having prepared Baedeker's United States and written a book of his own on America.

IF MAIAKOVSKI gives us the philosophy behind Communist poetry, W. H. Auden gives us the real article. Although a protégé of the Anglo-Catholic royalist, T. S. Eliot, and a recent graduate of Oxford, Mr. Auden is a Communist with a considerable following among his own generation. His work marks a sharp break away from Britain's post-war literature of cynicism, futility, defeat, and escape.

THE Paris topical weekly, *Vu*, sent a group of journalists to Rome last August

to report on Fascism and devoted an entire issue to their findings. Each member of the party covered several subjects, and Edmond Wellhoff devoted himself chiefly to the Vatican. His essay on the Pope reveals a man of exceptional parts and of unimpeachable piety.

THE article by Vitalbhai Patel was actually an interview that he gave to a representative of the *Prager Tagblatt*. The following introductory note from that journal is therefore in order: 'One of our editors visited Vitalbhai Patel, former president of the Indian National Congress, while he was taking the cure at Franzensbad, and heard from the lips of one of the leading men in Indian public life the opinions of the Indian National movement toward the political problems that are agitating both England and India.'

AS ONE of the first American magazines to call attention to the importance of John Strachey's *The Coming Struggle for Power*, we are also devoting considerable space to his new and much shorter book, *The Menace of Fascism*. We have referred from time to time in our editorial comments to the probability that a Fascist movement will develop in England, and the attention that Mr. Strachey received in the press of his native country indicates that he has hit upon a live issue. Sir Norman Angell's review in our 'Books Abroad' department brings Mr. Strachey up short here and there, and we should therefore like to append our own opinion here that the mass popularity that has been worked up for Roosevelt's New Deal is going to force the British Cabinet to attempt some similar movement of its own, but with a much more definitely Fascist character. We therefore call special attention to *The Menace of Fascism* as a sign of the times.

WAR AND PEACE

THE real friends of peace in England to-day are those who have the courage to say that they are prepared to run the risk of burning their feet in stamping on the flames, whenever and wherever they appear. This is a truth repugnant to every Englishman. The one thing we want is to be left alone, and not to be called upon to intervene, diplomatically or otherwise, in the affairs of Europe. But, like France, we also want peace.—*Brigadier General E. L. Spears of Great Britain.*

Anyone who really and sincerely desires the victory of the pacifist idea must strive by every means after the conquest of the world by the Germans.—*Adolf Hitler.*

Clemenceau once declared, 'I make war.' I may say that to the best of my ability I make peace.—*Édouard Herriot, former French Premier.*

In America thousands of pounds are being poured into research and experiment in speed-boat design. My late rival, Commodore Gar Wood, now holder of the world's water speed record, has a marvelous organization of brains and money at his back. The whole organization is a cohesive unit, working for one object—America's supremacy on the sea. Their navy is already larger in tonnage than ours. Think of it, the British navy—second class! It is enough to make Nelson turn in his grave.—*Kaye Don, British speed-boat champion.*

Our policy is to maintain a navy strong enough to make it impossible for another navy to gain supremacy in the Western Pacific except at a cost in losses that would destroy its position as a naval power.

According to the principles of racial equality and equal opportunity we might use force against those who exclude our emigrants or raise tariffs against our goods but that would violate the spirit of the anti-war pact. We could break down those difficulties with our strong navy if we wanted to, but Japan will never use her naval power unless someone dares disturb the peace of the Far East.—*From 'Nichi Nichi,' Tokyo Independent Daily.*

The good-will of one's neighbors is the greatest security. One delegate after another emphasized that truth. In other words, the supreme need for the world to-day is the fruit of the spirit—love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. We need it in our homes, in our communities, in the nation, in the world.—*Dr. Mary E. Woolley, president of Mount Holyoke College and delegate to the Disarmament Conference.*

Christ could not have been a Jew. Scientific proof is not necessary. It is so.—*Josef Goebbels.*

Germany has this great advantage over the other military powers—it has no out-of-date war material. This is especially the case with air armaments.

There is not a single chemical factory in Germany that could not be transformed into a gas factory within six weeks. Since 1930 in all the explosives factories of Germany there has been an enormous increase in the capacity of production. Within a maximum delay of three months enough gas and explosives for war could be easily produced.—*'Dernières Nouvelles,' Strasbourg Republican Daily.*

All technicians agree in recognizing that the next war will be chemical. The last war amply demonstrated this and, since then, the possibilities of poison gas have been considerably enlarged, both in quantity and quality. Henceforth the chemist will have his place in modern warfare: with the aviator, he is one of war's vital nerves, and this against his will.

Chemists, they are seeking to make us responsible for the horrors of the next war. It is for us to accept or to refuse this rôle.

What ought to be our position? To remain neutral is to accept. We are faced with a situation to be decided only by our individual conscience. What shall we do? A 'prohibition of chemical warfare' is as futile as a prohibition of chemistry itself.

But we can set before the world a knowledge of the brutal and inevitable fate that attends it, and thus shift the responsibility for events where it more rightly belongs.—*Appeal from a group of French chemical engineers.*